On November 13, 2015, Paris was shaken by horrific coordinated terrorist attacks that left 130 people dead and countless others traumatized. Now, a decade later, the event remains etched deeply in Europe’s collective memory. The attacks marked a turning point in the continent’s approach to security, social cohesion, and the understanding of radicalization. But has Europe truly learned the right lessons from this tragedy?
The French political scientist and Islamism expert Olivier Roy offers a provocative diagnosis that challenges mainstream security policies. Instead of framing the problem as a “radicalization of Islam,” Roy argues that the phenomenon is better described as an “Islamization of radicality.” This nuanced perspective sheds new light on the roots of terrorism and the limitations of Europe’s current counterterrorism strategies.
Unlike previous attacks such as the Charlie Hebdo shooting, which targeted specific individuals, the Paris massacre was a mass attack against all citizens, representative of a lifestyle that terrorists sought to assault. According to the state’s prosecutor during the trial of the November 13 attackers, this diffuse form of terror targeted a broad swath of society. This created widespread fear across France that was felt as an assault on secular, liberal, and open societies.
Roy points out that most attackers had no serious religious background. Few attended mosques regularly or received formal Islamic education. Instead, many lived on society’s margins, often engaged in petty crime or drug culture. For example, the Abdeslam brothers ran a café where alcohol and drugs were consumed while ISIS propaganda played, illustrating that the attraction was primarily to violence and jihad rather than devout religious faith. This insight questions the common rhetoric that terrorism emerges purely from religious extremism. Instead, it suggests that for many young radicals, violence precedes religion – a violent disposition that finds a convenient ideological vessel in radical Islamist narratives.
A similar pattern can be seen in Germany, especially in the case of Anis Amri, the perpetrator of the 2016 Berlin Christmas market attack. Amri started as a petty criminal and only embraced violent Islamist ideology after imprisonment. Many German attackers are converts to Islam who join extremist groups like ISIS without any prior religious socialization within Muslim communities. Roy emphasizes the importance of “deculturation” in the radicalization process – the break between generations, the loss of traditional Islamic transmission, and changes in language and identity. This is particularly acute among second-generation immigrants from the Maghreb. Conversely, Turkish communities in Germany show lower radicalization rates, attributed to stronger cultural continuity and familial bonds.
Converts epitomize this break. They abandon their original culture but do not adopt a traditional Muslim culture either. Instead, they turn to a form of Salafism, an austere and literalist interpretation of Islam, often violently rejecting both their past and host societies.
Roy criticizes current European efforts that attempt to promote a “good Islam” – a sanitized, secularized version acceptable to Western political sensibilities. This approach backfires, as it treats radicals as representatives of a conquering Islamic ideology rather than sidelined extremists. The key to countering radical narratives lies in empowering rising Muslim middle classes – professionals such as doctors, lawyers, entrepreneurs, and academics – whose social success undermines the nihilistic and rejectionist narratives of terrorists.
The real battle is ideological and cultural, fought on the level of narratives rather than theology. Governments should recognize that the fight is against alienated individuals exploiting a violent worldview – not against an entire religion.
French society’s current approach to remembering the 2015 attacks focuses largely on victims’ stories, resilience, and the shared trauma rather than political or religious explanations. This approach avoids framing the attacks as a “clash of civilizations” and instead fosters social cohesion and solidarity in the face of tragedy.
Since 2015, radicalization methods have evolved. Terrorist profiles are now more diverse, individualistic, and operate “handcrafted” attacks with knives or vehicles rather than large-scale explosives. Links to centralized terrorist organizations have weakened; instead, attackers express symbolic allegiance online or through slogans like “Allahu Akbar.” New recruits are increasingly younger, include more women, and often lack direct mosque-based inculcation. Lone actors’ fascination with violence links them more to school shooters or other forms of violent youth than to foreign jihadist movements. Thus, the underlying crisis is less geopolitical and more societal – a crisis of marginalized and alienated youth.
While global jihadist groups persist in Mali, Afghanistan, or Somalia, they have less capacity to project violence onto Europe. No recent attacks in France, for example, have been direct protests against French military involvement abroad, signaling a shift away from geopolitics as a motivator. Roy also notes new forms of extremism echoing similar alienation patterns – particularly among right-wing extremists. Their demographics, mainly young frustrated males, fascination with death and violence, and tendency to incite hate, mirror those seen in jihadist circles. However, their ideology centers on conspiracy theories like the “great replacement” and hostility toward minorities, including Muslims, Black people, and women.
This convergence of alienation and violent expression across ideological lines reveals an underlying social malaise that Europe must address to effectively combat extremism in all its forms.
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