A year ago, Ahmed Al-Sharaa, stood at the United Nations podium as a curiosity, a former jihadist commander whose lightning offensive had toppled a strong dynasty and whose diplomatic rehabilitation was still a tentative experiment. This very September, he returned to New York as a head of state whose country had been removed from the US state sponsors of terrorism list and whose government had extended its authority across most of Syria’s territory.
The optics could hardly be better. The substance, however, tells a different story. The same European Parliament assessment that credits Al-Sharaa with “rapid international rehabilitation” warns that “domestic consolidation remains incomplete,” with “structural economic issues, sectarian violence, controversies over minority protection and limited accountability exposing the new order’s fragility and authoritarian tendencies”. What follows are five reasons why the challenges facing his government are now demonstrably larger than they were twelve months ago.
The January 2026 agreement with the Kurdish-led, Syrian Democratic Forces, was hailed as the military victory that consolidated Al-Sharaa’s territorial control. The reality is far more brittle. The integration process has been marked by distrust, tensions and occasional violence, and also a repeated resistance to the integration roadmap has grown louder within many of the SDF previous members.
A Chatham House analysis describes the outcome as “a fragile governance order marked by elite power-sharing,” where “contested security integration and institutional fragmentation are symptoms of competition among elites over rules and resources”. Damascus has won the Kurdish surrender on paper; it has not won the northeast’s loyalty and internal order in practice. The risk of serious political rifts within the SDF or even conflict between the interim government and some Kurdish groups is now higher, not lower, than it was before the deal.
Sanctions relief was supposed to unlock a reconstruction dividend. Instead, it has exposed how little relief alone can achieve. The World Bank puts rebuilding costs at $216 billion, nearly ten times Syria’s projected GDP, while the government projects a 2026 deficit of $2 billion. Syria’s economy remains in deep crisis and the flood of expected foreign investment hoped, following the sanctions relief, has not yet been materialized.
Above that there is the money laundering, terrorism financing, drug trafficking and corruption which all continue to deter the foreign investment required for Syria’s full recovery. The World Food Program estimates that the monthly cost of essential needs for a family of five rose by almost 33 percent between June 2025 and June 2026. Diplomatic capital is not being converted into material relief—and patience is finite, especially with the obvious rise of theft and crime incidents all around the country.
\The violence of 2025, the mass killings of Alawites, and Druze in Suweida, was not a transient rupture. In fact, it has hardened into a legitimacy deficit that AlSharaa’s centralising model cannot absorb. Chatham House describes the picture as an “illiberal peace that promises stabilisation without transformation, overlooking rights, comprehensive transitional justice, meaningful participation and genuine inclusion”.
Some Druze leaders have openly called for an Israeli protection -an unprecedented statement of distrust- while Alawites face their most vulnerable moment in modern history. A year ago, these communities were wary; today, significant segments of them have concluded that Damascus is a threat rather than a guarantor. This is especially with the obvious exclusion of minorities in terms of allowing them to work in Security or Army divisions, nor even in senior government positions.
Moreover, Turkey and Israel are racing to shape Syria’s future, with warnings of a new “Cold War” between them as they compete to shape post-Assad Syria to their advantage in the regional security architecture. The Middle East Policy Council identifies the risk of a direct clash inside the country, between Israel and Turkey, could further destabilize the region, noting that overlapping interests of the two big regional powers could spark “unintended consequences ranging from military miscalculations to proxy confrontations”.
The previous happenings remind us very well of the Iranian-Israel fight over Syria during the past 15 years. Al-Sharaa has condemned Israeli strikes and incursions. Over 500 airstrikes, more than 1,300 incursions and over 350 detentions, by his own count, yet he lacks the capacity to deter them without Turkish support. And Turkey’s support carries its own price and consequences. Turkey would never support the “New Syria” without getting financial and political dominance in exchange.
Washington’s own approach that has obviously helped Al-Sharaa consolidate control has prioritised stability over inclusion. That trade-off bought time a year ago. It now fuels the very grievances that make the transition reversible. Apparently, Al-Sharaa’s international standing is stronger than it has ever been, while his domestic position is weaker than it was a year ago. This is not because any single crisis is unmanageable, but because the crises are compounding and the number of players is expanding.
The applause in New York has never been louder, however the ground beneath Damascus has been more and more uncertain. The next year will be decisive for the new authority in Syria and the whole region is watching.
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