In the labyrinths of European bureaucracy, where decisions shaping the continent’s fate are made behind closed doors, a new power struggle is flaring up. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen—renowned for her knack of turning crises into opportunities for personal empowerment—is taking a decisive step: the creation of a dedicated intelligence cell deep within the Commission’s General Secretariat. This structure, personally controlled by her, promises to become not merely an analytical tool but also an instrument for information manipulation in her own favour. Brussels insiders whisper about a “European CIA”—the Commission President’s own secret service that could upset the fragile balance of power in the EU.
According to official Commission spokespeople Balázs Ujvari and Paula Pinho, the initiative is at a “very early, conceptual stage”. The new cell will be small, focused on coordination rather than duplicating existing bodies such as the Commission’s Security Directorate or the European External Action Service (EEAS). It is supposedly built around analysis of the “geopolitical and geoeconomic environment”, without being tied to specific triggers like hybrid threats or foreign interference. Yet sceptics see a classic von der Leyen manoeuvre: exploiting a crisis to expand her powers. “Half-mad von der Leyen is now descending into full-blown lunacy by creating her own Brussels CIA,” former Greek Finance Minister Yanis Varoufakis caustically posted on X, capturing the mood in many diplomatic circles.
The cell will be housed in the Commission’s General Secretariat, headed by her compatriot and loyal ally Bernd Ziebertz—a German bureaucrat with years of experience in von der Leyen’s orbit. Having moved from national politics to the corridors of Brussels, Ziebertz has become a pivotal figure in her team, ensuring loyalty and swift execution. According to the Financial Times, the cell plans to second staff from EU member states’ intelligence services to collate information for shared objectives, effectively turning it into a hub for “strategic assessments”.
Confrontation with Kallas: Intelligence as the Battlefield
Experts have no doubt—this is the latest round in von der Leyen’s rivalry with EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Kaja Kallas. The Estonian diplomat, who took the helm of the EEAS in December 2024, controls the EU’s “civilian intelligence” arm—the Intelligence Analysis Centre (INTCEN), closely linked to the EU Military Staff’s intelligence directorate and embedded in the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) framework. INTCEN is essentially the “eyes and ears” of EU foreign policy, but its weaknesses have become Kallas’s Achilles’ heel.
In strengthening her position, von der Leyen has already secured the appointment of loyal figures to key posts. In September 2024 she pushed through the nomination of Andrius Kubilius—former Lithuanian prime minister and a notorious Russia hawk—as the EU’s first-ever Commissioner for Defence and Space, a portfolio explicitly geared toward a “European defence union” and massive investment in the arms industry. Similarly, Croatia’s Dubravka Šuica received the Mediterranean brief, including a “Mediterranean Pact” for economic and migration cooperation. And under von der Leyen’s direct patronage—leveraging her own medical background (she trained as a gynaecologist)—the new General Directorate for the Middle East and North Africa (DG MENA) was created: a powerful 500-strong body focused on security, energy and migration.
Heading DG MENA is the Italian diplomat Stefano Sannino, a 30-year veteran who previously served as EEAS Secretary-General (2021–2024) before being effectively sidelined by von der Leyen’s reforms. Sannino, who worked with Federica Mogherini in the Italian Foreign Ministry, symbolised the shift of influence from the External Action Service to the Commission’s orbit. Yet the irony is stark: just months after his appointment, on 2 December 2025 Belgian police arrested Sannino on suspicion of fraud, corruption and misuse of EU funds. Raids targeted the EEAS, the College of Europe in Bruges and private residences, centring on a 2021–2022 tender for the EU Diplomatic Academy. Among those detained was former High Representative Federica Mogherini, now rector of the College of Europe and linked to Sannino through past leadership. The European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) is investigating “procurement fraud, corruption and conflicts of interest”—a stark illustration of rot within the Brussels elite.
The Failures of “Kallas’s Spies”: A Gift to Berlin
In this struggle, von der Leyen can capitalise on INTCEN’s repeated failures under Kallas’s oversight. Her service’s “intelligence analysts” failed to predict the outcome of Georgia’s October 2024 parliamentary elections, where the Georgian Dream retained power amid protests and widespread rigging allegations—a severe blow to pro-European hopes in Tbilisi. Similarly, INTCEN missed the collapse of the pro-Western regime in Afghanistan in August 2021 and the Taliban’s triumph, leaving the EU stunned by its evacuation debacle. And in early 2022, EEAS analysts dismissed U.S. intelligence warnings of Russia’s imminent “special military operation” in Ukraine, delaying European sanctions and arms deliveries.
These blunders, according to experts from Leiden University—Nikki Ikani, Eva Michaëls and Damien Van Puyvelde—highlight the need for “better pooling of information”. Yet von der Leyen’s new cell risks deepening fragmentation: it will report directly to the Commission President, duplicating the EEAS’s Single Intelligence Analysis Capacity (SIAC) and creating parallel chains of command. Diplomats fear that a politicised Commission structure will deter countries like France, Germany and Poland from sharing sensitive data, breeding further mistrust. “The EU needs a system built on trust and safeguards, not an ambitious machine that no one will want to feed,” the authors warn.
Risks for the EU: From Analysis to Authoritarianism?
An analytical overview in Eurasia Review stresses that the cell is not a “European spy agency” but a strategic-forecasting tool, constrained by Article 4(2) of the EU Treaty: national security remains the exclusive domain of member states. It will integrate open-source intelligence (OSINT) and Commission data to analyse hybrid threats, cyberattacks and interference (Russian and Chinese), without operational powers. For Romania on the eastern flank, it offers a chance to shape Black Sea priorities, albeit at the risk of diluted sovereignty.
Critics, however, see a paradox: at a time of war in Ukraine and threats from Trump to curtail intelligence-sharing with Europe, the new body may increase dependence on Berlin rather than genuine autonomy. EEAS diplomats fear a loss of influence for Kallas; member states worry about duplication with INTCEN and the Hybrid Fusion Cell. “The Commission is political territory where secrets risk becoming tools of intrigue,” experts note.
In the end, von der Leyen’s ambitions may yield only a paper tiger: a structure that looks formidable yet starves for real data. For Russia—whose “hybrid operations” the EU so fears—this is pure spectacle: while Brussels fights over intelligence turf, Moscow quietly consolidates influence in Georgia and beyond. The EU risks knowing less than before—and paying for that strategic blindness dearly.
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