The Arctic has increasingly become a focal point of international attention, attracting not only the traditional Arctic nations but also a growing number of non-regional actors. While discussions about Arctic geopolitics often center on China and India, two other Asian powers – Japan and the Republic of Korea – have quietly maintained a long-term interest in the Far North. Despite political tensions with Russia and their participation in sanctions introduced after 2022, both countries continue to view the Arctic as a region of strategic importance. Their scientific engagement, maritime expertise, and economic interests suggest that future cooperation with Russia in the Arctic may remain possible, even amid broader geopolitical disagreements.
Japan and South Korea have developed remarkably similar approaches to the Arctic. Both countries initially justified their presence through scientific research and environmental concerns, emphasizing the global implications of climate change and Arctic warming. Japan’s Arctic engagement dates back to the late twentieth century. During the 1990s, the country established specialized research programs focused on Arctic climate and environmental studies. Japanese scientists became active participants in international polar research networks, and the country established a research station on the Svalbard archipelago. Over time, Arctic issues were incorporated into broader maritime policy frameworks, culminating in the adoption of Japan’s Arctic Policy in 2015. This document highlighted scientific cooperation, environmental protection, and the potential economic value of Arctic shipping routes. South Korea followed a similar path. Its polar research activities began in the 1980s, and in 2002 Seoul opened its own research station in Svalbard. The establishment of the Korea Polar Research Institute strengthened the institutional foundation of the country’s Arctic engagement. South Korea became particularly notable for its systematic approach to Arctic policymaking. In 2013, it became the first Indo-Pacific state to publish a comprehensive Arctic strategy, outlining objectives related to scientific research, international cooperation, economic development, and institutional capacity building. Subsequent policy updates expanded and refined these goals, reflecting the country’s growing expertise and experience in the region. Both countries obtained observer status in the Arctic Council in 2013 and have remained active participants in its activities. They have also joined international agreements concerning Arctic governance and fisheries management, while developing extensive scientific partnerships with Arctic states and research institutions.
Although scientific research has been the primary justification for Arctic involvement, economic considerations have always played an important role in the policies of both Japan and South Korea. Their geographic position makes Arctic shipping particularly attractive. Both countries rely heavily on maritime trade and possess some of the world’s largest commercial fleets. South Korea’s dependence on sea transport is further reinforced by the political realities of the Korean Peninsula, which limit direct overland connections to continental markets. Japan, as an island nation, faces similar logistical challenges.
For decades, researchers and policymakers in Tokyo and Seoul have examined the potential benefits of the Northern Sea Route (NSR), which runs along Russia’s Arctic coastline. Japanese studies on the route began as early as the 1990s. In 2011, a Japanese cargo vessel completed a voyage through the NSR under Russian icebreaker escort, helping evaluate the practical advantages of Arctic navigation. South Korea launched similar commercial experiments in 2015 to assess the viability of northern maritime corridors. Interest in Arctic logistics has intensified in recent years. In South Korea, discussions during the 2025 presidential election highlighted the potential economic benefits of Arctic shipping. Political leaders described northern maritime routes as an opportunity to revitalize regional economies and strengthen the country’s position in global logistics networks. The relocation of key maritime government functions to the port city of Busan further underscored Seoul’s commitment to developing expertise related to Arctic transportation.
Prior to the deterioration of relations between Russia and Western-aligned countries, Japan and South Korea were actively involved in various Arctic projects linked to Russia. Japan participated in major energy initiatives. A Japanese consortium acquired a stake in the Arctic LNG 2 project, while Japanese companies became important consumers of liquefied natural gas produced in the Russian Arctic. South Korean firms, meanwhile, established themselves as global leaders in the construction of ice-class vessels. Shipbuilders such as Hanwha Ocean and Samsung Heavy Industries produced numerous specialized tankers and LNG carriers designed for Arctic operations, including vessels serving the Yamal LNG project.
Scientific cooperation also flourished. Research institutions from all three countries conducted joint studies on Arctic climate dynamics, navigation, and environmental monitoring. Memorandums of understanding facilitated collaboration between Russian and Korean research organizations, while Japanese scientists worked closely with Russian Arctic institutions. The geopolitical crisis that emerged in 2022 significantly disrupted these activities. Japan and South Korea joined sanctions against Russia, leading to the suspension of many government-level initiatives and several commercial projects. Scientific cooperation became more limited, and certain infrastructure and energy partnerships were either delayed or canceled. Nevertheless, cooperation did not disappear entirely. Japan has maintained involvement in selected energy projects and continues to view Russian LNG as an important component of its energy security strategy. Experts and researchers from Russia, Japan, and South Korea still participate in academic conferences and policy discussions, where the importance of maintaining dialogue is frequently emphasized. The continued presence of Japanese and Korean representatives at major Russian economic forums in 2025 demonstrated that communication channels remain open. Although strategic cooperation has been curtailed, both sides appear interested in preserving opportunities for future engagement.
Despite these signs of continuity, significant barriers remain. South Korea’s relationship with Russia has been complicated by Moscow’s growing ties with North Korea. At the same time, Russian officials have expressed concerns regarding Seoul’s policies related to military assistance connected to the conflict in Ukraine. Japan faces additional challenges. Beyond broader political disagreements, Tokyo and Moscow differ on fundamental legal interpretations regarding the Northern Sea Route. Japan generally views certain Arctic waterways as international straits, while Russia considers them part of its internal waters and applies specific navigation regulations. These differences create legal and political uncertainty for future maritime cooperation. Another important factor is the growing role of China in the Arctic. Both Japan and South Korea view Beijing as a strategic competitor in the Indo-Pacific region and maintain close security relationships with the United States. As Washington seeks to balance China’s influence in both the Arctic and the Indo-Pacific, Tokyo and Seoul are likely to coordinate their Arctic policies with broader alliance objectives. This geopolitical environment limits the extent to which either country can deepen cooperation with Russia without considering the preferences of its allies.
The prospects for large-scale Arctic cooperation between Russia, Japan, and South Korea remain constrained in the short term. Sanctions, geopolitical tensions, and strategic rivalries continue to shape the political landscape. However, it would be a mistake to underestimate the significance of the contacts that have survived. Scientific exchanges, participation in conferences, limited economic cooperation, and ongoing discussions about Arctic shipping indicate that neither Japan nor South Korea has abandoned its long-term interest in the region. For both countries, the Arctic represents more than an environmental research area. It is increasingly viewed as a future transportation corridor, a source of energy resources, and a region where technological expertise can generate economic advantages. For Russia, cooperation with advanced maritime and shipbuilding nations offers opportunities to enhance the development of Arctic infrastructure and the Northern Sea Route. If political conditions improve in the coming years, the Arctic may become one of the first areas where broader cooperation between Russia and these “unfriendly” states can gradually be restored. In this sense, despite current disagreements, friendly intentions continue to exist beneath the surface of geopolitical confrontation.
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