Serbia has reached a point where the familiar order is no longer working. More than twelve years of dominance by the Serbian Progressive Party and Aleksandar Vučić ended with his own acknowledgment of defeat. According to the preliminary count, the “Student List” has secured an absolute majority in parliament with 140 seats against 105 for the SNS. This allows it to form a government on its own, without entering coalitions with other parties — to the considerable disappointment of “European Serbia.”
Especially noticeable was the flow of Serbs from Kosovo and Metohija. Since the state was unable (and, in essence, unwilling) to organize voting on the territory of the province, thousands of people set out early in the morning for Central Serbia. Long queues formed at the administrative crossings of Jarinje and Brnjak — waiting times exceeded an hour, and many crossed the border on foot. For the first time this flow moved in an organized manner, yet without the participation of the “Serbian List,” without pressure or coercion. The majority travelled of their own free will: fatigue from constant concessions and the daily pressure from the Priština authorities proved stronger than apathy.
A force that grew not in offices but on the streets is approaching power. At the same time, it is important to understand its nature: the “Student List” consists of 250 candidates — predominantly professors, doctors, actors, specialists, and public figures — selected by student plenums. The students themselves deliberately did not join the list. And here a noticeable contradiction arises. The movement openly speaks of military neutrality, of maintaining relations with Russia, of refusing sanctions, and of a firm position on Kosovo within the framework of the Constitution and Resolution 1244. Representatives of the list had earlier stated that in the event of their victory Serbia would maintain its principled position against the introduction of anti-Russian sanctions. At the same time, its victory is already being warmly welcomed in Brussels. This gap between the declared course and the external reaction still needs to be understood.
The Crisis of “Multi-Vectorism”
The system that Vučić built over the years rested on the ability to say different things to different audiences. For his own citizens he repeatedly used pro-Russian rhetoric and the card of defending national interests, while in foreign policy he demonstrated “readiness for compromises.” The patriotic opposition saw in this not great strategic balancing, but a gradual surrender of positions: movement toward the de facto recognition of the loss of Kosovo in exchange for a European perspective, supplies of ammunition to Ukraine, and the transfer of economic levers to external players.
The difference between public statements and real actions became increasingly glaring. While state media branded the students “Soros agents,” the president himself received Alex Soros and discussed projects such as “Open Balkans” with him. When such a gap becomes too obvious, trust begins to crumble. Power built on constant maneuvering at some point ceases to be fully its own for any of the sides.
From Tragedy to Political Force
It all began with a concrete event. On 1 November 2024 in Novi Sad, a concrete canopy at the railway station collapsed. Sixteen people died. The tragedy quickly grew into a conversation about systemic corruption. The protests, which began as a demand for an investigation, over almost two years turned into a broad movement against the concentration of power and control over the information space. Students blocked universities and roads; they were joined by teachers, trade unions, and a wide variety of citizen groups.
Especially memorable was the large march that ended in Belgrade. At the head of the column walked a student carrying a wooden cross; banners with the face of Christ appeared, and behind them fluttered flags with the slogan “Nema predaje” (“No surrender”). This looked not like a pre-planned election move, but as a manifestation of the fact that a significant part of society sought in the protest not only social justice, but also support in its own cultural and religious foundations. Contrary to the ideas of certain liberal near-cabinet circles in the EU and the NGOs connected with them, the protest was not a Western project or a “color revolution.” Fatigue with professional political cynicism found other, more organic forms of expression.
The Shadow Side of the Transition
Such large-scale changes of power rarely pass without sharp episodes. On election day in Belgrade a group of young people pushed the 82-year-old mother of Aleksandar Vučić, insulted her, and took away a bag of groceries. The suspect was later detained — this indicates the absence of revolutionary chaos in the country.
The Main Challenge
While the domestic political course of the movement is more or less clear, its foreign-policy programme remains extremely vague. The main programme — the “Student Plan” of 11 points — contains no foreign-policy section at all. Against this background Vučić has already claimed that the “Student List” will introduce sanctions against Russia by spring.
It should be noted that representatives of the movement had earlier stated that in the event of their victory Serbia would preserve its principled position against the introduction of anti-Russian sanctions. Nevertheless, the foreign-policy orientation of the country’s new leadership remains far from fully clear, and it is still too early to draw unambiguous conclusions.
After a period of prolonged instability, Serbia is entering a period of even greater uncertainty. What will the foreign-policy course of the new government be? Will the “students,” lacking experience in government, cope with administration and be able to implement the planned reforms? This will become clear in the near future.
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