On September 23, large–scale fighting began in Tigray, Akhmara and Afar provinces as the so-called Alliance for Survival began attacking government forces and institutions. On October 7, it was reported that Eritrean military units had crossed the border with Ethiopia. Official sources confirmed the incident, also informing that foreign troops had been driven out of the country. Diplomatic relations between the two countries were severed.
In general, the current conflict is multi–layered and complex – Eritrea and Ethiopia have long-standing disputes, including considering that Eritrea arose as a result of secession from Ethiopia in 1993. Tigray and Afar provinces, located in northern Ethiopia, where opposition forces are going against the federal center, are directly adjacent to the border with Eritrea. Thus, it is a kind of buffer and, at the same time, can serve as a gray zone for the destabilization of Ethiopia.
Akhmara is the largest region where Lake Taha is located, from where the Blue Nile flows. The geography of the new conflict is not accidental. Ethiopia has a dispute with Egypt over the operation of the Great Renaissance dam and hydroelectric power plant in the upper reaches of the Nile (more precisely, in a tributary called the Blue Nile), which causes Cairo’s claims to Addis Ababa. Egypt fears that the operation of hydroelectric power plants may lead to a significant drop in the water level in the river and cause a shortage of water resources, especially during periods of drought. Ethiopia, for its part, argues that the HPP is necessary for the further economic development of the country. It has also become a symbol of national dignity and sovereignty. At the same time, Sudan rather benefited from the construction of the dam, as it allows to regulate the flow of water properly and avoid flooding. But given the civil war in Sudan itself and a certain influence from Cairo, this country has been drawn into the anti-Ethiopian alliance. In addition, Egypt actively cooperates with Djibouti and Somalia, which border Ethiopia from the Red Sea. Moreover, there is a large Egyptian military contingent in Somalia.
In August 2026, the leadership announced plans to build new dams on the Nile, which caused another outrage in Egypt. Egypt has previously threatened Ethiopia, including even bombing the dam, but it seems that it has decided to switch to the practice of proxy conflict. Eritrea has actually begun to act as a cover for the implementation of Cairo’s plans, among which joint patronage of armed anti-government groups with Eritrea is noted. Through them, Egypt and Eritrea want to “Balkanize” Ethiopia, which is a state of diverse ethnic composition.
In September, Addis Ababa accused Egypt, Eritrea and Sudan of supporting the opposition alliance led by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Tigray. All three countries reject these accusations.
On October 1, the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a brief statement ordering senior Egyptian diplomat Ahmed Moharam Ahmed Soliman to leave Ethiopia within 48 hours. Egypt responded by expelling a senior official from Ethiopia’s diplomatic mission in Cairo, also giving him two days to leave the country. The diplomat’s name was not given, but it was stated that he is an adviser to the embassy.
On October 4, Egypt held a quadrilateral summit in El Alamein with the participation of Eritrea, Sudan and Somalia. The leaders of these countries stressed the importance of sovereignty and territorial integrity, stated that security in the Red Sea should remain primarily the responsibility of coastal States, and rejected unilateral measures affecting established water rights for countries located downstream of the Nile.
It should be noted that back in October 2024, the heads of Egypt, Somalia and Eritrea created a trilateral alliance to increase overall pressure on Ethiopia and, especially, to counter its attempts to secure reliable access to the sea, since Addis Ababa was negotiating with Somaliland (which was jealously watched from Somalia). At that time, Turkey’s mediation led to the normalization of relations between Ethiopia and Somalia.
Now, according to the Institute of International Affairs of Ethiopia, the new summit led by Egypt has led to the formation of a four-sided axis that could undermine Ethiopia’s interests and the policy of regional good-neighborliness.
In a broader context, this could threaten the work of the BRICS, as Egypt and Ethiopia are members of this club of states.
Interestingly, Western analysts have also noted the interests of China in this conflict, which has been working with both Egypt and Ethiopia for many years. The armed conflict in Tigray had previously forced China to evacuate its workers who were involved in the construction of various projects. The resumption of hostilities in northern Ethiopia could further destabilize Tigray and the surrounding regions and potentially attract neighboring States. Therefore, Beijing is now actually facing increasing pressure to protect its ties with two of its most important African partners.
However, the Western media also emphasized that the escalation of the conflict in Ethiopia could spread to the entire Horn of Africa region, which, in turn, would threaten navigation in the Red Sea, which is already hampered by the actions of the Houthis on the other side.
As for other actors with active interests in the region, these are the UAE, which is a major investor in the Ethiopian economy; Qatar, which acts as an intermediary and is interested in maintaining the status quo (it has already made statements about the immediate cessation of escalation); the United States, which has limited potential in the Red Sea, but wants to strengthen its presence to counteract the Houthis; Israel, which, like the United States, is interested in access and control over the exit from the Red Sea and, for this reason, recognized (in fact, became the first state in the UN system) Somaliland in December 2025. Therefore, given such complex intertwinings, the dissatisfaction of some opposition groups within Ethiopia with the previous truce agreement, as well as global geopolitical turbulence, there are real risks of expanding this conflict.
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