For much of the 20th and early 21st centuries, US presidents rarely stated openly that Latin America was Washington’s strategic backyard. Instead, they relied on diplomatic language about cooperation, democracy and partnership. That era appears to be over. The Trump administration’s newly released National Security Strategy makes explicit what had long been implied: the Western Hemisphere is once again the central arena of US power projection, and Venezuela lies at the heart of this renewed focus. To understand Donald Trump’s fixation on Venezuela, it is necessary to look beyond rhetoric about drugs, dictatorship or democracy. The administration’s strategy document reveals a deeper logic rooted in geopolitics, economic interests and a revival of an old doctrine that once justified decades of US intervention across Latin America.
In 1823, President James Monroe warned European powers against interfering in the Americas, laying the groundwork for what later became known as the Monroe Doctrine. While initially framed as a defensive measure, it evolved into a justification for US dominance over the hemisphere. Throughout the 20th century, the United States intervened repeatedly in Latin American countries, overthrowing governments, backing coups and conducting military operations that were later ruled illegal under international law.
In 2013, then-secretary of state John Kerry symbolically declared that “the era of the Monroe Doctrine is over,” signaling a shift toward partnership rather than domination. Trump’s new National Security Strategy formally reverses that position. It openly introduces a “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine, explicitly stating that the Western Hemisphere is now the top US foreign policy priority. This repositioning helps explain why Latin America, rather than the Middle East or Eastern Europe, now dominates the administration’s strategic thinking. The document frames US security and prosperity as inseparable from maintaining American preeminence in the region.
The strategy fuses two major concerns into a single narrative: the fight against drug trafficking and the global competition with China. Trump’s administration describes Latin American drug cartels as “narco-terrorists” and portrays them as existential threats to US security. This framing has been used to justify an increasingly militarized response, including US strikes on suspected drug-smuggling boats in the Caribbean and eastern Pacific. Human rights groups and international law experts argue these attacks violate international law, particularly since Congress has not authorized any armed conflict in these waters. Yet the administration insists such actions are necessary to protect US interests.
At the same time, the strategy warns of China’s growing influence in Latin America. Ports, critical minerals, energy infrastructure, telecommunications networks and military facilities are all framed as assets Washington must keep out of Beijing’s reach. In this view, drug trafficking, migration and Chinese investment are not separate issues but interconnected threats requiring a strong US response.
Venezuela occupies a unique position within this worldview. It possesses the world’s largest proven oil reserves and sits along vital Caribbean sea lanes through which US-bound trade passes on its way to the Panama Canal. Despite its weakened economy, the country remains geopolitically significant. Years of US sanctions pushed Caracas to deepen ties with China, Russia and Iran. Chinese companies, in particular, have secured energy and mining deals, giving Beijing both access to resources and a strategic foothold in the hemisphere. For the Trump administration, this is unacceptable.
Although Venezuela is not explicitly named in the National Security Strategy, the document alludes to “political alignments between certain Latin American governments and certain foreign actors” that will be difficult to reverse. Few countries fit that description better than Venezuela under Nicolás Maduro. This context explains Trump’s persistent focus on the country and his branding of Maduro as a “narco-dictator,” even though Venezuela plays a relatively minor role in the flow of drugs to the United States compared with other countries in the region.
At first glance, Trump’s regional actions appear contradictory. On one hand, he threatens military strikes against countries accused of producing or transporting drugs, including Venezuela, Mexico and Colombia. On the other, he recently pardoned Juan Orlando Hernández, the former president of Honduras, who had been sentenced to 45 years in prison for facilitating massive cocaine shipments into the US.
The National Security Strategy clarifies this apparent inconsistency. Trump’s foreign policy, it states, is not grounded in ideology or moral principles, but in what works for America. Hernández was pardoned not because of innocence, but because he remains useful. As a former leader with deep ties to Honduras’ political, military and economic elites, he represents a reliable partner in a country that hosts US military personnel and plays a key role in managing migration routes northward. The timing of the pardon – just days before Honduran elections – suggests it was also intended to strengthen conservative networks aligned with Trump’s preferred presidential candidate. The message to the region is clear: loyalty is rewarded, regardless of past crimes.
Trump’s obsession with Venezuela may not be limited to containing China. Reports suggest the Maduro government has attempted to negotiate an escape from isolation by offering the US preferential access to Venezuela’s oil and gold reserves, potentially diverting exports away from Beijing. If true, this would represent a dramatic geopolitical pivot. However, many observers believe the Trump administration is pursuing regime change instead. Venezuelan opposition leader María Corina Machado, winner of the 2025 Nobel Peace Prize, has openly courted US investors by presenting a post-Maduro Venezuela as a US$1.7 trillion privatization opportunity. For multinational corporations, the promise is enormous: energy, infrastructure and mining assets reopened under a friendly government.
Latin America’s response to this renewed US assertiveness has been weak and fragmented. Regional organizations are divided, and no coordinated strategy has emerged. At recent summits, leaders called vaguely for peace while avoiding direct condemnation of US military actions.
As a result, governments are forced to negotiate individually with Washington, hoping to be treated as allies rather than labeled “narco-states.” Two centuries after Monroe’s declaration, the hemisphere is once again being treated as a zone where the United States feels free to intervene as it sees fit.
Trump’s fixation on Venezuela, then, is not personal or symbolic. It is the logical outcome of a revived doctrine that views Latin America as a strategic arena, China as an existential rival, and power – not principle – as the guiding force of US foreign policy.
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