On settlements, Eisenkot’s position is mixed. He supports Jewish settlement in the occupied West Bank but says it should be “legal” and serve national interests, a remark suggesting opposition to unauthorised outposts. He has criticised settler violence and opposed the government’s plans for the E1 bloc, which Western states object to because it would bisect the West Bank. He also opposes Netanyahu’s far-right partners, Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich, who have both faced sanctions from some Western countries for allegedly inciting violence against Palestinians.
Gaza policy is a point where both men claim the other has failed. A peace plan announced by Trump a year ago led to a ceasefire and the release of the remaining hostages, but its wider goals, Hamas disarmament, new Palestinian governance under international supervision and an Israeli withdrawal, remain unfulfilled. Israel occupies more than half of Gaza and Hamas is still armed. Under a Trump-backed plan unveiled in July, Hamas said it had agreed to disarm in return for a gradual Israeli withdrawal, but Netanyahu rejected it, saying Hamas must be disarmed first.
Eisenkot attacks the government’s record from the other side. He recalls that the cabinet defined the destruction of Hamas’s military and governmental power as the goal, to be achieved within a year, and notes that over three years have passed. He criticises Netanyahu’s declared goal of “total victory,” and says freeing the hostages was the only war aim that Israel achieved. His own formula is similarly demanding, which means that voters who want the war to end more quickly will not necessarily find a different policy in him.
The result will be decided in the 120-seat parliament, and several mechanisms matter.
The far right. Netanyahu may again have to rely on Ben-Gvir and Smotrich. Ben-Gvir’s Jewish Power party has gained support in polls, including among young voters, which increases the leverage of the far right over any government that Netanyahu forms.
The Arab minority. Turnout among Arab citizens, Israeli by citizenship and Palestinian by heritage, could nudge the arithmetic in Eisenkot’s favour. He has ruled out partnering with Arab parties, saying none accepts his four core principles, including destroying or dismantling Israel’s enemies. But analysts foresee a scenario in which those parties support a minority government that he leads, in order to ensure that Netanyahu is removed. This is an analytical scenario, not a declared plan, and it relies on parties acting against their stated positions for a limited purpose.
Deadlock. If neither man can form a coalition, Netanyahu could remain as caretaker until another election next year. Eisenkot has said that he will try to bring in more Zionist parties for “a broad national consensus,” which indicates a preference for a wide coalition.
Analyst Amotz Asa-El summed up the expectation: “We will have only a slight majority either way. No landslide.”
A Netanyahu victory would confirm that nationalist politics and wartime leadership remain stronger than anger over October 7, and would likely mean a continuation of the current policies, including in Gaza and the West Bank, with the far right retaining influence. It would also test his statement about Trump’s readiness to act on Iran.
An Eisenkot government would change the faces and tone in Jerusalem, alter relations with Western states and with the far-right ministers, and probably support a national inquiry into October 7. It would not alter the opposition to Palestinian statehood or the hardline posture on Hamas and Iran. Its stability would depend on a fragile coalition, which may be obliged to rely on outside support from parties with which it disagrees profoundly.
A stalemate would extend the uncertainty, leaving a caretaker prime minister and the prospect of a further vote.
The election is often described as a referendum on Netanyahu, and for many voters it is. But the choice before the electorate is narrower than the rhetoric suggests. The differences between the two leading candidates concern accountability, style, alliances and the treatment of the far right more than the basic questions of Palestinian statehood or confrontation with Iran. That is why the result may bring less change in policy than in the character of government, and why the post-election bargaining could matter as much as the votes cast.
Comments