One year after the fall of Syria’s old regime, the country remains shrouded in what military theorists once called the “fog of war” – a condition of uncertainty, incomplete information, and contradictory interpretations. External observers, diplomats, journalists, and analysts offer sharply divergent assessments of what has emerged in Damascus since December 2024. For some, Syria has finally entered a long-awaited phase of justice, accountability, and reintegration into the international community. For others, the change of power looks less like a revolution than a reconfiguration: a new ruling clan replacing the old, reproducing familiar patterns of patronage, repression, and violence, often along ethno-confessional lines.
This ambiguity has been amplified by a series of momentous decisions taken in 2025: the gradual lifting of sanctions by the United States, the European Union, and eventually the United Nations. These moves have reignited debate about the nature of Syria’s new elite, the real balance of power inside the country, and the effectiveness of sanctions as a tool of regime change. Understanding this moment requires disentangling political myth from institutional reality, and symbolism from substance.
In December 2024, many Western politicians greeted the overthrow of the previous Syrian regime with visible enthusiasm. After more than a decade of war, sanctions, and diplomatic isolation, the fall of Bashar al-Assad seemed to confirm the long-held belief that authoritarian systems in the Middle East were ultimately brittle. Yet the forces that filled the vacuum in Damascus were neither liberal reformers nor technocratic caretakers.
De facto power passed to a coalition of armed groups led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), formerly known as Jabhat Fatah al-Sham and earlier Jabhat al-Nusra, once Al-Qaeda’s affiliate in the Levant. At the center of this coalition stood Ahmad al-Sharaa, also known as Abu Mohammad al-Jolani, who emerged as Syria’s transitional president.
Over the course of 2025, al-Sharaa systematically placed loyalists and relatives in key state positions. The resemblance to the governance style of the former Assad–al-Akhras clan was hard to miss. In place of Assad’s inner circle, a new network crystallized around the al-Sharaa and al-Droubi families (the latter linked to the president through his wife, Latifa al-Droubi, from an influential Sunni lineage).
The General Secretariat of the Presidency – effectively the second most powerful institution in the absence of a prime minister – was entrusted to Maher al-Sharaa, the president’s brother. According to Reuters, economic restructuring fell under the supervision of another brother, Hazem al-Sharaa. Alongside him operated a shadowy “economic committee”, apparently parallel to formal state structures, led by Abu Mariam al-Australi (also known as Abraham Sukkarieh), an Australian citizen of Lebanese origin sanctioned by Australia and the EU for alleged terrorist financing. His long-standing association with al-Sharaa dates back to the Jabhat al-Nusra period.
Even the Central Bank reflected this duality. While Abdelkader Husrieh held the official post of governor, real influence reportedly rested with Mustafa Qadid, better known as Abu Abdel Rahman, an HTS insider acting as a “shadow governor”. Syrian outlet Enab Baladi described a clandestine committee that quietly took control of former regime-linked companies and assets, reshaping the economy away from public scrutiny.
Relatives of Latifa al-Droubi were also integrated into the system: Ahmad al-Droubi, the president’s son-in-law, became head of the Central Bank’s treasury, while Maher Marwan, married to Latifa’s sister, was appointed governor of Damascus. These appointments reinforced the impression of a state captured by family networks rather than governed by transparent institutions.
Yet the system also appeared to have limits. When revelations surfaced about the luxurious lifestyle and corrupt dealings of Jamal al-Sharaa, another presidential brother, Ahmad al-Sharaa intervened directly. In August 2025, he ordered Jamal’s office closed and his activities terminated. The episode suggested an attempt to impose discipline within the ruling family – but also underscored how personalized power had become.
The essence of the new Syrian state thus lies in its hybridity: formal ministers coexist with informal overseers; official hierarchies are mirrored by shadow structures; and revolutionary rhetoric masks deeply traditional modes of rule.
Against this backdrop, the debate over sanctions unfolded with considerable confusion. Media headlines often implied swift normalization, but specialists understood that dismantling Syria’s sanctions regime would be legally intricate and politically fraught.
First, there was the U.S. Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act, which entered into force on June 17, 2020, with bipartisan support in Congress. The Caesar Act imposed sweeping secondary sanctions, effectively deterring not only American but also European, Asian, and Middle Eastern actors from engaging economically with Syria. Even if the EU were to lift its own restrictions, Caesar would continue to cast a long shadow. Moreover, U.S. sanctions on Syria predated the civil war by decades: Washington designated Syria a state sponsor of terrorism as early as 1979, amid Cold War and Arab–Israeli tensions.
Second, HTS itself remained under UN sanctions as a terrorist organization. Since its members now constituted Syria’s leadership, a legal paradox emerged: should sanctions against HTS automatically apply to the Syrian state? In December 2024, Damascus announced the formal dissolution of HTS and its integration into new political institutions, but this raised further questions. How would the UN Security Council interpret such a transformation? What procedural path existed to lift sanctions if, and only if, all permanent members agreed?
Third, there was the moral and political dilemma: should sanctions be lifted while reports of human rights abuses persisted? Violence against ethno-confessional minorities in March 2025 prompted the EU, even after lifting broad economic sanctions on May 20, to impose targeted measures on three Syrian factions just eight days later. European officials also attempted to link sanctions relief to Syria’s stance toward Russia, demanding the removal of Russian military presence – a condition Damascus largely ignored.
to be continued
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