How & Why The UK, U.S., And Canada Governments Imported Nazis Into Canada

With the help of the US and the UK, Canada deliberately brought in Nazi criminals to tantle political radicalism and tame labor militancy.

On 25 July 1945, the new U.S. President Harry Truman decided to accept the advice from British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and especially from Truman’s personal hero, General Dwight Eisenhower, that if the U.S. Government would not ultimately take over (create the world’s first global empire to include) the entire world, then the Soviet Union would do it; and, so, Truman reversed the foreign policies of his immediate predecessor Franklin Delano Roosevelt, who had instead been planning, ever since August 1941 (even before Pearl Harbor), that if Hitler would become defeated, then a new democratic global federal democracy amongst nations must be created, a global federal republic of nations, which FDR named “the United Nations” (but which Truman ended up shaping). On that date, 25 July 1945, Truman told the Soviet Union’s leader Joseph Stalin that the U.S. Government would not recognize the legitimacy of its control over the countries that it had conquered from Hitler unless the U.S. Government is granted veto-power over the Soviet Union’s decisions regarding those Governments (both their internal and external affairs); and, in Truman’s letter that night to his wife, Bess, he even gloated over it, by saying:

Russia and Poland have gobbled up a big hunk of Germany and want Britain and us to agree. I have flatly refused. We have unalterably opposed the recognition of police governments in the Germany Axis countries. I told Stalin that until we had free access to those countries and our nationals had their property rights restored, so far as we were concerned there’d never be recognition. He seems to like it when I hit him with a hammer.

Suddenly,  the amicable relationship between the U.S. and U.S.S.R., which had prevailed throughout FDR’s three terms in office, and which had won WW2 for the Allies, and which FDR had been planning to continue afterward, ended in a crash of mutual hostility, because Stalin couldn’t accept Truman’s demand, any more than Truman would have accepted a similar demand from Stalin about the nations that America and its colonies such as the UK had conquered in Europe. Stalin (like FDR would have done if he had survived) made no such demand upon Truman or anyone else, and from that date forward Stalin recognized that unless he could change Truman’s mind on this (which never happened), the U.S. Government would be at war against the Soviet Government. It turned out to be (on the American side at least) a war not actually between capitalism versus communism (as Truman propagandized it to be) but instead between the U.S. against the entire world — to take all of it — as was made clear when U.S. President GHW Bush started, on 24 February 1990, secretly instructing his stooge leaders, such as Helmut Kohl and Francois Mitterrand, that their war against the soon-no-longer-communist Russia would secretly continue until it too becomes a part of the U.S. empire.

The current war inside Ukraine started with U.S. President Barack Obama’s coup there in 2014 but had been in preparation ever since the Truman Administration; and here is how that happened, as recounted, first, by the CIA’s historian, and then by a Canadian historian about his own country:




“Cold War Allies: The Origins of CIA’s Relationship with Ukrainian Nationalists” (S) [by] Kevin C [Conley] Ruffrer

In April 1945, Adolf Hitler’s Thousand Year Reich faced imminent and catastrophic military defeat. From the west, Allied troops poured into Germany after securing a bridgehead over the Rhine at Remagen. From the east, the Red Army advanced toward Berlin. (U)

Millions of refugees fled before the advancing armies — especially in the east. Germans, Ukrainians, Poles, Balts, Hungarians, Rumanians, and countless others became displaced persons or DPs in military jargon. By the end of the war in May 1945, 13 million DPs were in the American-occupied zone of Germany alone: Allied occupation authorities organized the DPs into camps until they could he repatriated. Many, however, refused to return to their homes in countries the Red Army then controlled. (u) Contact with ethnic groups from the Soviet Union gave American intelligence officials the first direct knowledge of dissent within the USSR. Initially the United States recruited espionage agents from among the emigre groups, but soon expanded its effort to include recruitment In potential covert action and paramilitary operations. Recent wartime experience with resistance groups behind German lines heavily influenced American thinking about the emigres. Americans hoped that if war with the USSR broke out, Eastern and Southern Europeans would become resistance fighters like the French maquis. (II)  As relations between the United States and the Soviet Union deteriorated, the Central Intelligence Agency expanded its ties with these emigres. Using the Ukrainians as an example, this bonding illustrates the pitfalls and problems of enlisting disaffected ethnic minorities in an ideological struggle. (U) …


Stefan Bandera was not a member of R-33, but was another personality — perhaps the personality of the Ukrainian emigre community — that had to be recognized. According to an OSS report of September 1945, Bandera had earned a fierce reputation for conducting a [pro-Nazi] “reign of terror” during World War II. He led the largest faction of OUN (which split when the war broke out), and Andrey Melnik led the smaller. Both factions participated in terrorist activities against Polish officials [and Jews, and communists, and liberals] before the war, and Ukrainian nationalists allied themselves with their Nazi “liberators” during the first days of Operation Barbarossa in 1941.


