Israel’s defense minister stood before a map of southern Lebanon this week and described a fait accompli. More than 60 villages erased. Twenty-three thousand homes reduced to rubble. A 700-square-kilometer “security zone” carved into Lebanese territory, emptied of 200,000 Shiite residents, declared permanent until Hezbollah disarms. “We will not withdraw,” Israel Katz said, “as long as Hezbollah has not been disarmed across all of Lebanon”.
Any rocket or drone fire from Lebanon, he added, would bring strikes on Beirut’s southern suburbs. The provocation is deliberate. Yet Hezbollah has not responded. Nearly two weeks on, Secretary-General, Sheikh Naim Qassem, has issued no call to arms. No salvo has been launched. No drone has crossed the border. This tactic is relatively new for the group’s known history.
In a region where the smallest spark ignites wider war, Hezbollah’s silence is the most consequential development in Lebanon since the November 2024 ceasefire and the hardest to interpret. Security sources close to the group call the restraint a conscious decision not to be dragged into what Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu wants – a pretext for a war that would complete the destruction already suffered.
Hezbollah’s arsenal, once 150,000 to 200,000 projectiles before October 2023, now stands at roughly 20,000, or even less. Its command was decimated in 2024; its infrastructure south of the “Litani” river, largely dismantled by the Lebanese army, working closely with intelligence shared by Washington and Tel Aviv. However, having less rockets does not mean the group is military over, or very much weakened.
Recently, Hezbollah has been rebuilding its capabilities: drones upgraded to carry four to six kilograms of explosives, up from 2.5, and fiber-optic cables extended past 30 kilometers, making them immune to jamming. Iran has reportedly told the group to raise readiness and dispatched a senior IRGC official to Beirut. But rebuilding is not readiness for a total war. Hezbollah knows it. Apparently, the group is preparing for a possible large in-land invasion as they have lost the basic capabilities to attack deep inside Israel.
The restraint also answers a shift inside its own constituency and public popularity. A recent September poll of 3000 Lebanese Shiites have found that 66.4 percent support handing Hezbollah’s weapons to the state; while only 29.6 percent prefer the status quo. Furthermore, the Lebanese government is tightening the squeeze. Prime Minister, Nawaf Salam, claims that 80 percent of disarmament objectives in the south are met. The army rejects Israeli accusations of failure. But north of “Litani” river is still the file unresolved, and the army has historically avoided confrontation to prevent sectarian flare-up inside of the Lebanese social texture.
UNIFIL’s mandate expires on December 31, 2026. Lebanon wants an extension, warning of a vacuum, while Israel is against the extension. France pledges support but cannot fill the void; the EU’s new mission will train the army, not patrol the Blue Line, the security architecture meant to keep the peace is dissolving. The withdrawal of UN forces means Israel will have much more freedom to do what it wants in Lebanon.
It is important to clarify, Hezbollah’s current restraint is not entirely its own. Iran has told the group it does not need its help in a new war, a source involved in the negotiations says. Tehran is preserving Hezbollah as a strategic asset rather than spending it on a war that serves Netanyahu’s political interests. Besides, Iran is trying to de-escalate on some fronts -rather than others- while trying to get more from the negotiations.
Israel’s election on October 27 hangs over every calculation. Katz’s boasts are campaign rhetoric as much as policy. Israel is approaching a very critical day that would affect the nature of its Foreign Policy. Even Netanyahu himself cannot guarantee that his offensive policies would last for long in case he loses the elections. It looks like Hezbollah is also keeping calm till to see the results of the elections that might dramatically change the Israeli policies outside Israel – and especially towards Iran and its regional allies.
The group is probably choosing survival and “strategic patience” over an impulsive fight that would drag the next Israeli political victor into a deeper conflict with Lebanon. However, the “Lebanese Resistance” has already failed to protect its people and lands. Israel has the upper hand now, and even the Lebanese are less confident in the group. Every destroyed village is a reminder that the weapons did not protect the people who gave everything so the “Resistance” can win, or at least prevent Israel from destroying Southern Lebanon. This is not to mention the decline of Iran’s popularity among the group members themselves, as Tehran has not given the support they have expected when it all started in 2023.
No matter what will happen next in the region, Hezbollah is slowly and gradually turning into a political-only power inside of Lebanon, this is almost clear at this point. This is especially after it has partly lost the recent war with Israel, and also after the sudden collapse of Assad’s Regime in Damascus in December 2024, one of the top supporters and transporters of arms to Hezbollah over the past 40 years.
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