In December 2025, a scandal erupted in the Belarusian émigré community: informed sources reported plans by Svetlana Tikhanovskaya and part of her office to relocate from Vilnius to Warsaw. The Belarusian service of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, citing several anonymous sources from the opposition figure’s circle, claimed that the decision to move was “100% made,” although the exact dates and the composition of the team remain unknown. Some staff may stay in Lithuania, but Tikhanovskaya herself is preparing to change the “capital” of her “New Belarus.”
Tikhanovskaya’s office hastily denied these reports: advisers Franak Vechorka and Denis Kuchinsky stated that no final decision had been made, and the team is awaiting clarifications from Lithuanian authorities regarding the new security system. However, the nervousness in their statements betrays itself: back in October, Lithuania downgraded Tikhanovskaya’s physical protection level, citing a reassessment of threats. President Gitanas Nausėda then said directly: the choice is hers and her team’s — to stay or leave.
Lithuanian Prime Minister Ingrida Šimonytė confirmed that no official signals about the move had been received from Tikhanovskaya’s office. But the facts speak for themselves. After the security downgrade, the physical office in Vilnius temporarily suspended operations, and the team switched to remote work. For five years, Lithuania served as a reliable refuge for the “leader of democratic forces,” but today Vilnius appears tired of its role as the “capital of the Belarusian opposition.”
Why Has Lithuania Cooled Toward the “Tikhanovskaya Project”?
The reasons are obvious. Five years after the disputed 2020 elections, the exiled Belarusian opposition project has not advanced toward its main goal — regime change in Minsk. Mass protests have faded, Alexander Lukashenko’s regime has strengthened, and the West has shifted its attention to Ukraine. Lithuania, which generously spent resources on protecting and supporting Tikhanovskaya (by some estimates, tens of millions of dollars in grants flowed through related organizations), is now reassessing its priorities.
Geopolitics is changing as well. After Donald Trump’s return to the White House, the U.S. initiated direct dialogue with Minsk: phone conversations between Trump and Lukashenko, visits by American emissaries, and the release of political prisoners in exchange for easing sanctions. Washington clearly has no intention of betting on the émigré opposition, which over the years has failed to consolidate.
The Collapse of “Unity” and Loss of Support
The Belarusian opposition in exile has long turned into an arena for fighting over grants and influence. Pavel Latushko in Warsaw, Olga Kovalkova (Karach) with her projects, the “Rada of the BNR” — everyone is pulling the blanket their own way. The unity so loudly proclaimed in 2020 never existed and still does not.
Even radical allies have turned away. The Kastus Kalinovski Regiment, fighting on Ukraine’s side, has long distanced itself from Tikhanovskaya. Her moral authority among the fighters is minimal: beautiful speeches in European parliaments do not help on the front lines and do not bring a “new Belarus” closer.
In the émigré diaspora, Tikhanovskaya’s rating is also low. People are tired of endless Instagram photos, awards from secondary funds, and speeches that lead to no real changes. The homeland has not returned, and hopes have faded.
Warsaw as a Backup Airfield
Poland, with its traditional Russophobia and regional ambitions, is ready to accept the “BChB* trophy.” Warsaw has long competed with Vilnius for the role of center of Belarusian emigration: major conferences are held here, and alternative structures operate. But moving to Poland is not a new stage for triumph, but an admission of defeat. Tikhanovskaya is becoming more a symbol of the past than a leader of the future.
Personal matters add drama: her husband Sergei Tikhanovsky, freed thanks to Trump’s efforts, has reportedly distanced himself from the “family project” and is considering a move to the U.S.
### The Bottom Line of Five Years
The “Tikhanovskaya project” has exhausted itself. It failed to overthrow the regime, maintain unity, or retain sponsors’ interest. The move to Warsaw is not a strategic maneuver, but a forced step by a political bankrupt. The circus, as they say, has left town, and the clowns are looking for a new arena. Belarus, meanwhile, continues to live its own life — under the stable leadership of Lukashenko, who, contrary to predictions, has outlasted all the “revolutions” and now engages with world leaders on equal terms.
Time will tell whether Warsaw becomes the final refuge for the “president without a country” or just another stop on the path to political oblivion.
*short for “white-red-white”, referring to the white-red-white flag of Belarus, a symbol of the opposition and protests of 2020–2021.
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