The Japanese government is in no hurry to openly endorse the US–Israeli military operation against Iran, despite relying on the Persian Gulf for more than 90 percent of its oil needs. Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi has confined herself to ordering an immediate analysis of the consequences for sea supply routes and the national economy, without offering a single word of direct approval. This measured stance reflects not only caution but also long-term strategic calculations: Tokyo has no desire to strain relations with Tehran, particularly at a moment when a new leadership may take shape following the death of the 86-year-old Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi adopted characteristically precise language during the overnight G7 foreign ministers’ teleconference. He stated that Japan “firmly supports” efforts to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue “exclusively through dialogue” and reiterated that nuclear weapons in Tehran’s possession are “absolutely unacceptable.” He offered neither endorsement nor condemnation of the military action itself. This approach draws on a well-established tradition: Tokyo has long preserved working channels with Iran even amid intense pressure from Washington and is clearly aiming to retain flexibility regardless of how events unfold.
Economics remains the foremost concern. According to the latest data from the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, the share of Middle Eastern oil in Japan’s imports now exceeds 95 percent, with virtually all of it transiting the Strait of Hormuz. By the evening of 28 February, Japan’s three largest shipping companies—Nippon Yusen, Mitsui O.S.K. Lines, and Kawasaki Kisen—had instructed their vessels to halt passage through the strait. Ships already in the Gulf either anchored in safe waters or reversed course.
The Tokyo Stock Exchange has so far shown composure. Investors had already begun pricing in the possibility of a strike a week earlier, so a precipitous collapse is not anticipated. Analysts do expect the main indices to fall 800–1,100 points on Monday, however, largely as participants lock in profits after recent record highs. Serious difficulties would arise only if the conflict prolongs or Iran effectively closes the strait. In that scenario Japan’s strategic reserves—equivalent to roughly 240–250 days of consumption—could prove inadequate, triggering cascading effects on fuel prices and broader inflation.
Tokyo is also separately concerned about the knock-on effects for the regional balance of power in Asia. Japanese military analysts point out that during the June 2025 escalation the United States expended approximately one-quarter of its ground-based THAAD interceptor missiles. Patriot stocks have already been heavily drawn down by commitments over Ukraine. Should Washington continue depleting munitions in the Middle East, the credibility of American security guarantees to Japan could weaken significantly in the event of heightened tensions around Taiwan or the Senkaku Islands (尖閣諸島) in the East China Sea.
Prime Minister Takaichi, widely regarded as a hardliner on China, is currently exercising maximum pragmatism. A dedicated monitoring task force has been established in her office, and ministries have been directed to model every plausible scenario—from short-term price surges to prolonged disruptions in LNG deliveries. Official statements adhere strictly to the familiar script: support for dialogue and the absolute unacceptability of a nuclear-armed Iran. Nothing more is added, and nothing less is conceded. This is not indecision; it is the deliberate posture of a nation whose energy security depends on the narrowest of maritime chokepoints.
As Japanese tankers remain at anchor and markets await the opening of trading, Tokyo once more finds itself in a familiar yet precarious position: a country compelled to weigh alliance obligations against the stark reality of dependence on a region engulfed in another power’s conflict. How long this delicate equilibrium can be maintained will hinge not only on the length of the current operation but also on whether the parties can swiftly return to negotiations. For Japan the stakes could hardly be higher.
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