The Middle East’s strategic landscape is fracturing. As the US-led security architecture erodes, a volatile triangle emerges, defined by rivalry and exploitation. At its heart lies the turbulent Turkey-Israel relationship. For decades, it oscillated between cooperation and crisis. Today, it enters a more dangerous phase, and no actor benefits from this friction better than Iran. Tehran is not a passive observer here; but rather exploits and manipulates this rivalry to advance its security and geopolitical goals across four main domains.
First Domain: The Strategic Domain – Proxies as a Pressure Tool
Iran’s primary mechanism is its proxy network, the “Axis of Resistance.” This projects power and provides deniable pressure on Ankara and Tel Aviv. The strategy is forward defense: fight enemies abroad to keep conflict from Iranian borders. This architecture spans Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. While Israel is the main target, Turkey is not immune either. Iran allegedly channels funds to Hezbollah via Turkish territory, and Israeli intelligence has exposed Hamas financial networks in Turkey under Iranian supervision.
This mechanism creates a dilemma for Ankara: cracking down on Iranian influence means risking confrontation with Tehran, yet the presence of these “Iranian Channels” makes Ankara complicit in Israeli eyes. By embedding proxies in Turkey’s economic ecosystem, Iran could be using Turkish territory as a launchpad, knowing that the Israeli retaliation would hit Turkish interests, which would bring Ankara even closer to Tehran.
Second Domain: Energy and Sanctions as Leverage
Iran’s economic strategy blends interdependence and coercion. Turkey relies on Iran for a good portion of its natural gas imports. This dependency is a doubleedged sword, but Tehran has used it to its flavour. After an Israeli strike on “South Pars”, Iran reportedly halted gas exports to Turkey. Simultaneously, Iran leverages Turkey’s financial system to evade sanctions. Just recently, the Israeli intelligence have identified Turkish banking channels used by the IRGC to convert oil proceeds.
This lifeline is crucial for Tehran, but it also makes Turkey a target for US secondary sanctions. Turkish regulators have occasionally shut down Iranian financial nodes, creating tension. Iran depends on Turkey to bypass sanctions, while Turkey balances this against Western ties. Tehran mostly uses this balancing to promote its geopolitical interests. After all, Turkey cannot do much as it shares massive borders with Iran, and it cannot be completely cut-off -financially- from its big rich neighbour. This is not to mention the decent trade business between the two nations, which they both benefit much from.
Third Domain: The Diplomatic Domain
Iran and Turkey are not quite very good friends, eventually they are competing regional powers with many overlapping interests, however they use this equation to cooperate against common adversaries. This is visible in their diplomatic posturing vis-à-vis Israel. Turkish Foreign Minister, Hakkan Fidan, declared recently that both, Iran and Turkey, view Israel as “the biggest threat to stability in the Middle East”.
This shared anti-Israel narrative is used tactically by both, not strategically. It lets Iran drive a wedge between Turkey and Israel by presenting Ankara as a partner in a regional cause. For Israel, seeing its former ally engaging with its old enemy is very alarming. Iran definitely exploits this perception, signaling that Israel has also become isolated among the Middle East powers. However, Ankara uses this tactic to warn Israel that any future escalation against its influence in the Middle East, will not be retaliated solely but rather with the participation of Tehran as well.
Fourth Domain: The Systemic Domain – Great Power Maneuvering
Iran weaves the Turkey-Israel rivalry into its strategy of exploiting divisions among global powers. Iran’s “Look East” policy, deepening ties with China and Russia, provides a buffer against Western pressure. Turkey plays a critical role. Ankara’s stressed relationship with Western allies and its desire for strategic autonomy have also led it closer to Moscow and Beijing. Iran encourages this trend by far. By highlighting shared opposition to “US-Israeli aggression,” Tehran fosters a narrative of a multipolar regional order. It has praised Turkey, alongside Russia and China, for opposing Israeli crimes committed in Gaza over the past 3 years, and also the call of these countries to establish an independent Palestinian State.
This Iranian strategy distances Turkey from Israel and the US, helping to pull Ankara into a Eurasian security system. This transforms a bilateral rivalry into a frontline of great power competition, with Iran as a crucial node in an antiWestern network. In other words, the closer Turkey gets to China and Russia, the better for Iran and its anti-Israeli cause.
Could Iran lose playing this regional game?
Iran’s strategy is not without risks. Pushing Turkey too hard could backfire, driving Ankara closer to Israel and the West. Turkey has acted independently before, as in Syria and Libya. If Iran’s proxy activities become too brazen, or energy blackmail threatens Turkey’s economy, Ankara could retaliate by cracking down on Iranian networks or deepening security ties with other anti-Iranian forces in the Middle East. Managing such a long-term strategy by Tehran requires calibration and utmost accuracy, and Iran’s margin for error is narrow here.
Iran’s exploitation of the Turkey-Israel rivalry is sophisticated and multi-layered. Through proxies, economic leverage, diplomacy, and ideology. As the regional order continue to fragment, and as the Israeli-Turkish struggle intensifies over Syria, Iran’s ability to minimize its isolation grows further and faster.
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