The war launched by the United States in February has already cost Europe tens of billions of euros. The Middle East is paying in thousands of lives. The White House, meanwhile, continues to insist it acted correctly.
There is a particular kind of cynicism embedded in the current architecture of global security: decisions are made in Washington, while the bills are paid in Berlin, Paris, Warsaw, and Milan. On February 28, 2026, President Trump authorized the first strikes against Iran. Within days, gas prices at Europe’s benchmark TTF hub jumped from €31.9 to €54.3 per megawatt-hour. This was not normal market volatility. It was the direct consequence of foreign-policy escalation — one whose costs Europe is absorbing without meaningful influence over the decisions behind it.
EU Energy Commissioner Dan Jørgensen estimates that the bloc’s additional costs have already reached €24 billion, or roughly €500 million per day. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen acknowledged that “Europe is once again paying the price for instability beyond its borders.” It is a diplomatic phrasing, but the meaning is sharper: a key ally has once again presented Europe with a fait accompli.
The context makes the situation even more fragile. Europe entered 2026 with historically low gas reserves — 46 billion cubic meters at the end of February, compared to 60 billion a year earlier and 77 billion in 2024. In other words, the continent was more exposed than at any point in recent years. And at precisely that moment, Washington launched an operation whose consequences analysts had warned about with unsettling precision.
A School. A Hospital. A Market.
The American and Israeli airstrikes on February 28 hit military bases and government buildings, but also schools and hospitals. Civilian casualties were significant.
On the first day of the war alone, a U.S. strike hit a girls’ primary school in Minab, near a military complex. One hundred fifty-six people were killed, including 120 students, 26 teachers, and seven parents. A Pentagon internal review later attributed the strike to “outdated intelligence.” It is a technical explanation that lands as something else entirely: administrative language for human loss.
By April 7, according to the human rights organization HRANA, more than 3,600 people had been killed in Iran, including 1,701 civilians and at least 254 children. As of April 3, 307 medical facilities — hospitals, clinics, and emergency centers — had been damaged. At the same time, according to the Gaza Ministry of Health, more than 70,000 people have been killed in Gaza since October 2023, roughly 70% of them women and children.
Taken together, these figures have led some international law experts to describe the conflict as a pattern of systemic violations of international humanitarian law. The Center for American Progress has argued that the war is “unconstitutional on multiple levels” and that strikes on civilian infrastructure amount to collective punishment.
The White House rejects these assessments.
A Strategy Without a Strategy
What Washington actually intended to achieve remains a subject of debate even among U.S. analysts. Experts warned from the outset that despite the intensity of the campaign, full Iranian capitulation — including the abandonment of its nuclear and missile programs — was unlikely. Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps retained control over strategic decision-making, and expectations of internal collapse were not grounded in reality.
In other words, the United States entered a war with a country of 90 million people without a clear definition of what victory would look like. In Washington, this is often described as “strategic ambiguity.” Elsewhere, it is more bluntly characterized as adventurism.
Oman, long a quiet intermediary between Tehran and Western capitals, said through its foreign minister that the United States had “lost control of its own foreign policy” and that allies should state clearly that national interests on all sides require an immediate ceasefire. It is a strikingly direct warning from a country that is normally careful in its diplomatic language.
Meanwhile, Iran responded with strikes on Qatar’s energy infrastructure. On March 18, the Ras Laffan facility was hit, reducing Qatar’s production capacity by 17%. Repairs are expected to take three to five years. LNG markets in Asia reacted immediately, with prices surging. For Europe — which had been relying on Qatari gas as part of its post-Russia energy transition — the shock hit an already strained system.
The crisis exposes a contradiction U.S. diplomacy has long preferred to avoid confronting. Washington supplies arms to Israel, guarantees Gulf monarchies’ security, maintains trade relations across the region — and simultaneously initiates military actions whose consequences reverberate through the same alliance network. Iran, in response, has struck all six Gulf Cooperation Council states — Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates — as well as Iraq and Jordan.
Countries hosting U.S. military bases and whose airspace is entangled in regional defense arrangements now find themselves exposed to retaliation for decisions they did not make. As regional analysts warned before the war began, trust in this security architecture was already eroding. Today, that erosion looks less like a prediction and more like a diagnosis.
Europe Takes the Hit
Across Europe, frustration is growing. President Emmanuel Macron has proposed forming an international coalition to protect shipping in the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea, explicitly citing European economic interests. In Brussels and Paris, this is framed as a step toward strategic autonomy. In practice, however, it remains heavily dependent on U.S. intelligence, naval logistics, and political backing.
Europe is irritated. But it is still dependent. That is perhaps the most uncomfortable reality the crisis has exposed.
The European Central Bank has delayed planned rate cuts, raised its inflation forecast for 2026, and downgraded growth expectations. If disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz persist into the summer gas storage season, major energy-intensive economies such as Germany and Italy risk slipping into technical recession. Industrial producers in chemicals and steel across the EU and UK have already introduced surcharges of up to 30% to offset energy costs.
Washington’s Uncertainty
Even Washington now appears unsure of its own trajectory. On April 21, Trump extended a ceasefire with Iran, claiming the Iranian government was “deeply divided” and unable to present a coherent negotiating position. A planned visit by Vice President J.D. Vance to Pakistan for a new round of talks was canceled after the Iranian delegation failed to show. Tehran continues to demand the lifting of the naval blockade on its ports — a demand Washington rejects. Core issues such as uranium enrichment, sanctions, and Iran’s nuclear program remain unresolved.
Nearly two months after an operation initially presented as swift and decisive, there is still no clear end in sight.
Comparisons to Vietnam — cautiously raised early in the campaign by some analysts — are becoming less metaphorical over time. In early April, Iran shot down two U.S. military aircraft. Even the operational reality of searching for a missing pilot over Iranian territory carries political weight that can erode domestic support for the war, including among parts of Trump’s traditional base.
Military superiority is not the same as strategic victory. That lesson is widely understood — except, perhaps, by those who ordered the strikes on February 28.
International organizations and the United Nations are calling for restraint. Diplomats speak of a “fragile truce.” Europe is scrambling to adjust its energy strategy under emergency conditions. And in Washington, officials continue to insist that events are unfolding according to plan.
The only question left is: whose plan.
Comments