The Soviets wanted Stefan [for his demanding that the Nazis grant independence to Ukraine]. American intelligence officials recognized that his arrest would have quick and adverse effects on the future of US operations with the Ukrainians.


In December 1947 the National Security Council issued NSC 4-A, which had important consequences for CIA in general and the emigre programs in particular. NSC 4-A gave the DC1 responsibility for conducting covert psychological operations. This meant that CIA could now take the offensive in ways not possible previously. (u)

Before NSC 4-A the Central Intelligence Group tried unsuccessfully to use emigres to collect intelligence. With the NSC’s directive, the newly formed Central Intelligence Agency could move toward active cooperation with them in other areas of activity. The change resulted in part from CIA’s first attempts to penetrate the Iron Curtain and linked the fate of the Ukrainians (and other Eastern European emigre groups) with the CIA’s efforts. (C)

DCI Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter initially opposed the employment of emigre groups despite the pressure from other federal agencies, including the State Department and the Army. In early March 1948, Frank Wisner, a former OSS officer and a member of the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff, proposed that the State-Army-Navy-Air Force

Coordinating Committee (SANACC) form an ad hoc committee to explore the use of Soviet exiles. Under the authority of NSC 4-A, SANACC took up Wisner’s proposal and circulated his paper, “Utilization of Refugees from the Soviet Union in U.S. National Interest,” as SANACC 395 on 17 March 1948. Shortly afterwards, SANACC’s ad hoc committee, comprising members from State, Army, CIA, and other agencies, began considering the paper and its recommendations.’ (U)

Wisner proposed in SANACC 395 to “increase defections among the elite of the Soviet World and to utilize refugees from the Soviet World in the national interests of the U.S.”


CIA’s reluctance to use East European and Soviet ethnic minorities as intelligence sources and operatives had waned considerably as the 1940s grew to a close. NSC 4A was one reason: another was the growing fear in Washington that World War III was imminent Although initial attempts to use emigres as sources of foreign intelligence failed. NSC 4A made it clear that CIA could use — and the NSC expected CIA to use — emigres as agents for covert psychological warfare behind the Iron Curtain. CIA reestablished and expanded its contacts with the Ukrainians and others fin- covert action against the Communists and as wartime assets to be used behind Red Army lines as guerrillas, saboteurs, and resistance leaders. CIA continued to cling to these groups long after their immediate utility expired out of the mistaken belief that they were a valuable wartime reserve. (s)

The sometimes brutal war record of many emigre groups became blurred as they became more critical to the CIA. … Hillenkoetter did not deny that many emigres had sided with the Nazis, but did so, he said, less out of “a pro-German or pro-Fascist orientation, but from a strong anti-Soviet bias. In many cases their motivation was primarily nationalistic and patriotic with their espousal of the German cause determined by the national interests.”41 (S)

CIA later informed the Immigration and Naturalization Service that it had concealed Stefan Bandera and other Ukrainians from the Soviets. “Luckily the [Soviet] attempt to locate these anti-Soviet Ukrainians was sabotaged by a few farsighted Americans who warned the persons concerned to go into hiding.” The Agency cited the Ukrainian resistance movement’s struggle against the Soviets and believed that “the main activities of the OUN in Ukraine cannot be considered detrimental to the United States.” By 1951, the Agency excused the illegal activities of OUN’s security branch in the name of Cold War necessity.” (C)


CIA’s experience with Ukrainian emigres in the late 1940s illustrates the uncertainties of the Cold War. On the one hand. the Agency was reluctant to utilize these groups because of their own ideological coals and ensuing internal divisiveness. On the other hand. CIA was rightly concerned about Soviet ambitions in western Europe and the Agency expected the imminent outbreak of war. The Ukrainians, despite their  disadvantages. offered a tool to combat Soviet expansionism. (U)



