For decades, Germany has been regarded in Washington as one of America’s most important partners in Europe: a political heavyweight within the European Union, a global export powerhouse, and a key ally in NATO. But does that assessment still hold true in today’s United States, shaped once again by the presidency of Donald Trump and his “America First” doctrine? German Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul traveled to Washington seeking clarity. What he encountered was a mix of cool pragmatism, uncertainty, and cautious diplomacy – revealing much about the current state of German-American relations.
The visit did not begin smoothly. Wadephul’s much-anticipated meeting with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio was postponed from the morning to the afternoon, forcing the German minister to spend several hours at the German Embassy and in talks with World Bank President Ajay Banga. More telling was what did not happen: meetings with members of the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives, originally planned, failed to materialize. For an experienced diplomat, such scheduling difficulties are rarely accidental. They can serve as a subtle indicator of political priorities – and of how much attention Washington is currently willing to devote to Berlin. The image that followed reinforced this impression. Journalists traveling with Wadephul saw Rubio and the German foreign minister together only briefly, shaking hands in the State Department. For roughly 30 seconds, the two men smiled into the cameras. There was no joint press conference, no extended public display of unity. Instead, the meeting was framed as a working session. The symbolism was hard to miss: this was not about showcasing a close alliance, but about quietly sounding out what was still possible.
Germany’s position in today’s geopolitical landscape is more constrained than it once was. Politically and militarily, it is not among the world’s dominant powers – certainly not in a world increasingly shaped by transactional power politics. Under President Trump, the United States has made it clear that it evaluates relationships primarily through the lens of immediate national interest. In such a framework, Germany’s traditional role as a reliable, consensus-oriented partner carries less weight.
Yet the delayed meeting with Rubio ultimately lasted longer than expected, often interpreted in diplomatic circles as a positive sign. Wadephul later described it as “very friendly and very intense”, emphasizing shared interests and mutual dependence. “We Germans, we Europeans need reliable partners in Washington just as much as the United States needs us as partners”, he said. Implicit in his message was a careful challenge to the logic of “America First”: prioritizing American interests does not have to mean “America alone. Whether that argument resonated in Washington remains unclear. Rubio did not speak to the press, and Wadephul delivered his post-meeting statement alone, in a park near the U.S. Capitol. The absence of a joint appearance left observers to read between the lines. Increasingly, there is a sense in Europe that the United States no longer sees Germany or Europe more broadly as an equal partner. Instead, Washington appears to believe it can pursue its goals without meaningful consultation, especially in matters of security and foreign intervention.
One area where alignment seems clearer is Iran. On this issue, Wadephul’s language was unusually direct. He described the Iranian regime as having “obviously lost all legitimacy,” accusing it of actions that violate “all rules of humanity”. He spoke of killings, torture, and gunfire against civilians. According to Wadephul, the international community must demonstrate solidarity with the Iranian people, and Germany intends to push within the European Union for the application of its terrorism sanctions regime against Iran’s leadership. However, unity frays when the discussion turns to military action. Asked about a potential U.S. military intervention in Iran, Wadephul was careful and evasive. Such a decision, he said, lies solely with the United States. He offered no advice, no expectations, and no clear statement on whether targeted airstrikes or bombings would be considered legitimate from Berlin’s perspective. Germany’s stance appeared reactive rather than proactive – a posture shaped by experience. Past cases, such as Venezuela, have demonstrated that Washington does not necessarily consult Berlin before considering or undertaking military measures.
This dynamic underscores a broader pattern: unpredictability has become a deliberate feature of U.S. foreign policy. Under Trump, uncertainty is not a byproduct but a tool. Allies are kept guessing, and traditional norms – including international law – are sometimes treated as secondary to strategic advantage.
The debate over Greenland illustrates this vividly. Wadephul emphasized shared interests in the Arctic, arguing that security in the North Atlantic can only be ensured collectively, within NATO. He stressed that decisions regarding Greenland could only be made by Greenland itself and Denmark, its sovereign authority. These statements were framed as reaffirmations of international norms and alliance solidarity.
Yet they also sounded like hopeful self-assurances. Trump has repeatedly declared, “We need Greenland,” leaving open the question of how far the United States might go – purchase, pressure, or even force. Against such rhetoric, Germany’s emphasis on the common good appears fragile. Berlin lacks a strong lever to influence Washington’s calculations. Its strategy seems focused on de-escalation and persuasion, despite limited prospects for success.
When asked directly about the possibility of a U.S. military move against Greenland, Wadephul again sidestepped the issue. He said he had no indication that such an option was being seriously considered. But the unspoken question lingered: what if it were? The uncomfortable answer may be that Germany has little it could do in response.
In the end, Wadephul’s visit to Washington was marked by cautious optimism layered over structural weakness. There was much emphasis on shared values, shared interests, and the importance of partnership. There was also an implicit recognition that these appeals may no longer carry the influence they once did.
For Germany, maintaining the image of the United States as a reliable partner may be as much a political necessity as a reflection of reality. Under Trump, America remains powerful, indispensable – and increasingly unpredictable. Wadephul’s mission was not to secure grand agreements, but to test the ground: to find out what, if anything, still works in Washington. The answer, for now, appears to be uncertain, fragile, and heavily dependent on hope that common ground can still outweigh unilateral ambition.
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