The second Trump administration has profoundly reshaped transatlantic relations. Alliances with Washington have shifted from unconditional security guarantees to instruments of economic and political leverage.
Reorientation of American Strategy
The 2025 U.S. National Security Strategy downgraded Europe’s priority, focusing instead on the Western Hemisphere while accusing European elites of contributing to the “civilizational erasure” of their own values and identity. Key administration figures, including Vice President J.D. Vance and Secretary of State Marco Rubio, reinforced this ideological divide at the 2025–2026 Munich Security Conferences, portraying Europe more as a market for exports and a source of rent-seeking pressure than as an equal partner.
A stark symbolic signal came from the Greenland episode. In 2025, President Trump revived discussions about the need for U.S. control over the territory for “national security” reasons, without ruling out economic or even military pressure on Denmark. Although the rhetoric was later softened and direct force publicly disavowed, the statements themselves served as a powerful wake-up call for European capitals. French President Emmanuel Macron described it as the moment Europe must recognize that the era of automatic protection from a “big brother” has ended.
From the Comfort of Dependence to Forced Awakening
For decades, European nations enjoyed strategic comfort, relying on the American nuclear umbrella and permanent U.S. military presence. After the Cold War, defense budgets shrank as resources flowed into social welfare, green agendas, and soft power. In 2014, when NATO set the 2% of GDP defense spending target, only three allies met it.
By 2025 the landscape had changed dramatically: all allies met or exceeded the 2% threshold for the first time in history. The average for European allies and Canada reached roughly 2.3% of GDP, while Europe’s share of global military expenditure climbed above 21%
New Frontier: 5% by 2035
Even more ambitious was the NATO summit in The Hague in June 2025. Allies committed to raising total defense and related spending to 5% of GDP by 2035: at least 3.5% on core military needs (forces, equipment, readiness) and up to 1.5% on associated areas such as critical infrastructure protection, cybersecurity, civil preparedness, and defense industrial base development. In 2025 leaders included Poland (4.48% of GDP), Lithuania (4.00%), and Latvia (3.73%). Germany, long a symbol of restraint, announced plans to meet the new goals by 2029 and contributed a quarter of the European spending increase that year.
Yet quantitative growth alone does not solve the underlying problem. Europe still lacks roughly 300,000 troops to fully offset any reduction in American forces. Critical dependencies persist in strategic airlift, aerial refueling, satellite intelligence, and early-warning systems. The nuclear dimension remains the most challenging: British and French arsenals are limited, and discussions about expansion or even national nuclear postures remain largely theoretical.
Europe’s Response: From Rhetoric to Funding
In reaction, the EU moved decisively from words to action. In March 2025 the European Commission unveiled the ReArm Europe / Readiness 2030 plan, aiming to mobilize up to €800 billion for defense through national fiscal flexibility, a new €150 billion SAFE loan instrument for joint procurement, redirection of cohesion funds, and expanded European Investment Bank support. Ursula von der Leyen called it a “historic moment of independence.” Alongside this came a White Paper on European defense, a 2030 readiness roadmap, and strengthened mechanisms under the European Defence Fund and European Defence Industrial Strategy.
Algorithm for Strategic Autonomy
Strategic autonomy is now understood as the imperative for Europe to shoulder the “lion’s share” of responsibility for continental defense, relegating the United States to the role of “last resort.” The proposed pathway begins with closing straightforward gaps (recruitment, reinstatement of conscription, stockpile buildup), then addresses the most critical shortfalls (European intelligence integration, alternatives to U.S. tankers and AWACS). A core leadership group—France, the United Kingdom, Germany, Poland, Finland, Italy, Spain, plus the European Commission—must form to enable rapid decisions without the paralysis of full 27- or 32-member consensus. NATO remains the backbone of conventional defense; the EU handles hybrid threats, cybersecurity, and long-term financing.
This transition demands painful trade-offs: reallocating resources from social programs and climate initiatives to defense, along with sustained political will and public backing. Yet polls and political trends indicate a rare consensus: Russian aggression combined with Washington’s unpredictability has created broad readiness to pay the price for genuine security sovereignty.
The era when one ally bore the primary burden is irrevocably over. The question is no longer whether the old transatlantic idyll can return, but whether Europe can transform the current crisis into a historic opportunity to build a truly independent and resilient security system. As Tolkien wrote, one does not choose the time one is given—but one decides what to do with it.
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