That CIA account about “emigres” was actually about only pro-Nazi ones, because, as the following makes clear, the U.S., and British, and Canadian, Governments, were working ONLY with those, and actually suppressed the anti-Nazi ones (so, the following shows false the CIA’s pretense to have been backing “emigres” instead of “Nazi emigres” — such as Ruffrer’s allegation that the pro-Nazi “Stefan Bandera was not a member of R-33, but was another personality — perhaps the personality of the Ukrainian emigre community — that had to be recognized”):



“To Crush Left-Wing Organizing, Canada Embraced Ukrainian Nazi Collaborators”

21 December 2023, BY WILLIAM GILLIES

In September, Canada’s parliament ignited controversy when it celebrated Yaroslav Hunka, a ninety-eight-year-old World War II Nazi collaborator. The incident has brought renewed focus to the issue of war criminals who immigrated to the country after 1945. The primary source of outrage has rightly centered on how someone like Hunka, who voluntarily served in the 14th Waffen Grenadier Division of the SS (1st Galician), gained entry into Canada, and why the government never deported or prosecuted suspected war criminals. Even a desultory 1980s investigation into the matter of Nazi immigrants is still mostly sealed from the public, despite identifying dozens of suspected war criminals living freely in Canada — most of whom are now likely all dead.

However, media coverage has largely failed to engage with the question of why Canada let people like Hunka immigrate, resulting in the current political controversy lacking essential historical context. There have been some exceptions, such as pieces in these pages that have pointed out that there is a troubling history that Canada must reckon with, and correctly suggested that this immigration of war criminals was tied to anti-communism. It is important to delve further into this history, as it reveals a deliberate effort by the Canadian state to dismantle political radicalism and tame labor militancy in the postwar period.

Immigrants like Hunka were granted entry specifically because their collaborationist pasts made them useful in crushing left-wing organizing in Ukrainian Canadian communities. Collaborators assumed control of community organizations, some of which were transferred to them by the federal government, having seized them from socialist groups during the war. The process was often quite violent, with mob violence intimidating leftists, fascists serving as strikebreakers in mining towns, and a Ukrainian labor temple being attacked with a bomb during a concert. All of these actions were condoned by the Canadian state in the name of anti-communism.

Ukrainian Labor Temples and “Hall Socialism”

Contrary to the present existence of Ukrainian Nazi collaborator monuments in Canada, there was once a robust Ukrainian Canadian left. Organized around the Ukrainian Labour Farmer Temple Association (ULFTA), it played a pivotal role in various chapters of Canadian labor history, often adopting radical stances. The ULFTA operated hundreds of “labor temples” across the country that nurtured a political movement often called “hall socialism.” Labor temples hosted political rallies, contained lending libraries, published newspapers, supported Ukrainian immigrants, sponsored cultural activities, and provided a venue for collective socialization. In Winnipeg, Manitoba, the finest still-existing labor temple was completed in 1919, just in time to serve as the headquarters of the city’s general strike that same year.

Between the world wars, the Canadian government feared Ukrainian Canadian radicalism and its connections to communist agitation. Ukrainians were enormously overrepresented in the Communist Party of Canada, which even had a Ukrainian language section. The ULFTA was formally affiliated with the party and helped organize Winnipeg’s large Ukrainian Canadian working class to elect communists like Bill Kardash from the 1930s to the 1950s. In contrast, Ukrainian nationalists in Canada were marginal. They expressed admiration for Hitler and denounced communist politicians as the triumph of the “Bolshevik-Jewish clique.” In 1934, they published a Ukrainian edition of The Protocols of the Elders of Zion. …

[After WW2]

In 1945, the surrendered 14th SS Division was held at a POW camp in Rimini, Italy, while the Western Allies decided what to do with them. The Soviets wanted them repatriated to face consequences for collaboration, but the onset of the Cold War altered the political landscape. Former enemy collaborators, such as Ukrainians who had served in the 14th SS Division, were reconsidered [by the Governments in U.S., UK, and Canada] as potential allies against Soviet communism.

By June 1947, displaced persons registered as ethnic Ukrainian totaled 106,549. Initially, the Canadian government showed limited interest in admitting more Ukrainians, reflecting a long-standing bias against non-Western European immigrants. Furthermore, Canadian law prohibited the acceptance of former combatants who had voluntarily served in the German armed forces. However, much of the screening was conducted by British major Denis Hills, a self-described fascist who instructed collaborators on how to avoid investigation. The British exonerated the Galicia Division and transferred many of them to Britain to fill labor shortages in agriculture.

