In January 2026, the United States conducted a sudden military operation on Venezuelan territory. A series of airstrikes and special forces actions culminated in the detention of President Nicolás Maduro and his wife Cilia Flores, followed by their transfer to the United States. Washington’s official justification rested on accusations of drug trafficking, corruption, and a modern interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine, which implies special U.S. rights in the Western Hemisphere.
The operation immediately sparked intense debates about its compliance with international law. Many experts and governments pointed to a violation of the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign state and the absence of a UN Security Council mandate.
Reaction of European Countries
The overall reaction of European countries was extremely restrained. The official EU statement of January 4, 2026, issued on behalf of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs, was limited to general calls for calm, restraint by all parties, and the need for a peaceful democratic transition. A direct assessment of U.S. actions was deliberately avoided, reflecting a desire not to strain transatlantic relations during the return of the Trump administration.
Within the European Union, however, a noticeable divide emerged: France, Spain, and Norway took a firmer stance, directly stating that the operation violated international law and was unacceptable, while Germany and several other countries limited themselves to neutral formulations about the need for a political solution. Eastern European countries and those that had previously refused to recognize Maduro’s legitimacy after the 2024 elections leaned toward tacit approval, seeing the events as an opportunity for stabilization.
These included Poland (Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski reacted positively to Maduro’s detention, consistent with Warsaw’s traditionally tough stance toward authoritarian regimes), Italy (Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni called the U.S. operation “legitimate” and “defensive,” supported the Venezuelan people’s aspirations for democracy, and did not recognize Maduro’s victory), Greece (Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis welcomed the end of a “brutal and repressive dictatorship,” emphasizing that it gave hope to Venezuelans and placed the transition to democracy above questions of legality), and Sweden (Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson stated that Venezuelans had been “freed from dictatorship,” stressing Maduro’s illegitimacy while still mentioning the need to uphold international law).
Factors Behind European Restraint
This restraint was explained by several interconnected factors. First and foremost, Europe is heavily dependent on the United States for security—particularly amid the ongoing war in Ukraine and tensions with Russia and China—and was unwilling to risk the transatlantic alliance. European capitals also took into account potential new initiatives from the U.S. administration, including previously voiced ideas about “spheres of influence” that could affect Europe’s own neighborhood.
Practical interests also played a significant role: European companies retained hopes of access to Venezuelan oil, and sharp confrontation could complicate future contracts. Key players here were Italy (Eni maintained active gas projects, such as the Perla field in a joint venture with Repsol, with substantial investments and expectations of debt repayment), Spain (Repsol held major joint gas and oil projects, U.S. import licenses, and significant historical investments), and France (TotalEnergies and Maurel & Prom had multibillion-dollar historical investments, though some assets were scaled back due to sanctions, with potential for recovery remaining).
Notably, it was Spain and France (along with Germany) that most vocally criticized the violation of international law, even though their companies had direct economic stakes, which partly explains the overall European restraint.
Long-Term Consequences for International Norms
The long-term consequences of this position sparked discussions about the state of international norms. The precedent of unilateral military intervention without a UN mandate, according to many analysts, contributes to further weakening of the international legal system known as the rules-based order. Some experts argued that such actions could set a precedent for other major powers, encouraging similar steps in their regions of interest.
The “spheres of influence” logic underlying the operation directly affects European interests: the Balkans, the South Caucasus, Cyprus, and even the Arctic (including Greenland) risk becoming zones where major powers ignore international law. As Rosa Balfour of the Carnegie Endowment rightly noted, the strength of international rules depends solely on the willingness of democratic states to defend them consistently. Europe’s silence or half-tones in this case significantly weakened its position as a global champion of multilateralism.
Impact on Relations with the Global South
No less significant was the impact on relations with the Global South. Europe’s restrained reaction was noticed and interpreted by countries in Latin America, Africa, and Asia as evidence of double standards. Many states—Brazil, South Africa, India, Indonesia—sharply condemned the operation as neocolonialism while highlighting European neutrality.
Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva called the U.S. actions an “imperialist act,” emphasizing that Europe, which actively condemns sovereignty violations in other regions, chose silence this time. South African Foreign Minister Naledi Pandor stated that “Europe is once again demonstrating that international law rules are applied selectively”. India and Indonesia, in a joint BRICS statement, condemned the operation and expressed disappointment with the EU’s position, which “lacked the strength to defend the principles it itself proclaims”.
This undermined trust in the EU in areas requiring broad international cooperation: climate agenda, trade agreements, sustainable development initiatives. Against the backdrop of the crisis, EU–MERCOSUR negotiations stalled once again, and several African countries suspended discussions on new EU investment programs. Global South countries are increasingly turning to China and Russia as partners unburdened by moralizing and ready to offer infrastructure projects without political conditions. In the long term, this weakens Europe’s position in the competition for influence in Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia.
Additional Risks for Europe
The crisis also revealed further risks for Europe itself. Within the EU, it strengthened centrifugal tendencies: countries more dependent on the United States (Poland, the Baltic states, Italy) may systematically block strong common statements, deepening divisions in the Common Foreign and Security Policy and complicating consensus on other issues—from Ukraine to China.
Economically, the potential return of Venezuelan oil to the market under pro-American control temporarily lowered energy prices—Brent fell below $60 per barrel in January 2026—but simultaneously increased Europe’s dependence on U.S. foreign policy in energy: any future Washington decisions on production volumes or resource allocation now directly affect the European market.
Reputational damage extended to domestic politics: NGOs, left-wing and green parties accused governments of cowardice and hypocrisy. Ahead of the 2029 European Parliament elections, the theme of “subordination to the U.S.” became a key narrative for both right-wing populist and far-left forces.
Moreover, the crisis intensified internal contradictions on migration policy: while Venezuela’s stabilization potentially reduces refugee inflows—the EU accepted more than 100,000 Venezuelan asylum seekers in 2024—any new waves of instability in the region will be seen as a consequence of European passivity, increasing pressure on the EU’s southern borders.
Conclusions
The Venezuelan crisis of January 2026 became one of the most serious tests for European foreign policy in the era of returning “spheres of influence” logic. The restrained position, dictated by pragmatism and fear of confrontation with the United States, ensured short-term stability in transatlantic relations but at the cost of significant long-term losses: weakening of international norms, loss of moral authority in the Global South, and increased vulnerability of Europe itself to similar precedents.
To preserve strategic autonomy, the EU needs consistent defense of international law principles and accelerated development of its own diplomatic and defense capabilities. Otherwise, the price of weakness will continue to rise.
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