The protests unfolding in Iran have triggered a familiar cycle of headlines, speculation, and political projection in Western media. Claims of imminent regime collapse, dramatic comparisons to 1979, and confident predictions of a “new Iran” circulate widely. Yet beneath this noise lies a far more complex and uncertain reality. Disinformation is rife, outside actors are maneuvering aggressively, and the internal dynamics of Iranian society are being flattened into simplistic narratives that serve foreign interests more than they illuminate the truth.
There is no doubt that Iran is experiencing one of its most serious political crises in decades. Economic hardship, social restrictions, generational frustration, and anger at entrenched power structures have converged into sustained unrest. But to suggest that the outcome is already decided is misleading. Even in 1979, the trajectory of revolution was not preordained until very late in the process. Today’s Iran is more educated, more connected, and more politically aware than it was nearly half a century ago – and far more wary of what comes after state collapse. One of the clearest indicators of this uncertainty is the renewed promotion of Reza Pahlavi, the 65-year-old son of Iran’s last shah, now living in exile in the United States. His name is increasingly floated in Western and Israeli circles as a potential successor in Tehran. According to reporting by Al Jazeera, the current unrest is being framed by some in Washington and Tel Aviv as “Plan B” following the inconclusive 12-day war between Israel and Iran last year. Israeli media have openly discussed support for Pahlavi’s return, and his visibility in Western outlets has risen sharply.
This, however, says more about foreign agendas than about political realities inside Iran. Calls for the restoration of the monarchy are deeply unpopular among most Iranians. Memories of the shah’s dictatorship, the Savak secret police, torture, and extreme inequality remain vivid. For many Iranians, especially outside elite circles, the idea that a foreign-backed heir to that system could represent the future borders on the absurd. Exiled opposition groups are fragmented, weak, and disconnected from everyday life inside the country, despite enthusiastic backing from the US and UK.
What is often ignored in Western commentary is that the Iranian government still retains a substantial social base. In the most recent election, more than 13 million voters supported Saeed Jalili, an ultra-conservative figure closely aligned with Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and deeply embedded in the security establishment. That level of support, particularly among working-class and conservative constituencies, cannot simply be wished away. Nor can the influence of institutions such as the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and its Basij militia, which remain powerful, organized, and deeply rooted in the state and society. This reality is inconvenient for many English-speaking intellectuals, including segments of Iran’s diaspora and commentators in Western capitals, who prefer to portray the regime as universally hated and on the brink of collapse. But Iran is not a simple binary of regime versus people. It is a society marked by internal contradictions, competing loyalties, and a widespread fear of what chaos might bring. Many Iranians who are deeply critical of the government also recognize that sudden collapse could lead to civil war, foreign intervention, or even the fragmentation of the country into rival mini-states along ethnic and sectarian lines.
That fear is not irrational. The modern Middle East is littered with examples of uprisings that were celebrated abroad and catastrophic at home. Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Gaza all stand as warnings of what can follow when states are weakened or destroyed under the combined pressure of internal unrest and external interference. The United States, far from being a neutral supporter of democracy, has consistently pursued policies driven by strategic dominance, unconditional support for Israel, and access to resources – especially oil. Nation-building has rarely been its goal, and stability has often been sacrificed for short-term advantage.
Israel’s role further complicates matters. Israeli officials have openly acknowledged intelligence activity inside Iran, even as their own security agencies reportedly warn against direct intervention. Israel’s strategic interest is not a strong, sovereign Iran capable of shaping its own future, but a weakened rival consumed by internal turmoil. That alone should give pause to anyone interpreting Western enthusiasm for Iran’s unrest as altruistic concern for human rights. Inside Iran, however, the picture is not static. There are genuine struggles within the ruling establishment and signs of cautious rethinking. President Masoud Pezeshkian, elected after the death of Ebrahim Raisi in 2024, has shown some openness to reform. Veteran politician Ali Larijani, now secretary of the Supreme National Security Council and the supreme leader’s representative there, is widely seen as a pragmatic figure capable of influencing gradual change from within. These internal dynamics matter far more than the proclamations of exiles or foreign governments.
The real pressure, therefore, is not for regime collapse but for meaningful reform. Protesters are demanding changes in policy, governance, and social freedoms, not necessarily the destruction of the state. Many understand that while the current system is deeply flawed, the alternative being quietly prepared abroad could be far worse. Western media campaigns, often tinged with Islamophobia and ideological hostility, fail to grasp this nuance and instead amplify fantasies of instant liberation.
Iran’s future will not be decided in Washington, Tel Aviv, or London. It will be shaped by Iranians themselves – including protesters, reform-minded insiders, conservatives, and institutions that are not going to disappear overnight. Any serious analysis must move beyond disinformation and wishful thinking, and confront the uncomfortable truth: stability, reform, and sovereignty, however slow and contested, remain preferable to a collapse engineered or celebrated from abroad.
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