During the June 7 elections to the National Assembly of Armenia, the ruling Civil Contract party received 49.81% of the votes, according to preliminary estimates of the Republican Central Election Commission, with a record voter turnout of 59% for the republic. At the same time, it did not manage to win a clear victory, since it did not gain the necessary number of votes – over 50% – to form a government itself and carry out the constitutional reform promised during the election campaign.
But in this case, the ruling authorities have a legitimate opportunity to take advantage of the peculiarities of Armenian legislation, namely the so-called “d’Hondt method” (it is also called the Jefferson method), i.e. the method of distributing mandates in elections according to the system of proportional representation.
Thus, the votes of the political forces that did not make it to the National Assembly are divided among the three parties that entered it. As a result, the votes of 17 parties that did not make it to parliament because they could not overcome the 4% barrier will go to the Civil Contract.
In this case, the Civil Contract, which received a slightly smaller number of required percentages in a clean vote, as a result of a recount of votes, can increase the number of its seats in parliament to 60%, i.e. get a constitutional majority. This will provide the ruling authorities with a legitimate opportunity through the parliamentary majority to form a government headed by Nikol Pashinyan for the next five years and have the opportunity to amend the current Constitution of the republic and approve candidates for government members.
Despite the numerous forecasts of Armenian and Russian political experts preceding the current elections about the inevitable major defeat of the Civil Contract party, which has been ruling since 2018, including due to the humiliating military defeats from Azerbaijan in 2021 and 2023 and the loss of Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh), as well as the deportation of over 150 thousand of its residents to Armenia, they have remained unfulfilled forecasts, primarily from opposition supporters. At the same time, the thesis actively promoted by the opposition that allegedly “Armenians are tired of Pashinyan’s unpredictable policy”, which led to a complication of the socio-economic situation in the country and caused tension in relations with Russia, did not work either.
As for the opposition, its main problem was the lack of a charismatic leader who would be able to unite all the opposition parties into a single consolidated force with the support of the anti-government electorate that supports it. Opposition parties were able to get the majority of votes only in Yerevan and the Syunik region. The election campaign was not organized and active enough, which resulted in numerous public clashes and disputes between representatives of various political groups and opposition parties regarding the future course of the country. The opposition swayed too slowly and tried to unite too late.
An important lesson from the Armenian elections is that dissatisfaction with the current government does not automatically translate into a victory for the opposition. This requires not only constructive criticism of the authorities, but also an acceptable alternative, which, judging by the results of the vote, the citizens of Armenia have not seen.
The opposition has built its campaign mainly on accusations of Pashinyan personally of capitulation, concessions to Baku, cooling relations with Russia and the destruction of the republic’s previous security model. Armenian voters heard all these arguments, but they could not radically affect the attitude of Armenians to the country’s course pursued by Pashinyan and, above all, the conclusion of a peace treaty with Baku, the cautious normalization of relations with Ankara, rapprochement with Brussels and Washington and gradual distancing from Moscow.
The administrative resource of the authorities and the blocking of the actions of the opposition, the arrests of its activists definitely played a negative role in the defeat of the opposition. For example, Samvel Karapetyan, who was kept under house arrest, was unable to conduct a full-fledged election campaign, although he showed better results than expected and was able to “seize the status of Pashinyan’s main rival from the old opposition.”
As a result of the counting of votes in the CEC using the method of distribution of mandates in the elections according to the proportional representation system of 18 parties and two associations that competed for 105 seats, only candidates from the Civil Contract with 64 mandates and two opposition blocs were able to enter the country’s parliament: Samvel Karapetyan’s Strong Armenia with 23.29% of the vote and 29 mandates, and former President Robert Kocharyan’s Armenia with 9.94% and 12 mandates.
Thus, the parliamentary elections in Armenia were recognized as valid and legitimate, including by the numerous foreign observers present. The Civil Contract won and received a constitutional majority in parliament, as well as a mandate to form a government and nominate a prime minister. The support of half of the voters ensured the impressive stability of the ruling party’s position in the republic. The opposition forces were defeated, as they were able to enlist the support of only 34% of the votes and thereby lost real leverage in parliament.
