Institutional Unreliability Of EU Procedures: Anatomy Of Tobacco Lobbying (2024–2026)

EU-tobacco-lobbying
Google Map Street View,| iStock

Imagine a straightforward situation. The European Parliament is preparing new rules on cigarettes, vapes and nicotine pouches. On paper, public health should guide the process. Open data tell a different story.

Since the current Parliament took office in summer 2024, Members of the European Parliament have declared more than 400 meetings with tobacco and nicotine industry representatives. In the entire previous term (2019–2024) the figure was roughly 100. That is a fourfold increase. The numbers come from the EU Transparency Register, compiled by the Smoke Free Partnership and reported by Politico.

This is not routine consultation. It coincides with the Commission’s work on revisions to the Tobacco Products Directive, the Tobacco Advertising Directive and taxation rules. The timing is not accidental.

Philip Morris International accounts for at least 178 of those meetings — more than any other tobacco company. According to data shared with Politico by Transparency International EU, PMI ranks fourth among all companies for meetings with MEPs and their assistants, behind only Meta, Google and Apple. British American Tobacco follows with 60 meetings.

The political distribution is equally clear. Roughly 75 percent of the meetings involved MEPs from the centre-right European People’s Party, the European Conservatives and Reformists, and Patriots for Europe. The individual leaders are Auke Zijlstra (14 meetings), Pietro Fiocchi (9), and Jessica Polfjärd, Elena Nevado del Campo and Michalis Hadjipantela (8 each).

Geography matters too. Italian MEPs took part in more than one in five of all recorded meetings. Italy is the EU’s largest producer of tobacco leaf, and the conversations are frequently framed as defence of national farmers and rural jobs. A similar pattern appears in Spain’s Extremadura region, where Elena Nevado del Campo has pointed to local employment as the reason for her contacts.

In practice these meetings advance the language of “harm reduction.” Heated tobacco, e-cigarettes and nicotine pouches are presented as products that deserve lighter regulation than combustible cigarettes. The framing is useful: it keeps markets open while changing the packaging of the argument.

There is also a legal dimension. Article 5.3 of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control calls for contacts with the industry to be limited to those strictly necessary for regulation. Industry legal teams rely on a 2022 Court of Justice of the EU ruling to argue that the Convention does not prohibit participation in democratic debate. The result is a normative gap: an international obligation exists, yet regular meetings become normalised as ordinary parliamentary work.

One concrete example shows how influence can operate. In a European Parliament report on cardiovascular diseases the original text called for “the same” regulation of tobacco and nicotine. MEPs with the highest number of industry meetings, including Polfjärd and Nevado del Campo, supported a change to the softer word “appropriate.” The final wording was diluted. Small linguistic shifts of this kind later shape binding rules.

The Transparency Register captures only what MEPs choose to declare. Informal contacts, meetings through trade associations and national channels remain outside the official record. At the same time the resource imbalance is stark. Large companies operate with substantial lobbying budgets. Public-health organisations that track the industry work under continuous financial pressure.

The pattern that emerges is structural. Decisions that affect the health of millions of Europeans are shaped not only by scientific evidence and public interest, but by the relative strength of those who can sustain high-volume access and those who cannot. Transparency in its current form records the imbalance more than it corrects it. In socially sensitive policy areas the procedures of the European Union therefore risk reflecting the balance of corporate resources rather than the preferences of citizens.

Comments are closed.