The Kingmakers No One Wanted

Israel-Knesset-Speaker-vote

Israel’s election has produced a result that is, on the evidence of exit polls, a near tie, and in that tie lies a structural shift. Palestinian parties, meaning the Arab-led parties that represent a large share of Israel’s Arab citizens, are projected to win 17 to 18 seats in the 120-seat Knesset, up from 10. The exit polls place Gadi Eisenkot’s opposition bloc and Benjamin Netanyahu’s governing coalition level, and neither has the 61 seats needed for a majority. Netanyahu’s Likud may still emerge as the largest single party. The figures are projections, not final counts, and could change as votes are tallied. But if they hold, the result forces the mainstream opposition to confront a question it has long avoided: whether it is prepared to bargain with Arab parties as full partners, or whether it accepts the risk of handing Netanyahu a path to survival.

The headline is a deadlock. Eisenkot described the exit polls as a victory for “Israel’s Zionist national majority,” but the real outcome looks far more complicated. Neither bloc can govern alone. The biggest difference between the old Knesset and the new one is the surge in Arab representation, which changes the balance of the parliament even if it does not by itself decide who rules.

The projected numbers matter because of how Israeli coalition-building works. In a parliament of 120 seats, a government needs 61. When the two main blocs are level, the smaller factions decide who can reach that figure. With Arab parties on 17 or 18 seats, the group is too large to ignore: any plausible majority for the opposition bloc depends on them, either as coalition members or as outside supporters, while a Netanyahu government would need to find its extra seats elsewhere.

If the exit polls are confirmed, the president, Isaac Herzog, would have discretion over whom to ask first to try to form a government. A candidate has six weeks to succeed; if he cannot, the task passes to the next option. The process could therefore be very long, and throughout it Netanyahu’s coalition would stay on in a caretaker role.

This is a significant detail. A prolonged negotiation favours the incumbent in some ways, since the caretaker government retains the powers of office, and it gives time for pressure, deals and defections. It also increases the risk of another election, which Israel has experienced repeatedly in recent years.

The Arab parties are not a single bloc. Two main groupings are involved: the Joint List and Ra’am (the United Arab List). The negotiating challenge differs for each.

Ra’am. It would probably be the easier partner. Its leader, Mansour Abbas, has already participated in a right-leaning government, that of Naftali Bennett, who is now a junior partner in the Eisenkot bloc. Abbas has a Jewish Zionist deputy and has shown willingness to make political compromises. On Tuesday he said emphatically that his priority is to “bring down Benjamin Netanyahu, [Bezalel] Smotrich, and [Itamar] Ben-Gvir in this election.” The difficulty is arithmetic: most estimates based on the exit polls show Ra’am as the smaller of the two groupings, with seven projected seats. It is unclear whether that would be enough, even if a pact were made with the consent of the other members of the Eisenkot bloc, to produce a majority.

The Joint List. With 11 or more projected seats, it is the larger grouping and therefore the one whose support matters most for the numbers. But talks would be tougher. Eisenkot has set four conditions: recognise Israel as a Jewish and democratic state; accept the values of the declaration of independence; accept conscription for Palestinian citizens of Israel, who are currently exempt; and denounce Hamas as a terrorist organisation. Amjad Shbita, general secretary of Hadash, the socialist party that is the biggest faction in the Joint List, rejected the idea of preconditions: “Laying down conditions won’t work with the Joint List. We will negotiate as equals because we need each other.”

The gap between those positions is wide. Eisenkot’s conditions reflect the views of the mainstream Jewish electorate that he needs to retain, and conceding them would cost him support on the right and centre of his own bloc. The Joint List’s refusal to accept terms reflects its own constituency’s expectations and the history of exclusion that many Arab citizens feel. Each side has reason to believe the other needs it more.

If no agreement is reached with one or both groupings, Eisenkot could try to govern as a minority government, relying on informal, vote-by-vote understandings to stay afloat. This would avoid the symbolic cost of a formal pact but would be unstable, since any major vote would become a negotiation. It would also make another election more likely.

That scenario carries a specific political danger for the opposition. A second election would give Netanyahu an opportunity to rally conservative Jewish voters and claim vindication for his campaign slogan, “the Right or Palestine,” which rhymes in Hebrew. The slogan casts the choice as one between the Jewish right and a Palestinian-backed alternative. A government that depends openly on Arab votes would, in his telling, prove the point.

Netanyahu has looked beaten before in three decades at or near the top, and each time he has staged a comeback through tactical skill as a dealmaker. No one is ruling out another escape. The irony of the present situation is that, if he does bounce back, the main cause may be the failure of his opponents to find common ground. He would owe his survival to the refusal of political adversaries to make the historic compromise across the divide between Jewish and Arab citizens that a majority would require, rather than to any gain in his own support.

This is an interpretation, and it should be weighed as one. The projections show a tie, not a Netanyahu advantage, and the opposition still has routes to a majority. But the structure is such that the route runs through Arab parties, and the failure to take it would leave the incumbent as the main beneficiary.

Beyond the arithmetic, the result may mark a change in the role of Arab citizens in Israeli politics. For years, Arab parties were treated as outside the circle of legitimate coalition partners, a position often justified by security concerns and by differences over the definition of the state. Ra’am’s participation in the Bennett government broke that pattern in a limited way. A larger Arab representation, with the ability to determine whether a government can be formed, makes exclusion costly.

An official at the Joint List’s victory party in Nazareth put the choice starkly: “The Zionist opposition will have to choose between supremacy and building democracy.” That is a partisan formulation, and Eisenkot’s camp would describe its conditions as legitimate requirements for any partner in government. But it highlights the tension: the opposition presents itself as defending democracy against Netanyahu, and its credibility on that claim will be tested by how it treats its potential partners.

Several developments will clarify the situation. The first is the final count, which will show whether the exit-poll picture holds and what the actual seat totals are for Likud, the opposition bloc and each Arab party. The second is Herzog’s decision on whom to ask first to form a government. The third is whether Eisenkot softens or maintains his four conditions, and how the Joint List responds. The fourth is whether Ra’am’s seven seats, together with other opposition parties, come close to 61. The fifth is whether Netanyahu can attract defectors or new partners from within the opposition bloc.

The election has produced a parliament in which the old method of building coalitions no longer works. Arab parties have become too large to ignore, the two main blocs are level, and the person who may benefit from the stalemate is the incumbent. The opposition must decide whether to pay the political price of a deal with partners it has kept at a distance, or to risk a repeat of the same contest. Whatever happens, the question has moved from the margins of Israeli politics to the centre, and it will shape the next government, or the next election.

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