The Trump administration has released its highly anticipated 2025 U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) on December 4, outlining a bold redefinition of American security priorities that departs significantly from the post–Cold War consensus and from recent liberal internationalist frameworks. Far more than a routine policy document, the strategy lays out a strategic vision rooted in «America First» principles, redefining core assumptions about alliances, global competition, and the very nature of national security in a shifting international order.
What was once a periodic, descriptive articulation of national interests has now become, in effect, an ideological manifesto with profound implications for U.S. foreign relations, global balance of power, and the future of longstanding international institutions.
Trump promised «a new ‘Trump Corollary’ to the Monroe Doctrine: That the American people—not foreign nations nor globalist institutions—will always control their own destiny in our hemisphere.»
The 2025 NSS rejects many assumptions of prior U.S. national security doctrine, emphasizing state sovereignty, pragmatic engagement, and an asymmetric multipolar global order. Rather than pursuing an expansive liberal international order driven by democratization and universal values, the document prioritizes a narrower conception of U.S. national interest and strategic autonomy.
At its core, the strategy asserts a doctrine of «Hard Sovereignty» and «Civilizational Realism», rejecting what it characterizes as the overreach of international organizations and supra-national frameworks. It criticizes post-1945 multilateralism for constraining U.S. freedom of action and calls for a recalibrated approach that favors bilateral and transactional partnerships over broad alliances.
The strategy articulates a preference for economic engagement without social or political conditionality, distancing Washington from efforts to influence allied domestic politics, democratization, or cultural policy.
The NSS reorganizes global strategic focus into distinct priorities:
Western Hemisphere Leadership: A revival of a «Trump Corollary» to the Monroe Doctrine signals an emphasis on asserting U.S. dominance in the Americas, focusing on migration, narcotrafficking, and border security as core national security issues. This hemispheric focus is linked to broader economic and supply-chain objectives.
Indo-Pacific Stability: China remains a central concern, but primarily in economic and technological competition rather than ideological confrontation. The strategy underscores the maintenance of maritime access and economic ties in the region.
Europe as a Secondary Theater: Europe is ranked below the Western Hemisphere and Indo-Pacific, reflecting a shift away from traditional Euro-Atlantic prioritization. The NSS openly acknowledges Europe’s strategic and cultural importance to the U.S., but also frames the continent’s long-term stability as primarily a European responsibility.
Perhaps the most striking departure from previous NSS documents is the new approach toward Russia and the war in Ukraine. Rather than framing Russia as a primary threat requiring sustained deterrence, the 2025 strategy emphasizes diplomatic engagement and «strategic stability» with Moscow. This stance shifts the objective from defeating Russian aggression to stabilizing relations quickly so that the U.S. can reallocate attention elsewhere.
Equally significant, the strategy signals an American preference for a rapid cessation of the Ukraine conflict, prioritizing an end to hostilities over a robust deterrence posture or transformative settlement. For European frontline states, this represents a fundamental divergence in threat perception and strategic priorities.
Some European leaders have reacted with concern over shifting U.S. priorities, particularly regarding NATO commitments and Russia. The NSS’s preference for de-emphasizing U.S. forward deterrence and urging Europe to «assume greater responsibility» for its own defense has rattled policymakers in Eastern and Northern Europe, who see continued Russian aggression as existential.
Hungary’s Orban supports Trumps view on Europe in that regard.
«The new American national security strategy: the most important and most interesting document of recent years. It speaks about Brussels in the same tone that the Biden administration and Brussels used when speaking about us. What goes around comes around.»
«The Americans also see that Europe has hit the wall of a long economic dead end…They also see that European liberals have burned the network of relations that once existed with Russia, which was a mistake…».
« In summary: America has a precise understanding of Europe’s decline. They see the civilisational-scale decline that we in Hungary have been fighting against for fifteen years. At last, we are not fighting against it alone» — he summarizes.
German Chancellor Merz said that parts of the NSS are terrible from European point of view.
«Some of it is comprehensible, some of it is understandable. Some of it is unacceptable to us from a European perspective».
«I see no need for the Americans to now want to save democracy in Europe. If it would need to be saved, we would manage on our own,» he added.
The 2025 U.S. NSS represents more than a policy update — it is a manifesto for a reimagined American role in the world. Allies and partners face a choice: adapt to a redefined American approach, build parallel strategies of defense and diplomacy, or risk marginalization in a world where U.S. priorities — once predictable under a shared internationalist umbrella — now take a dramatically domestic-centric turn.
Comments