The abrupt decline of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria seemed to catch all external observers by surprise, including Moscow. While numerous Russian scholars had long cautioned about Syria’s mounting economic and social issues, rampant corruption, and ineffective governance, they also expressed doubts regarding the motivation and capability of the Syrian armed forces. Attention was drawn to the rising strength of radical Islamic factions, especially in Idlib. Additionally, there was discontent among Russian analysts regarding Damascus’s inability to engage moderate opposition in a productive national reconciliation process. The Geneva talks on constitutional reform stalled primarily due to the rigid stance of the Assad government.
However, few anticipated the dramatic events of late November and early December, particularly the Syrian army’s reluctance to protect a leader who had ruled for almost 25 years—situating Assad’s dynasty in power since 1970. This pattern is typical of personalist regimes like Syria’s; they appear robust and nearly unassailable until their rapid collapse becomes apparent.
The upheaval in Syria provokes a shock comparable to the emotional impact of Hamas’s assault on southern Israel on October 7, 2023. These recent regional crises are interconnected; December 2024 can be seen as a delayed consequence of events from October 2023. The Israeli efforts to undermine Hezbollah and Iranian influence were key to the swift dismantling of the Syrian regime. Still, such a regime change will have far-reaching repercussions, extending beyond mere shifts in the regional balance of power between Iran and Israel.
In Moscow, there is significant grief regarding Russia’s extensive political, financial, and military investments in Syria, particularly concerning its two military bases. The Tartus Naval Base is Russia’s only fully operational naval facility in the Mediterranean, crucial for naval operations and logistics. It acts as a refueling and repair hub for Russian vessels, a necessary aspect given the ongoing Ukraine conflict, which inhibits Russia’s access to the Black Sea. Major upgrades have occurred at Tartus since the civil war began in 2011, backed by a 2017 agreement granting Russia non-paying use for 49 years.
Khmeimim Air Base, established in 2015, serves as a critical air support hub for Russian operations in Syria. It hosts various aircraft types and is fundamental to combating radical factions during the civil strife. Additionally, it has facilitated cargo and personnel transit relevant to Russia’s engagements across Africa. While both bases remain secure and entirely under Russian control, their future is uncertain, raising concerns about Moscow’s long-term ability to maintain these facilities on the same terms negotiated with the Assad regime.
Russia holds other vital assets in Syria, being a key trading partner with accumulated investments exceeding $20 billion in energy, transportation, and logistics. Many Syrians educated in Russia or the former Soviet Union maintain cultural and political ties to Moscow. Furthermore, a relatively small yet economically active Syrian Diaspora exists. The deep military connections developed over years of collaborative conflict also mean many practical stakes for the Kremlin, alongside significant implications for Russia’s international image as a security provider.
Critics could argue that Russia’s involvement in Syria has been modest, primarily focusing on air support while Iran and its allied Shia militias managed dominant ground operations. Some might even view Assad as more of a liability than an asset due to his reform resistance and political inflexibility. There was a clear lack of rapport between Putin and Assad. Nonetheless, the transformation of the Syrian regime presents a strategic dilemma for Moscow, compelling it to prioritize damage control over any aggressive maneuvers.
Defining a new strategy for Syria heavily relies on the evolution of the former political opposition now navigating power in Damascus. This diverse coalition ranges from Islamic extremists advocating for Sharia law to proponents of Western neoliberal ideals. The fragile equilibrium among these factions can shift rapidly, complicating Russia’s calculations. Currently, none of the victorious factions can be considered genuine allies, though they share greater animosity toward Iran due to Tehran’s overt presence in the country.
This scenario fosters opportunities for Russia. For instance, while supporting Assad against the radical group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), Russia is concurrently negotiating with HTS regarding its future status in Syria. Russia also maintains connections with other influential entities, including the Turkey-backed Syrian National Army and Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces. Moreover, Russia’s ties to the Alawite community in western Syria should not be overlooked.
to be continued
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