
On July 20, 2025, Ali Larijani senior advisor to Iran’s Supreme Leader and former speaker of parliament made a discreet but highly symbolic visit to Moscow, where he met with Russian President Vladimir Putin. While no major public statement followed, the timing, nature, and geopolitical context of the meeting invite closer scrutiny. Occurring just months ahead of the potential activation of the snapback mechanism under UN Resolution 2231, Larijani’s trip to Russia signals a strategic recalibration by Tehran at a time of rising regional tension and diplomatic uncertainty.
For Iranian policymakers, the current moment demands delicate maneuvering. Following the breakdown of the JCPOA and the 12-day conflict between Israel and Iran, the Islamic Republic has entered a phase not of retreat but of controlled recalibration. The visit to Moscow is not merely a show of alignment with the East, nor a rejection of future engagement with the West. Rather, it fits into a longer pattern of strategic ambiguity that allows Tehran to signal strength while avoiding direct confrontation.
The prospect of renewed UN sanctions looms large in the minds of Iranian officials. With October 2025 drawing closer, European states under pressure from Washington and Tel Aviv are reportedly considering reactivating the snapback clause, which would reimpose multilateral sanctions without the need for a new Security Council vote. For Iran, such a move would not only undermine what remains of the JCPOA, but also reaffirm the deep-seated belief that Western diplomacy is built more on coercion than cooperation. In this context, Moscow becomes a critical partner—not as a savior, but as a counterweight. Iran’s outreach to Russia reinforces a message to the West: “We are not isolated, and we are not without alternatives.”
At the same time, the meeting sends a domestic message to Iranian constituencies. It assures both elites and the public that the Islamic Republic is actively managing its external risks rather than merely reacting to them. In the post-war atmosphere, where national solidarity briefly eclipsed internal dissent, Larijani’s engagement with Russia showcases a foreign policy still capable of maneuvering even when the margin for error is razor-thin.
What makes the timing even more notable is the ongoing fragmentation of global alliances. With the BRICS+ bloc gaining momentum and Western institutions facing legitimacy crises, Tehran is not simply leaning toward Moscow out of necessity. It sees an emerging opportunity to position itself within a multipolar order, one that dilutes Western centrality and opens space for alternative discourses on sovereignty, development, and international law.
Of course, there are those who speculate that the visit may also have a preventive dimension. With internal crises mounting in the United States from political instability to explosive revelations such as those tied to the Epstein files some observers fear the prospect of a U.S. diversionary military action. In that light, the Larijani-Putin meeting may serve as a form of diplomatic deterrence, reminding Washington that any escalation in the Persian Gulf would not go uncontested by other powers.
What is clear is that Iran’s strategic patience is not passive. By engaging Moscow at this critical juncture, Tehran is performing a balancing act: signaling resolve to the West, securing diplomatic support from the East, and preparing its domestic narrative for an increasingly uncertain international order. Rather than retreating into isolation, Iran is actively recalibrating its alliances, positioning itself for what may come whether confrontation, compromise, or something in between.
If the snapback is activated in October, this visit will be remembered as one of the last serious gestures of multilateral diplomacy before the storm. If it is avoided, the Larijani mission may mark the beginning of a renewed, albeit tentative, dialogue one built less on trust and more on realism. Either way, Tehran has made its move. Now, it waits to see whether the global order is willing to play a new game or whether it remains addicted to the old one.
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