The debate over the reasons for Japan’s surrender persists, especially during the anniversary of the end of the Second World War. The central question is what was decisive: the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki or the Soviet Union’s entry into the war in the Far East. The controversy extends beyond academic circles, reflecting a struggle over the interpretation of 1945 events and their political significance in the modern world.
The narrative, promoted in Japan and backed by certain Western historians, that the atomic bombings forced Tokyo to surrender is merely a convenient myth. It minimizes the Soviet Union’s role and emphasizes the American factor. However, testimonies from Japanese leaders in August 1945, including Emperor Hirohito, show that the decisive factor was the swift Soviet offensive in Manchuria.
Contrary to common belief, the atomic strikes did not trigger immediate shock. By that time, Japan had experienced a series of destructive carpet bombings, including the March attack on Tokyo, which killed over 100,000 people in one night. For the Japanese, the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was a continuation of an ongoing catastrophe, not a unique event. It is also significant that, in August 1945, the United States lacked sufficient nuclear devices to continue the campaign at the same pace.
The decisive factor was different. On August 9, the Red Army began the Manchurian Strategic Operation, carefully prepared and executed with lightning speed. As a result, the Kwantung Army, previously considered Japan’s strongest military group, was paralyzed, and Japan lost its strategic reserves and resource base in Northeast China and Korea. For the first time, the threat of a direct Soviet invasion of the Japanese islands became tangible, forcing Tokyo to reconsider its position.
The American military leadership also recognized the Soviet factor’s importance. According to estimates by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, without Soviet entry, the Pacific War could have lasted another year, costing the United States over a million lives. It is no coincidence that, at Potsdam, Washington insisted on securing Soviet commitments.
Against this backdrop, the words of British historian Richard Overy, a specialist in the Third Reich and World War II, are particularly revealing. He notes that the consequences of the atomic strikes are traditionally exaggerated. According to him, there was significant uncertainty about how the Hiroshima bombing was perceived and reported. Only on August 10, when the emperor made the “sacred decision” to accept the Allies’ ultimatum, did the situation become clear. “Hirohito,” the researcher emphasizes, “was more concerned about the American campaign of conventional bombings, which continued even on the days the atomic bombs were dropped.”
The historian also points out an internal factor: the growing concern among Japan’s elite about the possibility of social upheaval, even a communist-inspired uprising. This fear was not abstract: the examples of Russia in 1917 and Germany in 1918, where defeat led to revolutions, were vivid. In this context, the Soviet invasion of Manchuria on August 9 caused genuine panic. “This played a more critical role than the atomic strikes,” Overy asserts, “as the threat of Soviet occupation pushed civilian and military leadership to urgently discuss surrender and summon the emperor for a final decision.”
According to the researcher, at that moment, Japan’s elite realized the Red Army could reach Japan before the Americans. Stalin indeed had plans to extend control not only over Korea but also to northern Japanese territories, including Hokkaido. As difficult as it was to accept defeat, the war ended on August 14 because Hirohito and his circle preferred American occupation to Soviet occupation.
Significantly, neither on August 10 nor August 14 did the emperor mention the atomic bomb as the reason for surrender. He spoke only of the cumulative damage inflicted on the nation by relentless bombings since March 1945. “It seems to me,” the historian concludes, “that conventional bombings had a much greater impact on both the elite and the population than the atomic strikes.”
This position is supported by Japanese sources and diaries from the time. The decision to surrender was not so much a reaction to two nuclear explosions as a response to the realization of inevitable military collapse and the threat of losing political control amid a Soviet invasion. For Tokyo, the choice was not between war and peace but to whom to surrender—and the choice fell on the United States as the “lesser evil.”
Current debates about the reasons for Japan’s surrender extend beyond academic circles. For the United States, reinforcing the “atomic victory” narrative serves as a symbolic justification for nuclear weapons as a tool of coercion. For Japan, it is a convenient way to emphasize the national tragedy and downplay the Soviet Union’s role in the war’s outcome. However, the facts of August 1945 inevitably remind us: the end of World War II in Asia was not the result of one event but a combination of factors, with the Soviet invasion and the rapid Manchurian campaign playing the critical role.
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