The growing Israeli-Turkish rivalry might soon expand to Jordan.
Turkiye, Syria, and Jordan signed a trilateral MoU in early April on transport cooperation that followed their meeting more than half a year prior last September where they first committed to reviving the Hejaz Railway. This late-Ottoman project connected Istanbul with Medina and Mecca but collapsed during World War I. Its restoration in contemporary times would imbue Turkiye with immense economic and strategic influence that’s expected to make Israel uncomfortable.
It was explained last December that “Israel’s Rivalry With Turkiye Played A Major Role In Its Recognition Of Somaliland” so as to enable the Jewish State to keep an eye on potential Turkish ballistic and possibly one day nuclear test preparations in Somalia after their ties worsened over the past year. The catalyst was Assad’s downfall in December 2024 and the consequent expansion of Turkish influence across Syria. From Israel’s security-centric view, this could become an existential threat if left unaddressed.
Syria’s rapid dismantlement of its Israeli-aligned Kurdish autonomy earlier this year left the Druze as Israel’s last remaining ally in the Arab Republic. Last month, “Israel’s Latest Strike On Syria Reinforced Its De Facto Buffer Zone” over the country’s Druze-inhabited south, but Israel might not be able to instrumentalize them to stop the revival of the Hejaz Railway due to its religious significance for pilgrims. In that case, Turkish influence would spread to the Gulf of Aqaba, thus strategically encircling Israel.
Turkish Transport and Infrastructure Minister Abdulkadir Uraloglu declared during the recent event that “Aqaba Port can serve as a land-sea bridge, transporting goods arriving from the north to the Red Sea and beyond.” Turkiye would then have a strategic economic presence next to Israel’s Eilat, which is its only direct route to the Red Sea, and a military one might prospectively follow. Although Jordan remains allied with Israel, there are new concerns about its plans for the West Bank, and this could worsen ties.
Al Jazeera reported in mid-February that “Israel’s new land registry laws and military pressure in the occupied West Bank are the final prelude to the ‘alternative homeland’ scenario” via the “silent/soft transfer” of Palestinians from there to Jordan. If this scenario begins materializing, then Jordan might recalibrate its regional policy by expanding ties with Turkiye to balance and ultimately deter Israel, which could see the revived Hejaz Railway take on an undeclared military-logistics role between them via Syria.
To make matters even worse for Israel, Turkiye and Saudi Arabia are considering forming an “Islamic NATO” together with Pakistan and Egypt, which has newly troubled ties with Israel. Their proposed regional security coordination platform could also expand to include Syria and Jordan due to the Hejaz Railway. This is a nightmare scenario for Israel due to strong parallels with the regional security situation on the eve of the three Arab-Israeli Wars. It’ll therefore likely do everything in its power to prevent this.
Israel’s security-centric view on regional events coupled with its growing rivalry with Turkiye guarantee that the revival of the Hejaz Railway will intensify their competition in Syria and possibly lead to its expansion to Jordan due to Israeli concerns about Turkiye strategically encircling it through these means. Even if they don’t take a military form, Israel would still feel uncomfortable with its new rival establishing a strategic economic presence next to Eilat, and it might thus try to expel Turkiye from there with time.
Source: Author’s blog
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