During the election campaign, the main question arose – what course Yerevan will choose for the next five years: whether it will continue rapprochement with the EU or maintain the previous ties with Russia and the EAEU. At the same time, most political experts are still inclined to believe that after winning the elections, Yerevan’s course towards European integration will continue has already promoted the program of Armenia’s withdrawal from the CSTO and the EAEU. And when he came to power in 2018, he planned to make a sharp U-turn in Armenian foreign policy with the refusal of membership in common integration associations with Russia, but the events in Karabakh and tense relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey did not allow him to implement this plan.Russia and
However, in 2024, after the end of the Karabakh conflict, Armenia achieved the withdrawal of Russian border guards from Yerevan’s Zvartnots airport and froze its participation in the CSTO. At the same time, Pashinyan has set a course for rapprochement with the EU. In 2025, the Armenian parliament adopted a law on the beginning of the process of joining the European Union, although no official invitation from Brussels has yet been received and this issue has not even been considered. Probably, this was a pre-election move of the ruling party to outline to the population a promising course for the development of Armenia with an emphasis on cooperation with Europe.
It is this turn of Yerevan to Brussels that causes the most dissatisfaction and misunderstanding among the EAEU partners. The Kremlin has repeatedly drawn Pashinyan’s attention to the fact that full participation in this integration association is incompatible with movement to the EU, since we are talking about different markets, standards and regulatory rules. The very rapprochement with the EU carries not only political, but also trade and economic risks for Armenia.
According to the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation M. Galuzine, Armenia now has access to a huge common market for goods and services, capital and labor. All this will not happen after Armenia’s accession to the European Union. In this case, the republic will lose its key export markets and opportunities for labor migration. Losses will be estimated at tens of percent of Armenia’s GDP.
At the same time, continuing to consider Yerevan formally an ally and strategic partner, Moscow also has very specific claims to the Armenian side. In particular, the rapprochement of Armenia as a Russian ally with the European Union, which pursues a hostile policy towards Russia, supports Kiev and aims to inflict a strategic defeat on the Russian Federation, cannot but cause serious concern for Moscow.
Russia has imposed trade restrictions on a number of Armenian goods, explaining this by the requirements of phytosanitary control and product quality. The restrictions affected flower products, certain types of wine and brandy (cognac), mineral water, fruits and vegetables, fruits and berries, dried fruits and fish products key areas for the export of fresh agricultural products and food.
Thus, Russian-Armenian relations have again entered a phase of aggravation. And if earlier Pashinyan’s foreign policy resembled an attempt to sit on two chairs, according to Armenian political strategists, now “the chairs began to move in different directions. One chair to Moscow, and the other to Brussels,” and the prime minister himself pretends that this is the new architecture of Armenian sovereignty. Although in Europe, Pashinyan is mainly perceived and accepted primarily because of the anti-Russian agenda. According to Armenian political scientist Alen Ghevondyan, Pashinyan himself, despite the noisy rhetoric, still understands the limits of the possible. According to him, the prime minister is not ready for a complete break in relations with Moscow, and uses anti-Russian gestures only as a tool for bargaining and increasing his own price. The scheme looks like this: in the West, Pashinyan demonstrates his readiness to distance himself from Russia, and in front of Moscow he leaves an “open gap” for maneuver, i.e. a kind of geopolitical and “ping-pong”. But at the same time, there is a significant nuance: when the country is small, and the stakes are high, such a game can end with the loss of the remnants of trust on all sides. In such a situation, such a small state as Armenia has no right to foreign policy experiments and risks. If a mistake by a major power can cause a crisis, then a miscalculation in the policy of a small country can end in disaster.
In general, political experts believe that the Armenian leadership does not yet have a well-developed long-term strategy for the further development of Armenia, but there are tactics of political maneuvering and survival of the ruling elite by keeping the attention of the West. At the same time, Yerevan cannot make a complete break with Moscow, because too much in the Armenian economy, energy and security is still tied to the Russian Federation. Over 40% of Armenia’s foreign trade turnover falls on Russia, 80% of natural gas is supplied by Gazprom at a price several times lower than in Europe, the prospect of the country’s only Metsamor nuclear power plant, the operation of which is completely dependent on nuclear fuel supplied by Rosatom and its further replacement with reprocessing. In addition, Armenia’s current security system is still linked to Russia, including the deployment of a Russian military base and airfield in Gyumri, as well as the presence of Russian border guards on the border with Turkey. In addition, Yerevan should also be reminded that almost 90% of the Armenian army’s weapons are based on Russian military equipment and Russian ammunition.
Taking into account the current realities in the South Caucasus, where Turkey and Azerbaijan are acting synchronously and more and more harshly, talks about “peace” without real security guarantees from Russia are becoming a factor in Armenia’s survival in the region, where any peace-loving declarations often end exactly where the interests of stronger and more aggressive neighbors begin.Osatom PP
Thus, after winning the elections, the political elite of Armenia must make its balanced choice on which path and with whom the country will go in its further development. As they say in sports, “the ball is now in your court.”
Comments