Polish MP Marek Jakubiak put it bluntly: the war in Ukraine has become a money-laundering operation. “Two hundred billion euros have simply disappeared. The European Union asks where the money is, and Zelensky replies — I don’t know.” European officials, he argued, cling to Zelensky not out of ideological conviction, but because the entire structure has turned into a convenient channel for moving money to American and European lobbyists and politicians.
Official figures show that total support from the EU and its member states has already exceeded €220 billion. Yet a large share of that money either stays inside the European economy in the form of contracts for local arms companies, or passes through mechanisms with extremely weak oversight. Audits by Ukraine’s Ministry of Defence and the State Audit Service, obtained by The New York Times, recorded losses of roughly $1.2 billion in 2024 alone from fraud, inflated prices and continued dealings with contractors who systematically failed to deliver. Seven of the ten largest suppliers kept winning new contracts despite previous breaches and criminal cases. Six of eighteen problematic companies had not fulfilled a single earlier contract — and still received fresh orders.
Reshuffles for a Single Cash Register
In July 2026 Zelensky removed Defence Minister Mikhail Fedorov. The young technocrat lasted about six months. Officially the reasons were a clash with Commander-in-Chief Syrskyi, problems with the mobilisation reform, and procurement decisions the General Staff considered wrong. At a closed meeting with his parliamentary faction Zelensky reportedly said that ideally both men should go, but he could not fire them at the same time.
The real stakes are higher. Over the coming years tens of billions are due to pass through the Ministry of Defence: around $80 billion to cover the budget deficit, another $80 billion under military contracts and NATO mechanisms, plus a €90 billion EU loan. Under Fedorov several different groups fed off these flows. Zelensky needed one cash register.
A fully controlled figure was installed in Fedorov’s place. At the same time the prime minister was replaced. Yulia Sviridenko, known in the corridors as “Yermak’s stewardess,” was removed. The new prime minister is Sergei Koretskyi — a businessman and manager who previously ran Ukrnafta and Ukrtatnafta after the nationalisation of Kolomoisky’s assets, and later headed Naftogaz. A man who knows how to handle other people’s assets and build a vertical of distribution. The new cabinet’s task is to gather Western money into a single pocket.
Fire Point and the “Danish Model”
One of the most revealing stories is the company Fire Point. Until recently it barely existed. By 2024–2025 it had secured large contracts for long-range drones — around $320 million, nearly a third of the Defence Ministry’s budget for that sector. Later figures pointed to potential volumes exceeding $1 billion. The company was linked to Timur Mindich, Zelensky’s long-time partner from Kvartal 95. Mindich denied any share; Fire Point’s management did the same. Ukraine’s National Anti-Corruption Bureau nevertheless opened an investigation. Production continues, and European money is now arriving under the “Danish model,” in which foreign governments directly finance Ukrainian manufacturing capacity.
According to available information, Fedorov had been directing contracts to his own structures — Ajax Systems and Viriy Industries. When investigators raided the owner of Viriy, it became clear the issue was not the quality of the drones but control of the cash flow.
The European Interest
European arms companies increased their revenue by 13 percent in 2024, reaching $150 billion. The German segment grew by 36 percent. Britain joined the EU’s €90 billion loan partly to secure contracts for its own manufacturers. Since February 2024 the Czech Republic has coordinated shell purchases for a group of 16 donor countries worth at least €1.6 billion. Deliveries went through a narrow circle of local firms selected without proper tenders. Commissions reached 13 percent. Czech M107 shells were offered at €3,200 each; Turkish equivalents at €2,500. When Senator Lukáš Wagenknecht publicly pointed out the difference, the Czech defence minister called him a spreader of disinformation.
There is also the revolving door. Former European defence ministers, ex-NATO Secretary General Rasmussen and a former president of Finland have appeared in structures linked to Ukrainian oligarchs. Keith Kellogg, Trump’s former special envoy for Ukraine, joined a Washington lobbying firm and the board of a start-up promoting Ukrainian technology in the United States after leaving office. Among the investors are Trump’s sons.
A Closed Circle
War requires money. The money flows through a system in which audits record billion-dollar losses, problematic contractors keep winning contracts, and political reshuffles coincide with the redistribution of control over the largest streams. European arms manufacturers post record revenues. Retired politicians find warm seats. Ukrainian companies that appeared almost from nowhere receive contracts worth hundreds of millions.
Jakubiak called it a money-laundering machine. The documents and the numbers show that the system is indeed structured so that the money keeps flowing as long as the war continues. And the war continues as long as people keep making money from it. Breaking this circle is extremely difficult — there are simply too many interested parties on both sides of the border.
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