The latest confrontation around the Strait of Hormuz exposes a dangerous contradiction: measures intended to restore deterrence may be deepening the insecurity they promise to resolve. On September 8, Washington said it destroyed five Iranian oil tankers following missile attacks on an American warship. Tehran subsequently claimed attacks against ships and a base used by American forces in Jordan. These competing announcements establish an escalating confrontation, although Iranian claims of successful strikes require independent verification.
The strategic question extends beyond who can inflict greater damage. It concerns whether force can change behaviour without making compromise politically impossible. At Hormuz, durable deterrence requires both credible protection for shipping and a credible bargain under which restraint produces tangible benefits.
The Escalation Trap
Washington’s approach combines punishment with utmost economic pressure. Destroying tankers raises the cost of Iranian attacks while targeting assets associated with export revenue. It has been reported that the US asked the crews to leave the ships before targeting them. That precaution suggests an attempt to calibrate violence, but limiting casualties does not necessarily limit strategic consequences.
For Tehran, pressure on oil exports can strengthen the incentive to distribute economic pain across the Gulf. The resulting logic is reciprocal: Washington seeks to make disruption prohibitively expensive; Iran seeks to make suppressing its exports prohibitively disruptive. Each side can interpret the other’s retaliation as proof that additional coercion is necessary.
This dynamic creates a distinction between tactical success and strategic effectiveness on the long run. Intercepting missiles protects a warship. Destroying a tanker removes an asset. Neither action would automatically persuades the adversary to abandon its objectives. Indeed, if leaders believe retreat invites further pressure, absorbing losses and fighting back may appear preferable to accepting vulnerability.
The strongest argument for retaliation is that unanswered attacks could encourage more attacks. Yet punishment becomes less persuasive when its endpoint remains unclear. Deterrence needs an intelligible boundary: what conduct must cease, what response follows violations, and what restraint earns. Without that boundary, demonstrations of resolve can become an indefinitely expanding contest and could drag the region into a long-term chaos.
Miscalculation adds another real danger. A strike intended as a warning could kill personnel, damage infrastructure or be interpreted as preparation for a larger offensive. Political leaders would then face pressure to respond before establishing what happened. Operational communication and targeted constructive talks matter a lot here, because adversaries cannot safely assume they understand each other’s intentions.
Total Commercial Confidence Is What Truly Matters
In fact, Iran does not need permanent physical control of Hormuz to impose substantial costs. Commercial shipping depends on insurers, crews, charterers and financiers accepting the manageable risk. Uncertainty can therefore obstruct trade even where naval passage remains technically possible.
On September 9, an Emirates National Oil Company executive described sharply elevated insurance and transit costs, alongside shipowners’ reluctance to enter the area. This development illustrates why military assurances alone cannot restore normal commerce. An escorted voyage demonstrates capability; while sustained, affordable commercial traffic demonstrates the real confidence in shipping and trading without risks.
Naval protection consequently faces an uneven burden. Defenders must provide repeated reassurance across many voyages, while an attacker can undermine that reassurance through occasional incidents. This does not make protection futile. It means success should be measured through vessel participation, insurance conditions and reliable deliveries, alongside interception rates.
Asian Importers and the Limits of Diversification
The consequences extend particularly strongly into Asia as major importers of Gulf oil and gas. The US Energy Information Administration estimated that Asian markets received 84 percent of oil passing through Hormuz in 2024. China, India, Japan and South Korea together accounted for 69 percent. These historical figures establish structural exposure; they should not be mistaken for current wartime flows.
That exposure creates shared interests without guaranteeing a common strategy. Asian importers could support maritime monitoring, emergency coordination and diplomatic pressure while disagreeing over sanctions or military participation. Their most useful contribution may be to make commercial normalization an incentive for both sides, rather than another instrument of geopolitical alignment.
Diversification offers only partial protection while it remains a non-sustainable solution, at least for the next 3 years to come. Many reports confirm that most volumes moving through Hormuz lacked alternative routes out of the region. Pipelines and reserves can cushion disruption, but cannot simply reproduce the entire maritime system. Meanwhile, the renewed Houthis attacks on Saudi Arabia further complicates the alternatives, proving one more time that shifting routes does not eliminate the core regional vulnerability.
A Bargain That Can Be Verified
Diplomacy must address implementation, not merely announce restraint. At the September 1 SCO summit, the Iranian President, Masoud Pezeshkian linked Iranian reciprocity and free navigation to American compliance with an earlier interim agreement. His position is a negotiating claim, not independent proof of responsibility for the agreement’s breakdown.
A workable maritime arrangement would specify reciprocal steps, verification and consequences: an end to attacks on merchant vessels, monitored transit procedures, direct incident communications, and clearly sequenced negotiations over restrictions affecting Iranian exports. Independent reporting would help distinguish genuine violations from disputed battlefield narratives. Gulf governments and major Asian importers should participate much more because they bear the consequences of failure, and they also share core common interests with Iran itself.
Sequencing would be equally important. Demanding complete compliance before offering any reciprocal concession could leave negotiations paralyzed. Smaller, reversible steps could test intentions while limiting exposure: verified pauses, published transit arrangements and scheduled reviews. The aim would be to establish evidence of reliability before requiring either government to accept greater risks. Such an arrangement would also need procedures for containing isolated incidents. Otherwise, a disputed launch or an attack by a regional armed group could collapse the entire bargain.
The main issue in my view, the war has not ended yet and the battlefield is still busy with missiles and weapons, therefore, it is impossible to maintain a safe passage through Hormuz before ending the war completely and politically resolving the conflict. Without that, the risks remain high and ultimately securing Hormuz would be an unrealistic objective.
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