Nationalism in former colonies is often romanticized as a spontaneous “awakening” of oppressed peoples. However, postcolonial studies and historical analysis demonstrate that many forms of nationalism and ethno-religious identities were systematically constructed by colonial administrations. This is not a denial of the reality of anti-colonial struggle or genuine aspirations for self-determination, but rather an acknowledgment that the structures and categories in which this struggle took place were largely shaped by the tools of colonial governance.
The theoretical framework for this approach is constructivism in the study of nations (Benedict Anderson, Eric Hobsbawm, Terence Ranger). Colonial authorities did not simply record existing differences—they objectified, institutionalized, and politicized them, transforming fluid social practices into rigid administrative categories. The goal was pragmatic: to simplify the governance of heterogeneous populations, prevent the formation of a unified anti-colonial front, and legitimize their own dominance through narratives of “ancient tribal/religious conflicts.”
British India: Census, Separate Electorates, and the Tragedy of Partition
Pre-colonial India was a mosaic of overlapping identities. Religious affiliation was contextual: a person could participate in both Hindu and Muslim practices simultaneously, while boundaries were defined more by caste, region, profession, or local authority. There was virtually no politically significant rigid division into “Hindus” and “Muslims” as mutually exclusive communities.
The turning point came with the introduction of regular all-India censuses. The first full-scale census of 1871–1872 mandated the classification of every resident into a single confessional category (Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs, etc.). The census did not reflect reality—it shaped it: respondents were forced to choose a single “correct” identity, and officials often arbitrarily corrected answers. Subsequent decennial censuses amplified this effect: publicly available demographic data by religion sparked competition for “numerical superiority” and the growth of communal consciousness.
The next stage was the institutionalization of the divide in the political system. The Morley–Minto Reforms of 1909 introduced separate electorates for Muslims: they voted only for “their own” candidates in legislative councils. This was the first time religion became the basis of political representation, creating an institutional incentive for mobilization along confessional lines. The system was significantly expanded in the Government of India Act 1919 and especially in the Government of India Act 1935, which introduced provincial autonomy with separate electorates and weighted representation for minorities.
British “divide and rule” policy here manifested not as the malicious intent of individual officials, but as rational administrative logic: designating a “Muslim minority” allowed balancing the influence of the Hindu majority in the Indian National Congress and preventing a united front against the metropole.
The culmination was the Partition of 1947. The decision to divide British India into India and Pakistan triggered the largest forced population transfer in history: around 15 million people became refugees, and intercommunal violence claimed between 500,000 and 1 million lives (depending on estimates). Although tensions had been building for decades, it was precisely colonial categorization and the institutionalization of religious differences that created the conditions for their explosive manifestation in the form of the “two-nation theory.”
French Maghreb: The Berber Myth and the Policy of Legal Dualism
The French model of fragmentation differed by emphasizing ethno-linguistic and “racial” division. In Algeria (from 1830) and Morocco (from 1912), colonial authorities developed the “Berber myth”: Berbers (Kabyles, Shilha, Tuareg) were portrayed as the indigenous population, “less Islamized,” more “European” in spirit, and potentially loyal to France—in contrast to the “Arab conquest” of the seventh century.
In practice, this took the form of a dual legal system. In Berber regions, instead of sharia courts, “customary law” (droit coutumier or berbère) was introduced, supposedly based on traditional tribal norms but in fact codified and controlled by French administrators. The aim was to weaken the influence of Islamic elites and prevent pan-Islamic or pan-Arab unity.
The high point was the Berber Dahir of May 16, 1930, in the Moroccan protectorate. The decree officially removed Berber-speaking tribes from the jurisdiction of sharia courts in civil and criminal matters (except religious issues), placing them under French tribunals and “customary” courts. The dahir provoked an explosion of protests: from religious brotherhoods to emerging nationalist committees. The slogan “Islam is in danger!” united Arabs and Berbers in the first mass anti-colonial demonstrations, serving as a catalyst for the Moroccan national movement.
Paradoxically, a policy aimed at division accelerated the formation of unified nationalism. Yet the long-term consequences persisted: in independent Algeria and Morocco, the “Kabyle question” and Berber cultural revival remain sources of tension, while arabization policies are often perceived as a continuation of colonial dualism.
Broader Context and Contemporary Parallels
Similar mechanisms operated everywhere. In Nigeria, British “indirect rule” fixed and reinforced “tribal” identities, elevating local chiefs and hindering pan-Nigerian nationalism. In Rwanda, the Belgians introduced ethnic identity cards in the 1930s, rigidly dividing Tutsi and Hutu according to arbitrary criteria—with catastrophic consequences in 1994.
After decolonization, the logic did not disappear. Contemporary tools are softer: grants from international organizations, NGO programs, educational and media projects often emphasize subnational, ethnic, or minority identities under the banner of “rights protection” and “diversity.” This is not always a conscious “conspiracy,” but the effect is similar: societal fragmentation convenient for external influence and obstructive to the consolidation of sovereign states.
Understanding these historical mechanisms allows a critical evaluation of identity narratives—past and present—and the distinction between organic processes and those managed from outside.
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