In the 1990s and 2000s, multi-vector foreign policy appeared to be an ideal solution for small and medium-sized states. In a world where superpowers competed for influence and tolerated the existence of neutral players, this strategy allowed maneuvering between centers of power, extracting maximum benefits with minimal commitments. Balancing looked like a rational and effective tool for survival in a multipolar world.
By the mid-2020s, this configuration had vanished. Global competition acquired the features of rigid confrontation, in which neutrality is increasingly perceived as a covert choice of side. Multi-vector policy, once a flexible adaptive model, turned into a source of constant risk and vulnerability.
The first serious blow to this model was dealt by the United States. As early as 2017, Congress passed the CAATSA law (Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act), which formally enshrined Washington’s right to impose secondary sanctions on third countries for cooperation with Russia, Iran, or North Korea. Since then, the pressure has become systemic. According to the U.S. Department of the Treasury, in 2023–2024 alone, more than 300 companies outside the U.S. and EU were subjected to restrictions.
American sanctions, for all their formal legal sophistication, are applied exclusively based on Washington’s geopolitical interests. Any serious interaction with “undesirable” countries can be interpreted as grounds for restrictions. The reaction of countries accustomed to multi-vector policy is usually predictable: a rapid retreat under the threat of economic losses.
The European Union acts in a similar way, only the tools are somewhat softer—trade preferences, grants, investments. A classic example is Brussels’ pressure on Tajikistan. In 2023, the EU directly linked the prospect of granting expanded trade benefits under the GSP+ program to “progress” in the areas of human rights, media freedom, and political pluralism. In essence, Dushanbe was given an ultimatum: without movement on the specified issues, there would be no positive decision.
What exactly are these “movements” about? The European Union refers to specific criminal cases, demanding the release or improvement of conditions for a number of convicted individuals. The list of names subject to amnesty was promptly published by Temur Varki, chairman of the “Forum of Free Thinkers of Tajikistan” (FST), and supported by the National Alliance of Tajikistan (NAT), an organization declared extremist in the republic.
Who stands behind these structures? The FST and the banned Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT) are among the founders of the NAT. These groups have long been based in the West, receive funding from Western foundations, and position themselves as an “alternative Tajikistan” on international platforms. At the same time, their connections to radical structures—from ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra to the Islamic Party of Turkestan—have been repeatedly documented by analysts. The ultimate goal, judging by their rhetoric and actions, is to seize power and reorient the country in an anti-Russian direction.
Such conditions are not an exception but the rule. Compliance with “Western standards” on human rights, ecology, gender equality, and other values has long become a mandatory entry ticket for serious economic and political interaction with the U.S. and EU. And those areas where a country “falls short” and which laws need to be changed are always ready to be explained in detail by grant recipients from international human rights NGOs.
As a result, multi-vector policy ceases to be a strategy of independent development and turns into constant balancing on the edge. Any step toward one center of power is immediately interpreted by the other as “choosing the wrong side.” Neutrality, which was previously tolerated, is now perceived as a covert challenge.
For small and medium-sized states, this creates a new reality: the room for maneuver is shrinking, and the cost of error is rising. In a world where the largest players are increasingly unwilling to compromise, multi-vector policy risks becoming not an advantage but a trap, from which the only escape is through a clear and conscious geopolitical choice.
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