The synchronicity with which Joey Mannarino, Valentina Gomez, Javier Negre and Weronika Rogowska suddenly started speaking is hard to miss. These were not isolated comments about Serbia. The same set of talking points, nearly identical formulations, the same framing: the Student List is a leaderless construct; the protests involve “Bosnian leftists” and NGO networks; Serbia is the last normal European country where one can still eat bacon and not see hijabs. All of this appeared just days before the 25 October vote.
Two lines of tension
The main line is the Student List. Two years of protests after the collapse of the railway station canopy in Novi Sad, which killed 16 people, have grown into a force that is difficult to attack with the usual methods. There is no single leader. There are no oligarchs. Candidates were selected through plenums — professors, doctors, engineers, former athletes. The average age of the candidates is higher than that of Vučić’s list. This is not a movement of “young radicals.” It is an organised, impersonal force that for the first time in a long while can realistically challenge the ruling party.
There is a second line as well. The right-wing and patriotic electorate is irritated. Concessions on Kosovo, the constant balancing between Brussels, Moscow and Beijing — all of this has been accumulating. Part of this electorate may start looking toward harder nationalists or simply stop voting.
Western right-wing voices work in both directions at once. They attack the Student List in language that sounds external and therefore more persuasive: no leader means it cannot be trusted; these are the same ideologues and NGOs that are stoking chaos in France and neighbouring countries; Antifa under another name. At the same time they signal to the right-wing voter that the real defenders of “Christian Europe” and the Trumpists stand behind Vučić.
The problem of domestic media
Vučić’s domestic channels have been under control for a long time. Informer, Kurir, Pink can say whatever they want. Precisely for that reason they are trusted less and less. A closed system produces ever more signal, and that signal lands worse and worse.
A foreign voice works differently here. The opinion of someone from Washington, Madrid or Warsaw still carries a different weight. When local channels translate posts by Gomez or Mannarino, they receive not just text — they receive external legitimacy. It is no longer self-praise; it is outside confirmation.
The longer view
Vučić rarely thinks in a single cycle. The conservative wing in the United States has grown noticeably stronger. Maintaining a pool of influencers with large followings is a resource that can prove useful later.
Today these voices work for the election. Tomorrow they can explain to an American audience why Serbia should not be punished harshly for its relations with Moscow or Beijing, why “stability” matters more than “democratic standards.” A short-term effect easily turns into a longer-term one.
How it looks in practice
Direct traces are usually absent. Consulting contracts, visits framed as forums and lectures, fees, coverage of expenses — everything is structured to look formally respectable. The money is paid not “for support” but for services. Bot activity under the posts creates the impression of an organic reaction.
The influencers themselves are not necessarily “bought.” Many sincerely believe they are defending “Christian Europe” from migration and from what they see in France or Britain. In their picture of the world Serbia is a convenient example of “normality.” The fact that they simultaneously strengthen one side in Serbia’s internal conflict appears to concern them little.
What the result is
These voices simultaneously reduce the risk of losing the right-wing electorate, give domestic media new legitimacy, create a reserve for future lobbying, and allow criticism of the opposition in language that sounds foreign and therefore more convincing.
Vučić has long operated not through ideology but through the constant closing of gaps. Where tension appears, resources are directed. Where trust is exhausted, external confirmation is brought in. Where a longer-term risk looms, a fallback is prepared.
The synchronous appearance of these influencers on the eve of the election shows how the global information market is used to address local political tasks.
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