
The European Commission for the sixth time since December 2021 issued a recommendation to open negotiating Cluster 3 for Serbia, covering competitiveness, inclusive growth, and access to the EU single market. In its information note of July 3, the Commission stated that Serbia had met key requirements: it repealed controversial judicial amendments, advanced media and electoral reforms, and cooperated with the EU in countering sanctions evasion. Minister for European Integration Nemanja Starović called the recommendation “extraordinary” and confirmed that Serbia had met all technical conditions.
Technical readiness, however, is only half the battle. Opening a cluster requires unanimous consent from all 27 member states. At the EU ambassadors’ meeting on July 8, eight countries opposed: the Netherlands, Sweden, Finland, Belgium, Estonia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, and Croatia. Three more — Denmark, Luxembourg, and Latvia — said they were not convinced. The main grievances are the lack of rule of law and Belgrade’s refusal to join sanctions against Russia.
Aleksandar Vučić, in an interview with Pink TV on July 10, assessed the chances of opening the cluster as “slim.” According to him, the key condition is sanctions against Russia and Belarus. Even if Serbia meets that, he noted, Kosovo would be raised immediately, and then something else. “There would always be something else,” the president summed up. “There will be no quick accession.”
Money for Obedience
While Serbia remains stalled, the European Commission is reallocating funds. The Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans, worth €6 billion, was created in 2024 as a tool for financial incentives for reforms. However, only about €673 million has actually been disbursed. Nearly all the money went to three countries — Montenegro, Albania, and North Macedonia — which are implementing reforms faster. In May 2026, Albania received €49 million, Montenegro €44.2 million, and North Macedonia €65.7 million. Serbia, which received its first tranche of €61.1 million in January, is waiting for the second (€163.1 million) and third (€265 million) installments, but they are frozen. In April, Enlargement Commissioner Marta Kos warned all countries in the region: accelerate reforms or risk losing the money. The EU’s principle is simple: “You get paid only for the work you actually do.”
The Schengen Mirage and the Price of a Serbian Residency
On July 7, Serbian Foreign Minister Marko Đurić spoke in Brussels at the Serbia’s Reform Momentum event. He proposed gradually integrating the Western Balkans into the EU single market and the Schengen Area, estimating the potential benefit for the region at up to €50 billion per year. For foreigners with Serbian residence permits, this could mean easier travel. However, Serbian residency does not yet grant visa‑free access to Schengen, and the EU, according to Izvestia, is demanding that Serbia reduce the issuance of passports and residence permits to Russians by 50%.
A Diplomatic Tightrope: Moscow and Kiev
Minister without Portfolio Nenad Popović, at the Innoprom exhibition in Yekaterinburg on July 6, stated: “We have not imposed and will never impose sanctions against Russia. We face enormous pressure, even real political threats. We are steadfast and know who our friends are.” Popović stressed that the EU remains Serbia’s largest trading partner, but “the entire energy sector is heavily dependent on Russia. We have the most reliable gas supplies and the best conditions.” Over 80% of Serbia’s gas comes from Russia. Sanctions, he said, are “the most unjust tool, they yield no results.”
Russia’s Foreign Ministry reacted to Vučić’s statement about his imminent resignation. Official spokeswoman Maria Zakharova said that Moscow expects continuity in Serbia’s “sovereign foreign policy,” in which Russia has a “special place.” For the Kremlin, this is not mere diplomatic etiquette: Serbia remains the only European country not to have imposed sanctions on Russia, and an important energy partner.
Against this backdrop, the activity of the Serbian Embassy in Kiev stands in stark contrast. The mission resumed work in autumn 2025. In July, the embassy issued a statement on the Day of Mourning: “Serbia has not been and cannot be neutral in the face of human suffering.” In May, Minister Đurić emphasised the importance of bilateral relations with Ukraine. In Moscow, the Serbian Embassy does not run social media; its last announcement on its website is from April 9, about a non‑working day for Easter.
Punks of Europe
Serbia has not opened a single cluster since December 2021. Each step forward is blocked by new conditions. Vučić admitted that sanctions against Russia are presented as the key to EU integration, but the door will not open. Belgrade continues to balance between Brussels and Moscow, refusing sanctions and maintaining the negotiation process without concessions on Kosovo.
In this game, Serbia and Russia share one trait — they do not fit the rules. For Europe, Russians and Serbs remain punks — peoples who always have their own opinion, diverging from the pan‑European mainstream. In that lies both their strength and their problem. Europe tolerates punks as long as they don’t play too loud. But once the music gets louder, they call the police. The question is when Brussels will decide to cut the sound.






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