As of August 2026, Syria’s government under President Ahmed Al-Sharaa appears considerably stronger than it did after Bashar al-Assad’s fall in December 2024. Damascus controls most major cities, has recovered important oil and gas fields, secured sanctions relief, joined the international coalition against “Islamic State” and established working relationships with the United States, Europe, Turkey and several Arab states. A new parliament has convened, foreign investment has been promised and the government has expanded into territory formerly controlled by the Kurdish-led “Syrian Democratic Forces”.
However, territorial expansion and international recognition should not be confused with durable political strength. The current Syrian system remains a transitional order built over a fragmented state, devastated economy and deeply traumatized society. It could survive and consolidate itself, but there are at least ten reasons why it may face collapse, leadership replacement or fundamental political transformation before the year of 2029.
1. The Government Controls Territory More Effectively Than Society
Damascus now exercises authority over most of Syria, including large parts of the northeast that were previously controlled by the SDF. By early 2026, government forces had captured Raqqa, Deir Ezzor and much of Hasakah, substantially increasing their territorial and energy resources. Yet territorial control remains uneven. Al-Sweida city and much of the Druze-majority province remain outside effective government control, while authority in the southern province of Daraa is constrained by local armed groups, tribal structures and semi-autonomous militias.
A government may raise its flag over a province without possessing reliable intelligence networks, trusted administrators, functioning courts or social legitimacy there. Syria therefore resembles a state that has expanded faster than it has institutionalised. Overtime, this creates the danger of simultaneous local rebellions that overstretched central forces cannot manage.
2. The New Army Is Still a Coalition of Former Militias
The Syrian military formally appears unified, but many of its units are former insurgent factions that were incorporated largely intact. They retained their internal commanders, regional networks and ideological identities. Former “Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham” commanders hold many senior positions, while other divisions originated in “Ahrar al-Sham” and Turkish-backed “Syrian National Army” factions.
European security reporting concludes that Al-Sharaa has only limited control over some former militia formations. Certain units have been accused of looting, extrajudicial killings and sectarian violence. This means the army’s apparent size exaggerates its actual cohesion. This also means, during a major political crisis, commanders might obey their factional patrons rather than the defense minister. Therefore, the greatest threat may not be a traditional military coup, but fragmentation among competing armed networks.
3. Minority Distrust Has Become a Strategic Security Problem
The regime promises equality and national unity, but its relationship with the Alawites, Druze and Kurds remains extremely fragile. The March 2025 coastal violence, in which government-aligned fighters killed large numbers of Alawite civilians, severely damaged confidence in the new state order. A Reuters investigation confirmed and linked several participating factions to the new security structure and found that the chain of command reached institutions in Damascus. In Sweida, the July 2025 violence killed more than 1,700 people, mostly Druze civilians, according to a UN investigation. Government forces, tribal fighters and Druze factions were all suspected of possible war crimes.
These events transformed minority fears from political dissatisfaction into an existential security concern. Communities that believe the central government cannot protect them—or may threaten them—will maintain weapons, ask for foreign protection, resist integration and even seek autonomy.
4. The Province of Sweida Represents a Dangerous Model of State Disintegration
Sweida is not merely an isolated provincial dispute. It demonstrates that local groups can prevent Damascus from imposing authority. Druze forces administer security and governance across much of the province, while some leaders support decentralisation or separation. An internationally backed reintegration roadmap announced in September 2025 had made no meaningful progress by June 2026. Kidnappings, factional rivalries and calls for secession continued, while thousands of students were unable to take national examinations because Damascus and local authorities could not agree on arrangements.
Should Sweida’s de facto autonomy endure, Kurdish, tribal and other regional actors may conclude that armed resistance produces better results than political negotiation. This would undermine the government’s centralising project, and also encourage the minorities to seek the same path.
5. The Kurdish Settlement Is Incomplete and Potentially Explosive
Damascus dramatically weakened the SDF in early 2026 and forced it into a phased integration agreement. Government forces deployed in Kurdish-majority cities, while several SDF brigades began joining the national army. Nevertheless, crucial questions remain unresolved: Kurdish control over local security, the command structure of integrated forces, border crossings, women’s military units, education and cultural rights.
The SDF may still possess between 50,000 and 80,000 fighters. Although weakened, it remains too large to be treated as an ordinary political organisation. If Damascus attempts rapid disarmament or cultural Arabisation, another Kurdish conflict could begin. Conversely, granting substantial autonomy could provoke Turkish opposition and challenge the government’s commitment to a centralised state.
6. Economic Recovery Is Far Too Slow to Produce Stable Legitimacy
Syria’s economy has recently shown signs of stabilisation. Inflation fell significantly in 2025, the Syrian pound strengthened and the government regained control of oil-producing regions. Nevertheless, the country’s material condition remains catastrophic.
The World Bank estimates reconstruction costs at approximately $220 billion—nearly ten times Syria’s projected 2024 gross domestic product. Nearly one-third of the country’s pre-war capital stock was damaged. Meanwhile, 7.2 million Syrians remain acutely food insecure, including 1.6 million in severe conditions. Funding shortages forced the World Food Program to halve emergency food assistance and suspend a nationwide bread-support program in May 2026.
And as a result, the Political legitimacy created by Assad’s removal will gradually disappear if salaries, electricity, housing and employment do not improve as quickly as needed.
to be continued
Comments