Springtime Beijing greeted Donald Trump with the full ceremonial treatment. Temple of Heaven, Confucian references, red flags fluttering, green tea, and the carefully tended roses in the historic gardens of Zhongnanhai. Trump, according to reports, was genuinely impressed by the flowers and asked Xi Jinping for seeds. Xi smiled and said he would send them. On the surface it looked like a rare moment of genuine warmth between the two biggest powers on the planet.
The Real Bargain Behind the Roses
In reality, it was classic great-power bargaining. And as usual, someone else was paying the bill.
Trump did not come to Beijing holding strong cards. The war with Iran, originally sold as a short and decisive operation, had bogged down. The Strait of Hormuz was partially blocked, oil prices were volatile, American stocks of precision weapons were running lower than expected, and political pressure was mounting back in Washington. Many observers believed Xi held the upper hand before the talks even started. The results told a different story.
Beijing Backs Washington on Iran
Beijing ended up endorsing several core American demands. Iran should not be allowed to develop nuclear weapons. The Strait of Hormuz must stay open to unrestricted international shipping, without tolls or additional militarization. And China would refrain from supplying Iran with modern military equipment — at least not openly and directly.
For Tehran this was a heavy setback. The Iranians had tried to recoup some of their war costs by charging tankers passing through the strait. Now both superpowers were publicly rejecting that approach. Even more significant was what didn’t happen: Beijing never launched any serious version of military support. After two and a half months of fighting, there was no Chinese “lend-lease,” only limited and cautious assistance through third parties at best.
On top of that, Xi positioned himself not as a backer of the Iranian cause but as a potential mediator. This was a clear shift from the familiar image of China quietly sustaining the “Axis of Resistance.” Trump flew home in a noticeably better mood and, still from Beijing, dismissed the latest Iranian peace overture while reiterating threats of overwhelming force.
What Did China Actually Get?
Officially China received little in return. The word “Taiwan” never appeared in any joint statements. Yet that is almost certainly where the serious bargaining took place. Beijing probably secured some quiet understanding on slowing or limiting American arms deliveries to the island. There were also the usual transactional wins — agricultural purchases, Boeing deals, energy cooperation. But the real prize for Xi was strategic and narrative: reinforcing the idea that only the United States and China truly shape global affairs, and that the world’s biggest issues get settled between them.
The Cost of Being a “Strategic Partner”
This brand of cold pragmatism carries a price. Beijing has now done this dance with Venezuela and now with Iran. The message to every smaller partner is unmistakable: Chinese interests come first. Loud declarations of strategic partnership mean little when they conflict with Beijing’s bigger priorities. Loyalty buys no protection once the costs rise.
America’s Gulf allies face their own uncomfortable questions. U.S. bases in the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar did not shield them from the first wave of Iranian strikes. Confidence in the American security guarantee has visibly eroded. It is no coincidence that, according to the Financial Times, Saudi Arabia has begun exploring a regional non-aggression pact with Iran.
The Lesson for Russia
For Moscow the summit delivered yet another dose of realism. China remains Russia’s most important economic partner — the largest buyer of its resources, a critical supplier of technology and goods, and a useful diplomatic cover in international institutions. But it is not, and never was, an ally prepared to shoulder major costs for Russia’s sake.
Beijing has no intention of endangering its relationship with Washington or its broader global economic position to deliver either a decisive Russian victory in Ukraine or especially favorable terms. What it wants is a stable Russia that is strong enough to serve as a reliable rear area and energy supplier, but not so strong or independent that it creates new complications. Nothing more, nothing less.
Sharp Thorns
The roses in Zhongnanhai really are striking. They also come with sharp thorns. And those thorns tend to point in whatever direction serves China’s long-term interests.
We are moving into a period of open diarchy. The two dominant powers will increasingly make deals with each other, sometimes at the direct expense of their nominal partners. In this environment, success belongs not to those who invest the most emotion in the language of eternal friendship, but to those who see the relationship for exactly what it is and calibrate their strategy accordingly — with clear eyes and no illusions.
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