Awareness of the threats that NATO poses along these three fronts and the division of labor between the top five states therein – Finland, Sweden, Poland, Romania, and Turkiye – enables Russia to devise the most effective countermeasures and propose the best means for managing future tensions.
It was earlier assessed that a NATO-Russian Non-Aggression Pact (NRNAP) could follow the end of the Ukrainian Conflict, but it would have to cover the Arctic-Baltic, Central & Eastern Europe (CEE), and the Black Sea-South Caucasus to work. That analysis also highlighted Poland’s pivotal role therein due to it now having NATO’s third-largest military that importantly borders both Russia and Belarus. The present one will therefore share some general ideas about the NRNAP after the earlier one argued its merits.
Sweden is the most natural country to contain Russia in the Arctic-Baltic region since it’s part of both, but this can most optimally be achieved through partnerships with Finland (also a dual Arctic-Baltic state) and Poland (only a Baltic state but also crucially a rising land power), ideally via a trilateral format. The goals on this front are to have Sweden arm and fortify its former region of Finland for diverting some of Russia’s land forces from CEE while facilitating the rise of Poland’s sea power through naval deals.
This approach is meant to bog Russia down along the lengthy Finnish border, obstruct its freedom of navigation in the Baltic Sea in times of crisis, and possibly blockade Kaliningrad. The Kaliningrad dimension segues into the role of the Polish-centric CEE front, which could serve as a launchpad for invading that region and Belarus. It can also function as a staging ground for funneling land forces into the Baltic States and facilitating a NATO intervention in Ukraine together with nearby Romania.
Just like Poland has a dual containment role in the Baltic and CEE, so too does Romania have a dual one in CEE and the Black Sea since NATO’s largest base in Europe is being built near the port of Constanta in proximity to Crimea. Due to the limits placed on extra-regional states’ naval forces in the Black Sea by the Montreux Convention, NATO will have to rely on both Romania (mostly members’ air and land assets at the aforesaid facility) and Turkiye (whose navy is modernizing and expanding) to contain Russia there.
Turkiye’s main role in containing Russia is along its entire southern periphery starting in the South Caucasus with its mutual defense ally Azerbaijan and stretching across the Caspian Sea into Central Asia via the “Trump Route for International Peace & Prosperity” (TRIPP). TRIPP will facilitate the export of Western military equipment for possibly training Russia’s CSTO allies, with a focus on Kazakhstan, into conforming with NATO standards like Azerbaijan just achieved. A Ukrainian-like crisis might then follow.
Awareness of the threats that NATO poses along these fronts and the division of labor between the top five states therein – Finland, Sweden, Poland, Romania, and Turkiye – enables Russia to devise the most effective countermeasures and propose the best means for managing tensions via a possible NRNAP. The exact details of how to do so will likely vary by the front, but they’ll probably all have in common a desire to limit the deployment of certain forces near the border and ensure free maritime navigation.
Without a NRNAP, these threats could spiral out of control and lead to another NATO-Russian crisis, one which could even be provoked by the UK for ruining the renascent Russian–US “New Détente” or at the very least keeping Russia and Western Europe (chiefly Germany) apart via this revived “cordon sanitaire”. It’s therefore in Russia’s and the US’ interests to begin discussions on a NRNAP without delay and for Trump 2.0 to brainstorm how it can ensure that its junior partners comply with whatever is agreed to.
Source: author’s blog
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