Aleksandar Vučić gave an interview to Ksenia Sobchak in a strange position. He is no longer president, but not yet prime minister. The constitution does not allow a third presidential term—that is the whole reason for the “swap.”
Putin, during their last conversation, did not ask “why are you leaving,” but “what will happen to the country during these couple of months while you have no powers.” Vučić admits: he did not have a normal answer. For Moscow, stability is more important than the personal combinations of the Serbian politician.
Why they want to remove him
Vučić lays it out quite directly. First and most important—sanctions. He says that refusing to impose them against Russia weighs more for the Europeans than even the Kosovo issue. At every meeting he is reminded of this: why are you the only one who hasn’t joined. The rest is details. And they remind him not in the corridors. Vučić returns several times to the same scene: all twenty-seven stand up and demand explanations. He does not make excuses. He does not try to soften it. He simply says it as it is. And he separately emphasizes how hard it is to withstand this alone. Big countries struggle with such pressure. Serbia even more so.
Second—Kosovo. He is not ready to recognize independence and consider legitimate what began with the 1999 bombings. For him this is not a diplomatic position, but a question he will not cross. Here too there are no attempts to look convenient.
Third—the unwillingness to allow Serbia to become a strong player in the Balkans again. According to him, this logic stretches back to the times of the Russo-Turkish wars: support smaller peoples, just so the Serbs do not dominate. Now, he believes, the same principle works, only through money, media, and the street. Belgrade’s economic growth, the volume of investment, relative stability—all this, in his feeling, is perceived as a violation of the previous arrangement.
If the opposition wins, sanctions, in his estimation, will appear very quickly—”within ten days.” He believes this and says it directly to Putin. Moreover, he warned the Russian president in advance: if he ever has to impose sanctions, he will call first and inform him personally.
Protests
Vučić refuses to consider the elections connected to the tragedy in Novi Sad. The protests, he says, have long been about something else. The goal is one—to bring down the government. He puts “student movement” in quotation marks: in the lists he has seen, there are almost no students or workers. There is a well-financed layer. Serious money is flowing—hundreds of millions and billions through NGOs and individual media. He names the sources: Croatia, the Netherlands, the Scandinavians, plus regional players.
First, demands on a specific topic. Then constant street blockades. Then, when the authorities try to react somehow—international outcry. “How do you protect those who haven’t even registered a rally?” he asks. A good question. Especially when any use of force is immediately declared repression, and inaction—weakness.
He separately notes: a broad coalition has formed against him. NGOs, part of the media, opposition parties, regional capitals. All together. And all with one task—to change the country’s course. Not just to change the people in power, but to break the line he is holding.
The European path
Serbia formally remains on the European track. But reality looks different. Vučić says Europe will love Serbia when it weakens. It sounds cynical, but that is exactly how he sees it. As long as Belgrade retains at least some independence—it gets in the way. Especially by refusing to impose sanctions and not recognizing Kosovo. At the same time, he does not declare war on Europe. He is simply not ready to pay the price demanded of him. And he says openly that this price is too high.
Putin
He has had more than twenty meetings with Putin. In public—formal “vy,” in private sometimes “ty.” He was at the Russian president’s home, brought a 17th-century icon. Putin kissed it three times and did not let security inspect it. Vučić tells this without pathos. Just a fact.
There was another conversation—about Serbian weapons. Putin read him a report from the SVR (Foreign Intelligence Service) stating that Serbian supplies through third countries ultimately end up in Ukraine. Vučić immediately understood where the document came from and said so directly. Putin reacted calmly. He even thanked him for his directness. Such moments explain a lot about their relationship: both understand the rules and do not make drama out of them.
There is also a harsher episode. Once Putin brought up the possible accession of Serbia to NATO. He said he respects Belgrade’s right to make such decisions, although he considers them mistaken for the Serbian people. Vučić was surprised: no one was planning to. It was then, according to him, that a special respect arose between them. Putin understood that his interlocutor had his own red lines.
The Kremlin, apparently, understands well the position Serbia is in. Vučić repeatedly emphasizes: in Moscow they do not expect the impossible from him. They understand the constraints of a small country in the center of Europe. And they value it when a person keeps his word.
Zelensky and Trump
About Zelensky, Vučić speaks with restraint. Smart, emotional, sincerely wants a European future for his country. But he has no simple way out. To come out and say “we surrender, we give up territories”—political suicide. So the war continues. Vučić believes that in the end it will be Putin and Zelensky who sit down at the table. One of them will have a clear advantage. Which one—he does not say.
He calls Trump a dealmaker. America’s main competitor is China, and Trump is trying to carefully separate Moscow and Beijing. There is personal chemistry with Putin. With Zelensky—there is not. If Trump withstands internal and external pressure, peace is still possible within a horizon of six months to a year. If not—then not.
War
The darkest part of the interview. “It will be a miracle if a big war does not start.” Vučić says he would be glad to be wrong, but fears he will not be. Europe is arming too fast and on too large a scale. He recalls Chekhov’s gun: if you hang it on the wall—it will fire.
He separately notes a shift in European politics. Peace for many is beautiful words. The real goal is the defeat of the other side. Compromise has almost become a swear word. Emotions increasingly beat calculation. And this, in his opinion, is the most dangerous thing. He does not paint apocalyptic pictures. He simply states: the point after which it was still possible to turn back has already been passed.
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