
For years, the Houthis were seen as a Yemeni problem – a rebel group that seized a capital, fought a Saudi-led coalition, and occasionally fired missiles across a border. That picture is now dangerously out of date. Over the past two years, the Houthis have quietly built a second base of operations inside Iraq, and this is not a loose political friendship. It is a military merger that has made them stronger than they have ever been.
The first thing to understand is that this is no longer a relationship built on phone calls and shared statements. In 2024, the Houthi leadership spoke openly about a joint operations room with Iraqi factions. Since then, that room has become a working command center. When drones struck Saudi oil facilities in July 2026, regional officials confirmed that Houthi emissaries were working inside an operations room run by Iraqi militias, helping to plan and execute a two-day swarm attack. A United Nations expert panel later found that the Houthis had established joint operations rooms not only in Iraq but also in Lebanon, with Iranian support. This is not coordination on the margins. It is the Houthis sitting at the center of a regional command structure.
Geography is what makes Iraq so valuable to them. Yemen is a narrow battlefield. Iraq is wide open. The country shares a border with Saudi Arabia that stretches more than 800 kilometers, and large parts of it are desert that no one can properly police. A drone launched from Iraqi soil reaches Saudi oil infrastructure far faster than one fired from Yemen. It flies from a direction Riyadh has never had to defend. The Houthis have exploited this by moving their specialists and equipment into Iraqi territory, where they can threaten the kingdom from a second front that Saudi air defenses were not built to cover.
The physical heart of this new network is Jurf al-Sakhar, a fortified zone in Babil province, south of Baghdad. The area is controlled by Kataib Hezbollah, the most organized and heavily armed of Iraq’s pro-Iranian factions. According to multiple intelligence sources, the Houthis have established a secret operations headquarters inside this closed military zone, protected by Kataib Hezbollah and supervised by an officer from Iran’s Revolutionary Guard. The site was deliberately chosen for its isolation and its access to transport routes, and it replaced an earlier Houthi office in Baghdad that was considered too exposed. From Jurf al-Sakhar, the Houthis are not just hiding. They are running a war.
What they have built there is more than a base. It is a school. Houthi drone experts -men who spent years learning how to build and fly explosive drones in Yemen’s war- are now embedded with Iraqi factions, training personnel and transferring technical knowledge. This is a two-way street: the Houthis gain access to Iraqi facilities and manpower, while Iraqi militias learn the skills that made the Houthis such a persistent threat to shipping and energy infrastructure.
The money behind this operation is just as important as the weapons. Iraqi factions are estimated to channel roughly $100 million a year to the Houthis, often through informal oil shipments and donations collected at religious sites. The Houthis have also opened bank accounts in Iraq to bypass financial sanctions, and they have built a network of companies and intermediaries operating through Oman and Iraq to trade Iranian petroleum and conceal the destination of funds. The US Treasury estimates that illicit petroleum sales generate more than $2 billion annually for the group.
The logistics are just as sophisticated. Houthi personnel move under the protection of powerful Iraqi factions, using their security networks to transfer people and equipment between provinces. Supply routes link Syria, Iraq, and Yemen, allowing weapons and technical teams to circulate across the region. Iraq has also become a manufacturing platform. Workshops linked to the “Popular Mobilization Forces” have produced long-range drones similar to the models the Houthis use, and some of the aircraft and missiles seen in Houthi hands have come out of Iraqi factories. The PMF has even provided the Houthis with heavily subsidized Iraqi fuel, which is shipped from Basra to Hodeida in violation of an international embargo.
All of this is supervised from above. An Iranian Revolutionary Guard officer known as Haji Hamed, assigned to Iraq, directly oversees part of the Houthi activity, according to intelligence sources. Iraqi factions describe cells that bypass their original commanders and report directly to him, and a reactivated coordination channel links Iraqi operatives with the Houthis under his supervision. Apparently, this is not a spontaneous alliance of convenience. It is a deliberately designed structure, built by Iran, to give the Houthis something Yemen alone could never provide: strategic depth.
The recent result is a Houthi movement that is harder to deter, harder to disarm, and harder to contain. When an attack originates from Iraqi soil using Houthi technology and mixed crews, responsibility becomes deliberately blurred. Striking back in Yemen leaves the Iraqi infrastructure untouched; striking inside Iraq carries steep political and diplomatic costs. The Houthis have turned Iraq into a shield and a launch pad at the same time. They are no longer a national insurgency with regional ambitions. They are a transnational security problem with “multiple homes”, and that is precisely what makes them stronger than ever before.






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