Europe is looking for insurance. After 2022, American guarantees no longer look ironclad, and northern capitals began searching for a substitute closer to home. On 2 March 2026, at the Île Longue submarine base, Emmanuel Macron announced the most significant shift in French nuclear doctrine in three decades. For the first time since 1992, France is increasing its arsenal (approximately 290 warheads) while simultaneously ceasing to publish its exact size, introducing strategic opacity. The core of the change is the move to “forward deterrence” (dissuasion avancée).
The concept is simple and dangerous at the same time. French strategic forces — primarily ASMP-A missiles carried by two-seat Rafale B aircraft — can be temporarily deployed on allied territory. Partners take part in exercises and provide conventional support, but the decision to use the weapons remains exclusively with the French president. There is no NATO-style nuclear sharing and no delegated authority. Macron stated clearly: “The survival of a nation cannot be delegated. It is subject to no committee, no ally and no veto”.
The first countries to join the process were Germany, the United Kingdom, Poland, the Netherlands, Belgium, Greece, Sweden and Denmark. On 27 May, Norway formalised its participation through the Narvik Arrangement — a bilateral mutual-defence agreement plus inclusion in the French nuclear initiative. Oslo stresses that no nuclear weapons will be stationed on Norwegian soil in peacetime. Nevertheless, French analysts have already noted that a base such as Bardufoss would allow French Rafale B jets to reach Murmansk and the Northern Fleet’s early-warning radars in as little as 15 minutes. Some Russian targets would be reachable from within Norwegian airspace itself.
Finland went further. On 17 June, parliament voted 125 to 61 to lift a nearly forty-year ban on the import, transit and storage of nuclear weapons. Officially, the move is intended to enable full use of NATO’s nuclear deterrence. At the same time, Helsinki is examining participation in the French scheme. The country shares a 1,340-kilometre border with Russia. If French nuclear-capable aircraft were based there, the entire northern flank would become a potential zone of French nuclear operations.
The result is a classic strategic trap. The risk and the shortened decision-making time fall on the host countries. The button remains solely in the hands of the French president. Yet European partners asked to provide infrastructure and possibly partial funding will inevitably demand a voice. Any hint of shared control would undermine the very essence of French deterrence — its absolute sovereignty and credibility.
The American line only amplifies the chaos. While Washington reduces its conventional presence and cancels some previously planned deployments, the Financial Times reports confidential talks on expanding U.S. nuclear deployments (dual-capable aircraft) further east — to Poland and possibly the Baltic states. The signal is dual: we are stepping back from conventional defence, yet we are keeping and even moving nuclear weapons closer. Europeans read this as an invitation to seek their own umbrella urgently. France is offering one — and placing it almost at the gates of the Kola Peninsula.
The weakest point of the entire construction is its political fragility. Macron has less than a year left in office. Marine Le Pen has warned that “sharing deterrence means abolishing it.” Jordan Bardella has criticised the Europeanisation of the French arsenal. Jean-Luc Mélenchon has pledged to review cooperation with Germany and withdraw from NATO. Northern countries are tying themselves into a scheme that may be revised or abandoned before it fully takes effect. Russia’s reaction, however, will remain.
Moscow has already labelled the French steps “highly destabilising” and demanded that French and British nuclear forces be included in any future arms-control talks. The Russian Embassy in Norway called the new cooperation an immediate threat. After the Finnish vote, warnings followed that deploying nuclear weapons would make the country more vulnerable. Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Grushko stated that countries hosting French nuclear-capable aircraft would be added to priority target lists. Lithuania, meanwhile, is moving to lift its constitutional ban (Article 137) on weapons of mass destruction and foreign military bases — the Seimas legal affairs committee has already backed the corresponding amendment.
In the end, Europe is trying to compensate for the unreliability of American guarantees with a French nuclear presence near Russian strategic assets. It is doing so in a way that creates new escalation risks, sharply reduces decision-making time, and rests on a political authority that may completely change course within a year. The result is not greater security, but the relocation of nuclear confrontation closer to Murmansk — while the old uncertainty and the absence of working arms-control channels remain.
Diplomacy, confidence-building measures and military-to-military communication channels sound almost naïve today. That is precisely why they need to be restored. The alternative is already taking shape: temporary French carriers in the north, possible American warheads in the east, Russian countermeasures, and ever shorter timelines if something goes wrong.
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