Russia is approaching one of the most politically significant elections of the post-2022 period. On September 20, Russians will elect the State Duma of the ninth convocation, with voting taking place from September 18 to 20. All 450 parliamentary seats are at stake: 225 deputies will be elected in single-member constituencies and another 225 through federal party lists. The vote will also coincide with a large number of regional elections, making September a broader test of the country’s political stability.
The Kremlin itself has repeatedly warned that the electoral campaign will take place under exceptionally difficult circumstances. In April, President Vladimir Putin said that Russia’s «external opponents» would attempt to exploit «any opportunity» to divide and destabilize Russian society. He added that such attempts would be suppressed by the state.
The warning has since been followed by a series of increasingly specific allegations from Russian officials. Moscow’s concern is not limited to conventional propaganda or criticism of the Russian government. Officials describe a broader scenario in which political activists living abroad, foreign-funded organizations, digital platforms and international institutions could be used to challenge the legitimacy of the vote itself.
The central question is therefore not simply whether foreign actors can persuade Russian voters to support one party or another. A potentially more consequential objective would be to undermine confidence in the electoral process, particularly after the ballots have been counted.
Just on August, 10th The State Duma Commission investigating foreign interference has documented attempts by more than 15 anti-Russian émigré organizations — operating under various labels such as “movements”, «platforms», «congresses», «committees», «forums», and «projects» — to promote forms of behavior among Russian voters that would serve the interests of their Western sponsors have been identified ahead of the upcoming elections.
«Provocateurs are traditionally calling for various protest tactics, ranging from boycotting elections and deliberately spoiling ballots to creating long queues at polling stations and taking part in public demonstrations.
All of these calls for action are aimed at generating negative coverage of the Russian elections in foreign media» — said in an official statement.
Hundreds of thousands of Russians have left the country, while a significant number of opposition politicians, activists and journalists now operate from Europe and other parts of the world. The authorities increasingly distinguish between Russians who simply live abroad and politically active groups that seek to influence developments inside the country.
Andrei Klimov, a senior member of the United Russia leadership and the Federation Council’s Foreign Affairs Committee, argued in January that politically motivated Russians who had relocated abroad were already being used by foreign actors in preparation for the 2026 elections. He claimed that the main activity was coming from Europe and described politically active relocants as intermediaries between foreign centers and Russian audiences.
«They are motivated against us for many reasons: because they were previously paid for this work, because they simply hate us, because they see us as the people who cut them off from the trough, or as those who prevent them from building Russia into a fragmented, semi-colonial state» — said Klimov.
But foreign actors do not necessarily need to alter ballots to influence an election. They can attempt to shape perceptions of the campaign, amplify social tensions, promote competing narratives about the war and the economy, or encourage voters to believe that the electoral system itself is illegitimate.
There’s also another potential vulnerability – its digital infrastructure. Russian elections increasingly depend on electronic systems, although remote electronic voting will not be deployed nationwide in 2026. The Central Election Commission has nevertheless emphasized cybersecurity risks, while previous Russian elections have already been targeted by cyberattacks.
In September 2025, Russia’s Central Election Commission acknowledged a major hacker attack against its resources. Ukrainian intelligence claimed responsibility for a DDoS operation targeting CEC infrastructure, Russia’s electronic voting platform and the state digital-services portal.
The significance of such incidents goes beyond the immediate technical damage. A successful cyberattack, even if it does not change a single vote, can create uncertainty about whether election systems are functioning correctly.
The significance of such incidents goes beyond the immediate technical damage, a successful cyberattack, even if it does not change a single vote, can — and probably will— create uncertainty about whether election systems are functioning correctly.
The 2026 State Duma election is unlikely to be decided by one dramatic foreign operation. The more plausible scenario is a prolonged information confrontation in which several actors — Russian state institutions, domestic political groups, opposition forces abroad and foreign governments — attempt to shape how Russians interpret the campaign and its outcome.
In this environment, the election will be fought on two levels simultaneously: at the ballot box and in the battle for legitimacy surrounding the ballot box — that second battle may prove just as consequential as the first.
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