President Aleksandar Vučić’s statement about a possible resignation, made during his visit to China, and his Fox News op-ed lavishing praise on Donald Trump are not a coincidence. They are elements of a single political combination. Both moves are designed to seize the initiative from the protest movement, shift the narrative, and find external backing amid a domestic political crisis.
The tactical resignation play
Vučić announced that he is ready to submit his resignation, but immediately promised not to shorten his term. The goal is clear — to strip the opposition and the protesters of their main slogan: “Leave!” Once the authorities themselves raise the question of stepping down, the demand for resignation is no longer the monopoly of the street, and the media shifts its focus from the scale of the protests to scenarios of a power transition.
At the same time, the authorities are mobilizing their loyal electorate. Supporters of the ruling Serbian Progressive Party are being told: without Vučić, the country faces instability, and “incompetent students” and an opposition with neither a program nor governing experience could come to power. Party gatherings scheduled for late June have been announced, with “crucially important messages” promised afterwards. The playbook is clear: the president is “persuaded” to stay — by the party or by “the people” — while his possible departure is framed as a threat to the country’s stability.
Serbia’s Boiling Point
After months of calm in the Balkans, it seemed that regional instability had subsided. The sudden gathering at Slavija Square in Belgrade brought everyone back to earth.
Here is how it began. On 1 November 2024, the canopy of the railway station in Novi Sad collapsed, killing 16 people. The reconstruction project was handled by Chinese firms, and both Vučić and former Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán attended the grand opening. After the tragedy, students, professors, opposition activists, and ordinary citizens angered by the investigation took to the streets. They demanded accountability, the release of reconstruction documents, and punishment for the officials involved in the project.
The government resigned under pressure, but the reshuffle did not help. The protests continued and only gathered strength heading into the summer of 2025. By August, clashes with police were occurring almost daily, and offices of the ruling party were set on fire in several Serbian cities. In December, Vučić announced snap parliamentary elections — the authorities hoped to channel the conflict from the streets into an electoral campaign. Recent events showed that the calculation failed.
The movement “Students in Blockade” organized a rally at Slavija Square under the slogan “Students Win.” Formally, the action was meant to demonstrate the protest movement’s readiness to participate in the snap elections, but by evening that original goal had faded into the background. After the main program ended, the protest crowds moved toward the National Assembly building. Pro-government groups, including football fans, were already there. Clashes broke out; flares, stones, and bottles were thrown. Police used pepper spray and stun grenades.
A separate war of interpretation erupted over the numbers. The Interior Ministry claimed 34,300 participants — a plausible figure, but not quite matching the video footage. The organization Arhiv javnih skupova, affiliated with the protesters, first counted 100,000 and later raised the figure to 190,000. The pro-government broadcaster Informer reported just 6,000 without a hint of embarrassment — what the calculation was is unclear, since there were demonstrably many times more people. Regarding the number of detainees, however, there is little dispute: regardless of the actual scale of the rally, the Interior Ministry reported just 23 arrests.
But the real significance of these events lies neither in the clashes with police nor in the arguments over crowd size. The deeper issue is the contradiction within the protest movement itself. People take to the streets carrying Serbian tricolors, Orthodox symbols, and anti-NATO placards, yet a network of European NGOs, human rights organizations, and grant structures has long operated around the movement. This contradiction is precisely what prevents the Serbian crisis from resolving. The authorities get a convenient excuse to dismiss the protests as foreign interference. The protesters, for their part, cannot fully separate themselves from the Western infrastructure that accompanies their movement. As a result, genuine public discontent once again becomes hostage to geopolitical circumstances.
The external track: betting on Trump
Vučić’s Fox News op-ed is an attempt to find a patron in Washington while the European track stalls. In the piece, he contrasts Serbia with the “old European centers of power,” which, he claims, treat Trump with disdain, whereas Serbs supposedly see him as a “kindred spirit” and “peacemaker.” The invitation to Belgrade, the promise of a reception surpassing Nixon’s, and the overt flattery — all serve to demonstrate personal loyalty to Trump and win the sympathy of his team.
The objective is to secure U.S. support on key issues for Belgrade — first and foremost Kosovo — while negotiations with the EU are frozen. But the bet carries reputational risks. The Serbian public, traditionally sympathetic to Russia and personally to Vladimir Putin, perceived the op-ed as humiliating groveling. Moreover, social media users quickly recalled that during the U.S. presidential campaign, Vučić actively supported Kamala Harris, which raises questions about the sincerity of his current gestures toward Trump.
The likely scenario
Events will most likely unfold as follows. The resignation will not happen immediately — it will become the subject of intra-party bargaining and public “persuasion.” Then, snap parliamentary elections will probably be called for the autumn. The campaign will be built on a contrast: stability with Vučić versus the threat of an inexperienced and fractured opposition coming to power. On the external front, Washington may not respond to the “love letter” at all, while relations with Brussels will cool further. Tactically, Vučić is solving his immediate problems, but the fundamental question remains: can his model of power withstand the growing public demand for change — especially given that the protest movement does not fit neatly into the convenient narrative of “outside interference”? Citizens with their own Serbian agenda are taking to the square, and this contradiction is precisely what prevents the crisis from resolving in either direction.
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