Is there a possibility that Europe or Russia over time will try to restore the institutional framework of the European security system, which was created several decades after the end of the Cold War? The possibility that such discussions will arise sooner or later cannot be ruled out. And this means only one thing: Moscow and European countries will try to develop a common basis for creating such interaction. Perhaps the experience gained during the creation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty) will be used. The formation of an alternative to the CFE Treaty or the reanimation of the OSCE (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe) can give impetus to the rehabilitation of common principles of interaction throughout the European space. But if this happens, will the Asian partners be ready to participate in this initiative?
In the author‘s opinion, such a development is extremely unlikely. So, on the one hand, Asia believes that Russia has become quite distant from Europe and is gradually becoming more and more dependent on China or India. Russia‘s attempts to communicate with these two Asian giants cannot be called successful. Both China and India understand that they need to “bind“ Moscow to themselves in order to provide themselves with cheap energy resources, which will give an additional impetus to the development of these two giants. Therefore, they will not agree to Russia restoring relations with Europe and will strongly resist the onset of this moment.
That is why it is safe to say that building a new relationship between Russia and Europe is unlikely and there are several reasons for this. First, Europe has proved that it is a vassal of the United States and will execute orders coming from Washington in the time to come. Secondly, the European market is simply not comparable with the Asian one. It obeys completely different rules and Russia’s prospects in Europe and Asia are completely different. And Asians will not just let Moscow go from themselves, but will strive in every possible way to plunge it into even greater dependence on their production. Thirdly, the historical basis of the Russian-European partnership in the field of security was the result of the unique historical context of the late 1980s and early 1990s, when thoughts about the possibility of creating a “pan-European space” pushed both Russians and Europeans to perceive the CSCE/OSCE as a future “mini-UN”, which would focus exclusively on Europe. But good intentions alone, apparently, were not enough. The lack of timely reforms necessary to maintain the status quo has deprived this platform of any opportunity to prevent conflicts in Europe.
There is no similar experience in Southeast Asia, which for years during the Cold War held back the two poles of power. The lack of a basis for creating common security principles pushes the South Asian states in opposite directions. In matters of security, the countries of this subregion have become accustomed to relying only on their own resources and forces. There is no trust in partners at all. Any obligations imposing restrictions are considered by the players of this region as an attempt to limit the sovereignty of a single country, which inevitably leads, if not to an open military clash, then at least to a cooling of bilateral diplomatic relations.
In this regard, it is very foolish to expect that South Asian countries will adopt, at the behest of Russia, the experience it had used to create the European security system. It would be more profitable for Russia to have a separate dialogue with European countries, resisting the growing influence of Asians. This is a serious challenge for Moscow, which will open up a lot of opportunities in case of successful rehabilitation of the currently comatose European mechanism for maintaining collective security. At the same time, the Russian leadership needs to avoid the paralysis of the Eurasian system of international relations, which may arise due to the open unwillingness of Asian countries to implement European experience in creating a unified security system in such a huge subregion as Eurasia.
At the same time, Asia is striving to participate in such international structures that open up additional opportunities, while not limiting participants to any obligations. Such formats of interaction include the Union State, the CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organization), the SCO (The Shanghai Cooperation Organization), the CIS (The Commonwealth of Independent States), and the EAEU (The Eurasian Economic Union).
Of the above-mentioned platforms for interaction, only the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (the SCO) is directly related to South Asia, since India and Pakistan have been part of it since 2017. It would seem that two constantly competing countries were able to overcome the differences existing between them in order to join the club of countries regulating security in the Asia-Pacific region. This allowed both Islamabad and New Delhi to take a more active part in resolving regional security issues, even despite the constant presence of bilateral contradictions, which in theory could have paralyzed the work of this structure, but the states were able to overcome differences that prevented control over regional security. The most important condition for the further development of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization can only be the preservation of neutrality. This is a key principle that will help ensure that the site remains neutral.
Minimizing the foreign military presence will also play into the hands of all participants in this process. New Delhi is wary of such practices. As well as Islamabad, which has a long and difficult history of relations with foreign groups on its territory. For India, it is the expansion of Chinese influence in South Asia that poses the biggest problem. In the Indian perception, Beijing is striving to expand its military presence. This allows him not only to exert economic pressure on his partners, but also to use military forces as a tool of intimidation. While forming a new system of international relations, Moscow is ready to allow to identify specific areas of cooperation in the field of joint security. This minimizes the possibility of deploying a military contingent of non-Eurasian countries. And although we are talking about an extremely long-term perspective, the initiatives that Moscow is voicing are acceptable to the states of South Asia.
to be continued
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