Iran’s political system has entered one of the most dramatic transformations since the 1979 Islamic Revolution. For decades, the country was governed through a model centered on the absolute authority of the Supreme Leader, a clerical figure who held the final word on military, political, judicial, and strategic affairs. That structure, however, appears to be changing rapidly under the pressure of war. Following the reported killing of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei during the opening phase of the conflict with the United States and Israel, Iran has moved into a new era in which the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has emerged as the dominant force in national decision-making. Although Mojtaba Khamenei, the son of the late leader, now formally occupies the highest position in the system, multiple accounts suggest that real power has shifted from the clerical establishment to military-security institutions. This wartime restructuring could have far-reaching consequences for Iran’s domestic politics, foreign policy, and any future negotiations with Washington.
Since the revolution, Iran’s governing system revolved around a single supreme authority. First Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, and later Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, acted as the final arbiter in disputes among political factions, military institutions, and state agencies. That model offered one critical advantage: clear command authority. Even when tensions existed between reformists, conservatives, and the Revolutionary Guards, all sides ultimately answered to the Supreme Leader. Now that structure appears weakened. Mojtaba Khamenei may sit at the apex of the state, but reports indicate that his role is more symbolic than commanding. Instead of personally directing strategy, he is said to approve decisions formed by a wartime inner circle dominated by the Guards and national security institutions. This marks a historic departure from Iran’s previous political order.
The IRGC has long been one of the most powerful organizations in Iran. Originally founded to defend the revolution, it gradually expanded into intelligence, industry, missile programs, foreign operations, and internal security. Yet during this war, its influence appears to have reached an entirely new level. Military commanders are now reportedly shaping not only battlefield strategy but also key diplomatic and political choices. Figures linked to the Guards have taken prominent roles in ceasefire discussions, crisis management, and communications with mediators. Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi remains a diplomatic face of the government, but sources suggest that more decisive authority lies elsewhere. Former Guards commander and parliamentary speaker Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf has reportedly become an important bridge between political and security elites. IRGC commander Ahmad Vahidi has also been described as a pivotal actor during sensitive negotiations. This suggests that Iran’s civilian institutions are increasingly secondary to military-security leadership.
Wars often centralize power. In moments of national emergency, governments tend to prioritize speed, secrecy, discipline, and command unity. Security institutions are naturally positioned to benefit from this shift. In Iran’s case, the conflict has accelerated trends already underway for years. The Guards had been growing stronger economically and politically even before the war. They controlled large business interests, influenced parliament, shaped regional policy, and managed strategic military programs. The death of Ali Khamenei removed the one figure who could balance these forces from above. In the resulting vacuum, the Guards became not merely an instrument of the state but the core of the state itself. As one analyst described it, Iran has moved “from divine power to hard power”.
This internal shift may help explain why diplomacy with the United States has proven difficult despite battlefield pressures and economic strain. Iran reportedly submitted proposals favoring staged talks, in which the nuclear issue would be postponed until fighting ends and maritime disputes are addressed first. Washington, however, insists that nuclear matters must be central from the beginning. The deadlock is not simply about technical disagreements. It also reflects the new political balance inside Tehran. The Revolutionary Guards are deeply skeptical of appearing weak under pressure. Any concession to the United States during wartime could be portrayed internally as surrender. At the same time, American domestic politics may also limit flexibility in Washington. As a result, both sides may believe that waiting will strengthen their position more than compromise would.
The Guards’ growing dominance may also reshape life inside Iran. Historically, Iran’s political system included some space – however limited – for competition between pragmatic conservatives, hardliners, reformists, clerics, and technocrats. Elections were restricted but still mattered. Policy debates existed within defined limits. A security-dominated system could narrow those spaces further. The IRGC’s worldview is rooted in national defense, ideological resistance, centralized authority, and suspicion of Western influence. If that perspective becomes the primary organizing principle of the state, domestic policy may focus more heavily on surveillance, censorship, repression of dissent, and tighter social controls. This would likely reduce the already limited influence of reformist or moderate factions.
Despite military strikes, economic sanctions, and leadership upheaval, Iran has shown no visible signs of collapse. There has been no major fragmentation inside the ruling elite, and no nationwide uprising capable of threatening the state. That resilience reflects the strength of Iran’s institutional architecture. The Guards, intelligence services, bureaucracy, and political networks remain functional and coordinated. In some ways, the crisis may have strengthened regime cohesion. External threats often unify ruling systems by reducing internal disputes and shifting focus toward survival. The current consensus inside Iran reportedly centers on three priorities:
- Avoiding a return to full-scale war
- Preserving leverage, especially over the Strait of Hormuz
- Emerging from the conflict stronger politically and militarily
These goals are closely aligned with the Guards’ strategic mindset.
Even if the war ends soon, the internal power shift may endure. Institutions rarely surrender authority once gained during wartime. If the Guards now control strategic decision-making, diplomacy, and internal security, they may continue to dominate after the ceasefire. That would mean Iran’s future system may no longer be one led primarily by clerics with military backing, but one led by military-security elites with clerical legitimacy attached. Such a transformation would affect everything from nuclear negotiations to regional policy in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and the Gulf.
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