The UCC lobbied the Canadian government to accept Ukrainian displaced persons and emphasized their anti-communist potential. Against the backdrop of a booming labor market in Canada, these Ukrainians were portrayed as disciplined workers opposed to any sort of union radicalism. They were positively characterized as capable of filling vacancies in mining and forestry, where they could break up left-wing Ukrainian Canadian organizations.

Starting in 1947, this lobbying began to yield results, especially as the British government pressured Canada to accept them. In 1950, the immigration ban on Ukrainians who served in the SS was lifted, thanks to UCC advocacy that claimed they were simply soldiers who had fought against communism.

Many Ukrainian Canadians and Jewish groups opposed the admission of Nazi collaborators. The Association of United Ukrainian Canadians (AUUC), created in 1946 as the successor to the ULFTA, lobbied against the move. While supporting the immigration of Ukrainian refugees to Canada, they argued for thorough screening of their wartime activities. They were largely ignored.

By January 1952, official figures indicated that twenty-six thousand Ukrainian displaced persons had been accepted. However, later historical research suggests that official figures undercounted, and that the actual number could have been as high as fifty thousand, with half originating from western Ukraine, the heartland of the nationalist movement. Approximately 3 percent were veterans of the 14th SS Division, about 1,500 people, although some sources cite figures as high as two thousand. Additionally, there were other nationalists who collaborated in less formal ways than joining the SS, but were still active participants in the Holocaust.

Canada’s admittance of Ukrainian collaborators after 1945 was not a failure to properly screen immigrants, but an intentional policy decision. Canada did not care what many of these people were accused of doing in eastern Europe. The primary consideration was their usefulness in domestic anti-communism.

Expunging the Reds

On October 8, 1950, a bomb went off during a concert at the Central Ukrainian Labor Temple on Bathurst Street in Toronto. Eleven people were injured, and the explosion leveled part of the building. Authorities offered a $1,500 reward for information, but no one was ever caught. The long-standing suspicion is that Ukrainian nationalists were responsible, as this attack aligned with a pattern of violence directed against the Ukrainian Canadian left during the 1950s. Ukrainian labor temples and the broader labor movement were central to the postwar struggle between Ukrainian fascist emigres and the Ukrainian Canadian Left.

Soon after arriving in Canada in the late 1940s, Ukrainian nationalist immigrants organized to target labor temples and disrupt meetings. In December 1948 in Val-d’or, Quebec, a group of them attacked a temple hosting a speaker discussing the Soviet Union. Armed with sticks, stones, and bottles they invaded the event to attack the speaker but were repulsed and thrown out. Unable to kidnap the speaker, they split up into smaller groups to stake out the homes of suspected communists.

In the immediate postwar years, it became clear that an independent Ukraine was unlikely. Consequently, attacking leftists in the Ukrainian Canadian community became a sort of consolation prize. The Canadian state was to some extent pleased with this change of focus by the nationalists, and tacitly approved of such attacks.

Official anti-communist sentiment was coupled with the need for more workers in Canada’s booming postwar economy. Ukrainian displaced persons, as a condition for immigration, often entered into work contracts binding them to an employer, typically in resource extraction towns in the north of Ontario or Quebec. Mining company agents visited refugee camps in Europe, screening prospective employees for anti-communist beliefs, and then recruited them to relocate to Canada. They often arrived in places that had a preexisting Ukrainian Canadian left.

Initially the AUUC tried to organize the new immigrants, but this was ineffective. In December 1947, several dozen Ukrainian displaced persons took a train to Timmins, Ontario, to start work in a gold mine. Stopping in North Bay, Ontario (where Hunka currently resides), they were greeted by communist organizers at the station who sought to explain the importance of unionization. In response, the organizers were severely beaten and thrown off the train — an event celebrated by the local press.

As the work contracts for the first wave of nationalist emigres expired, they moved into urban areas, leading to an escalation in attacks on the AUUC. Simultaneously, a fresh wave of Ukrainian displaced persons were admitted into Canada in the early 1950s after the removal of the ban on the immigration of collaborators. In Winnipeg, Toronto, and Edmonton, nationalists would attend labor temple events with the intention of disrupting and attacking. This ranged from heckling to shut down a speaker to physical assaults on attendees and organizers, property vandalism, and even following attendees home.

