This was arguably a preemptive de-escalation move that would also gauge the US’ intentions.
The New York Times (NYT) interviewed Afghan Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi in Kabul as part of their coverage of the fifth anniversary of the Taliban’s return to power. Muttaqi invited the US to reopen its embassy and invest in his country’s minerals, dams, and roads. He also declared that “We consider the chapter of war to have come to an end, and from now on, we want relations based on mutual respect and a new chapter of positive engagement.” This new policy requires some interpretation.
After all, Trump has repeatedly called for the return of US forces to Bagram Airbase and the US has pivoted to the Taliban’s new Pakistani enemy over the past year and a half of his second term, both of which the NYT mentioned as possible obstacles. The Taliban also refuses to return the US arms and equipment that were left in Afghanistan while denying that it’s holding a dual Afghan-American citizen prisoner. The State Department thus predictably told the NYT that bilateral ties won’t be normalized.
Two of the experts that the NYT interviewed referenced Trump 2.0’s business-driven foreign policy, ergo why some might be surprised that the State Department rejected normalizing bilateral ties as a quid pro quo for presumably privileged access to Afghanistan’s rare earth minerals wealth. This goes to show that geostrategy, not geo-economics, is presently determining Trump 2.0’s policy towards Afghanistan. Interestingly enough, however, it’s the opposite with the Taliban. Here are three background briefings:
* 2 July: “Reviewing Russia’s Latest UNSC Briefing On Afghanistan”
* 19 July: “Lavrov Warned That Western Arms & Ammo Are Being Sent From Ukraine To ISIS-K In Afghanistan”
* 16 August: “Five Reflections On The Fifth Anniversary Of The Taliban’s Return To Power”
In a nutshell, Pakistan is passively facilitating the flow of arms to ISIS-K as part of its undeclared war with Afghanistan, which the US discreetly approves of as a means of pressuring the Taliban into complying with its demands. If the Taliban were weakened or deposed, they might not ever regain their former strength due to their historical Pakistani patron having cut them off and their new Russian military-technical partner being unable to replace the multifaceted support that Islamabad previously provided.
The end result could be the re-subjugation of Afghanistan, but this time as a US-Pakistani client state that would serve as a launchpad for expanding their military and economic influence into Central Asia, which aligns with Trump 2.0’s Neo-Reagan Doctrine of rolling back Russian influence. Turkiye is already poised to do the same from the west via August 2025’s “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity”, which also functions as a NATO military logistics corridor, so the combined effect could be profound.
Given the grand strategic consequences if the US and Pakistan successfully re-subjugate Afghanistan, there’s a certain logic to why Trump 2.0 rejected the rare earth minerals opportunity that the Taliban offered it. The group arguably did this as a preemptive de-escalation move that would also gauge the US’ intentions, which are now crystal clear. Looking forward, joint US-Pakistani pressure on Afghanistan is therefore expected to increase, which could lead to an increase in Russian-Taliban military-technical ties.
Source: author’s blog
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