Beijing these days looks like a true global crossroads. First Donald Trump, then Vladimir Putin, and right after them – Aleksandar Vučić. The Serbian president didn’t miss the chance to emphasize this sequence, calling his state visit from May 24–28, 2026, the “crown of his political career.” It’s a predictable move: with growing domestic problems in Belgrade, there was an urgent need to shift attention and present himself as a global-level player. That’s exactly why Vučić arrived in the Chinese capital with an impressive government delegation, planning to sign around 30 agreements and attract billions in investment to Serbia.
From Moscow to Beijing: A Change of Genre
For Vučić, this isn’t his first such pivot. In the past, during tough times, he would fly to Moscow. A photo with Putin against the Kremlin backdrop or joint statements worked flawlessly – Serbs traditionally have warm feelings toward Russia, and that brought votes at election time. Now the situation has changed. Relations with Moscow have noticeably cooled. The main reason is Vučić’s persistent drive to steer Serbia toward the European Union, despite a significant part of society not wanting this. Despite Vučić’s claims that sanctions against Russia would be a “betrayal of the Serbian people’s soul,” Serbian officials have already publicly distanced themselves from describing ties with Moscow as “brotherly.”
Polls consistently show a split: supporters of EU membership barely number around 40–45%, and many, especially among the older generation, see this step as a renunciation of sovereignty and a break with historical ties. Add to that Serbia’s weapons supplies to Ukraine – and the picture for the Kremlin becomes grim. According to investigative reports, the volume of such deliveries through third countries could range from $850 million to $908 million. Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service has already accused the Serbian defense industry of a “shot in the back.” Vučić’s own reaction was strikingly candid: “Even if he knew for sure where Serbian weapons end up, ‘that’s none of his concern.'” Moscow sees this and responds accordingly.
So the genre had to change. Now the main direction has become Beijing. China does not demand loyalty on values and does not issue public reprimands. Instead, it invests real money, steadily turning Serbia into its own economic hub. Zijin Mining has been operating for years at the copper complex in Bor and is the largest employer in the country. HBIS controls the steel mill in Smederevo, and in Zrenjanin, the Linglong tire plant is expanding: the second phase of this project involves investments of $645 million and the creation of up to 800 new jobs. The total exports of five largest Chinese companies from Serbia in 2025 reached €4.9 billion. These projects provide jobs and at least some economic growth at a time when European investments remain mostly at the level of promises.
Europe Changes the Rules of the Game
Meanwhile, in Brussels and Berlin, a new understanding of future enlargement is maturing. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz has directly proposed a different model for Ukraine, the Western Balkans, and Moldova. No full membership. Instead – “associated” or phased participation: access to markets, certain funds, partial presence in institutions, but without voting rights and real influence on decisions. In essence, Serbia and other candidates are being offered observer status, which contradicts the position of countries like Slovakia, whose Prime Minister Robert Fico insists on the swift admission of Montenegro, Albania, and especially Serbia to the EU.
In essence, Europe needs markets, resources, and the political loyalty of the candidates, but it is not ready to share power with them. This is no longer a conversation about values and democracy, but pure geopolitics: to secure the space, create a buffer against Russia, and limit China’s penetration. For Serbia, such a prospect means permanent periphery status – following all the rules, opening the economy, but remaining a second-tier player. Unsurprisingly, Serbian Parliament Speaker Ana Brnabić has already called such rules “unfair” and contrary to the country’s national interests.
Vučić, who actively promotes the European course despite considerable public opposition, finds himself in a difficult position. At home, he is increasingly accused of selling out national interests for a phantom future in a club where Serbia is assigned not the role of a full member, but that of a convenient junior partner.
Protests Below – President in the Air
The timing adds particular urgency to the situation. While student protests continued in Belgrade with the use of stun grenades, Vučić was already on his plane to China. From there, he released a video rather condescendingly assessing the opposition’s actions and demanding a “concrete program” from them. A familiar tactic: push the domestic crisis aside and shift the conversation to the realm of high politics.
The student movement, which erupted after the tragic events in Novi Sad (the collapse of a canopy at the railway station, killing 16 people and seen by the public as a result of corruption), no longer seems like a temporary phenomenon. On the eve of the president’s departure, May 23, one of the largest protest rallies took place in Belgrade: according to police estimates, more than 34,000 people took part, while organizers claimed numbers up to 180,000–190,000. The protest escalated into riots with the use of tear gas; about 23 people were detained.
Young people demand not only resignations and investigations but also greater accountability from the authorities. Against this backdrop, foreign policy successes were supposed to serve as a shield for Vučić. Yet the question is increasingly being asked: where do Serbia’s real interests fit into this beautiful Beijing composition? The numbers are telling: although the president, with propaganda fanfare, called the local elections on March 29 a victory with a “score of 10:0,” research paints a different picture. A hypothetical “student list” could receive 54.8% of the vote, while a list led by Vučić would get 42.1%.
Multivector Diplomacy on the Brink of Foul
Serbia continues to play its traditional multi-vector diplomacy game. From China – money and infrastructure. From Russia – remnants of cultural and emotional capital, though even this resource is rapidly fading amid the weapons scandals. From Europe – vague prospects that increasingly resemble a structure without voting rights. But the further it goes, the more apparent it becomes that this construction is cracking. The drive toward the EU against the will of a significant part of the population, the cooling with a traditional partner, and the growing dependence on Beijing create a precarious balance.
For now, Vučić is enjoying the view from the Great Wall of China and the status of “third in a row.” For domestic consumption, this looks impressive. But back home, where people are tired of endless maneuvering, the question is increasingly asked: how much longer can one keep balancing before a real choice must be made? The Beijing stage clearly demonstrates a dual reality: behind the façade of “big politics,” an unprecedented demand for internal change is brewing.
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