Police investigations into the attacks were largely lackluster, often attributing blame to the AUUC for somehow instigating them. In Dec 1949, a crowd of two hundred nationalists surrounded a labor temple event in Timmins, Ontario. They were denied entry, but refused to leave, shouting and banging on the door. When the police arrived, they concluded that nothing criminal had occurred, and then drove off. Emboldened, the nationalists broke inside and started beating men, women, and children, sending several people to hospital in serious condition. The local police returned but simply stood and watched. Eventually, one nationalist was charged with assault, but the prosecution and the defense colluded to acquit him.

The October 1950 bombing of a Toronto labor temple brought broader public attention to the conflict within the Ukrainian Canadian community. The AUUC accused Galicia Division veterans of the attack and blamed the Canadian government for failing to screen them during immigration. The RCMP investigation into the bombing swiftly eliminated nationalists as suspects, even when lacking alibis and possessing obvious motive. Law enforcement also entertained nationalist claims that the bombing was a false-flag operation carried out by the communists to garner public sympathy.

The investigation failed to pursue many significant leads, and by early 1951, the case was closed without ever identifying a potential suspect. Instead, the RCMP invested its effort into creating lists of anyone who wrote to the government about the bombing and conducted surveillance on victims of the attack. While it is likely that the bombing was perpetrated by Ukrainian nationalists, the intentionally poor investigation by the RCMP renders it impossible to establish with certainty.

Following the bombing, overt violence against Ukrainian Canadian leftists declined by the mid-1950s. This decline was, in large part, due to its effectiveness in intimidating AUUC supporters from attending events and organizing. Additionally, the far-right nationalists had become increasingly integrated into mainstream Ukrainian Canadian organizations by this point, affording them the legal means to expunge the reds in the community. This alignment with the broader Red Scare, which squashed left radicalism in Canada, further contributed to the decline of the AUUC.

In 1945 the AUUC welcomed 2,579 new members, but by 1969 that figure dwindled to eighty-four annually. The number of temples collapsed to forty-three by 1973. By the late 1960s, both the membership and leadership was aging, while young recruits were scarce.

Enduring Historical Revisionism

By the 1970s the nationalists had established domination over the Ukrainian Canadian experience. This framework excluded diverse points of view, such as labor radicalism, and replaced it with a monolithic identity built on a conservative nationalism. This era coincided with the fashioning of Canada’s official multiculturalism, in which both the federal and provincial governments aimed to celebrate diverse ethnic communities.

Under the fig leaf of celebrating ethnic heritage, statues of Ukrainian Nazi collaborators, such as Roman Shukhevych in Edmonton, began to be erected at this time, often with government money. Having extensively researched postwar violence in the Ukrainian Canadian community, the historian Kassandra Luciuk argues that this was a deliberate project of the Canadian state, intended to marginalize leftists. It left no room for other ideas of “Ukrainianness” other than one tightly wound with anti-communist nationalism.

The presence of Nazi monuments in Canada is symptomatic of this hegemony, visibly illustrating the historical revisionism the Ukrainian nationalists have successfully imposed. These monuments not only celebrate individuals and organizations that took part in war crimes during World War II, but also represent a triumph over left-wing opposition in the Ukrainian Canadian community. This historical revisionism has become so prevalent that even a mainstream politician, such as federal finance minister Chrystia Freeland, regularly extols her Ukrainian grandfather, who happened to run a Nazi collaborationist newspaper recruiting for the 14th SS Division — the same division that Hunka joined.

This revisionism owes its existence to the Canadian state, which used the many tools at its disposal — from the immigration system to the police — to ensure an outcome that has persisted well after its anti-communist purpose faded. Ukrainian Canadian nationalists of course have been active in constructing this revisionism, but they flatter themselves if they believe they could have accomplished it alone.

Understanding the political context of the Hunka affair requires delving into this chapter of Canadian history. It sheds light on how a small minority of far-right immigrants, with state backing, gained substantial influence in Ukrainian Canadian communities, and shaped Canadian policy toward Ukraine. Hunka’s celebration was not a result of historical ignorance, but rather stemmed from active historical revisionism that has sought to recast collaborators as heroes and render invisible Ukrainian Canadian socialist movements.



And this is how it came to be that the pro-Nazi Ukrainians in Canada have been organized and effectively represented while the others (the non-Nazi Ukrainians) were suppressed; and, above all, how it came to be the case that America’s armaments-manufacturers and their NATO have thrived while coup-after-coup and invasion-after-invasion have continued to expand the U.S. empire up till the present moment.

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