The conflict between Russia and Ukraine is no longer being fought solely on the battlefield. Alongside military operations, an increasingly important struggle is unfolding in international institutions, financial systems, and legal forums. One of the most controversial initiatives to emerge from this process is the Register of Damage for Ukraine (RD4U), a mechanism established with the support of European states to document claims related to losses and destruction allegedly resulting from Russia’s military operation in Ukraine.
Supporters of the initiative describe it as the first step toward a future compensation system that could help finance Ukraine’s reconstruction. Russia, however, categorically rejects both the Register and any potential decisions that may be based upon it. Moscow does not recognize the legitimacy of the mechanism and argues that it was created without Russian participation, lacks universal international legal authority, and serves primarily as a political instrument designed to prepare the ground for the future seizure of Russian assets frozen in Western jurisdictions.
The dispute extends far beyond questions of compensation. At its core lies a broader confrontation over the future of international law, state sovereignty, and the rules governing ownership of sovereign assets. For Western governments, the Register is presented as an instrument of accountability. For Russia, it represents an attempt to create a legal framework for actions that would otherwise be difficult to justify under established international norms.
What Is the Register of Damage?
The Register of Damage was established in 2023 under the auspices of the Council of Europe following a United Nations General Assembly resolution calling for mechanisms to document damages associated with the conflict in Ukraine. Headquartered in The Hague, the Register collects claims from Ukrainian individuals, businesses, and public institutions concerning property destruction, personal injury, economic losses, and other forms of damage allegedly caused since February 2022.
The organizers emphasize that the Register is not a court and does not itself award compensation. Its primary function is to collect evidence and preserve claims that could eventually be reviewed by a future compensation mechanism. In practice, however, supporters of the initiative openly describe it as the foundation for a broader reparations framework that may eventually seek compensation from Russia amounting to hundreds of billions of dollars.
As the Register expands, so too does the scope of claims it accepts. What began as a mechanism for documenting physical destruction increasingly encompasses business losses, infrastructure damage, personal injuries, and other categories of alleged harm. For Moscow, this evolution reinforces concerns that the Register is not merely an archival tool but part of a broader effort to establish future financial claims against the Russian state.
Why Russia Considers the Mechanism Illegitimate
Russia’s objections are both political and legal. Russian officials argue that the Register was created without the participation of one of the principal parties to the conflict and therefore lacks the neutrality required of a genuinely international mechanism. In Moscow’s view, the initiative effectively presumes Russian liability before any internationally recognized judicial process has taken place.
Russian authorities maintain that responsibility for wartime damages can only be determined through internationally accepted legal procedures, negotiated agreements, or decisions by competent judicial bodies operating with the participation of all relevant parties. Since the Register possesses none of these characteristics, Moscow argues that it cannot legitimately serve as the basis for legally binding compensation claims.
The Russian government further contends that the Register reverses the normal legal process by first establishing a framework for collecting compensation claims and only later attempting to construct legal justification for enforcement. According to this argument, the mechanism is less about impartial legal assessment and more about creating a political narrative that could subsequently be used to support financial measures against Russia.
Particularly significant for Moscow is the issue of sovereign immunity. For decades, sovereign immunity has been regarded as one of the fundamental principles of international law. Under this principle, state assets—especially central bank reserves—enjoy special protections against seizure by foreign governments. Russian officials argue that attempts to confiscate sovereign assets would directly undermine this principle and establish a dangerous precedent with consequences extending far beyond the current conflict.
Even within Western legal circles, concerns have been raised regarding the distinction between freezing assets and permanently confiscating them. While asset freezes have long been used as sanctions tools, outright confiscation represents a far more radical step. Many legal scholars and financial experts have warned that such actions could weaken protections traditionally afforded to sovereign property and create uncertainty within the international financial system.
The Frozen Assets Debate
The issue of frozen Russian assets has become one of the most contentious subjects in international finance. Since 2022, Western governments have immobilized hundreds of billions of dollars in Russian sovereign reserves and other Russian-owned assets held within their jurisdictions. A substantial portion of these funds consists of reserves belonging to the Central Bank of Russia.
Although most Western governments have thus far refrained from direct confiscation, discussions continue regarding possible mechanisms for using Russian assets to finance Ukraine’s reconstruction. Some proposals focus on transferring profits generated by frozen assets, while others envision more far-reaching measures involving the assets themselves.
For Moscow, however, the distinction between freezing and confiscation is crucial. Freezing assets may be presented as a temporary measure pending future political developments. Confiscation, by contrast, constitutes permanent deprivation of ownership. Russian officials argue that such a step would amount to expropriation and would fundamentally violate established principles governing state property and sovereign immunity.
Beyond the legal arguments, Moscow warns of broader systemic consequences. Russian officials frequently argue that confiscation would undermine confidence in Western financial institutions and accelerate efforts by many countries to diversify reserves away from Western jurisdictions. If sovereign assets can be permanently seized on political grounds, critics argue, governments around the world may begin to question the security of maintaining reserves within the existing Western-dominated financial architecture.
This concern is not limited to Russia. Even some Western policymakers have acknowledged that confiscation could create precedents whose long-term implications remain difficult to predict. The global financial system has traditionally relied upon confidence that sovereign reserves would remain protected regardless of geopolitical disputes. Any departure from that principle could have far-reaching consequences.
China, Iran, and the Concerns of Russia’s Partners
Russia’s position is reinforced by the fact that concerns about asset confiscation are shared by a number of countries that maintain close relations with Moscow or adopt more neutral positions toward the conflict.
China has consistently expressed opposition to the confiscation of Russian sovereign assets. Chinese officials have repeatedly emphasized the importance of respecting international law, protecting sovereign property, and avoiding actions that could undermine confidence in the global financial system. Beijing has also voiced concerns that politically motivated seizures of state assets could weaken the credibility of international financial institutions and create risks for countries holding reserves abroad.
Russian and Chinese leaders have incorporated these concerns into joint political statements. In several bilateral declarations, both governments have criticized attempts to confiscate sovereign assets and stressed the importance of respecting state immunity and property rights. While China has not formally endorsed every aspect of Russia’s position on the conflict, it has consistently opposed measures that could erode legal protections for state-owned assets.
Iran has taken a similar stance. Joint Russian-Iranian declarations addressing sanctions policy have emphasized opposition to the freezing, seizure, or confiscation of state and private property under unilateral coercive measures. Tehran shares Moscow’s concern that weakening sovereign immunity could create precedents that may eventually be applied against other states outside the Western alliance system.
Beyond China and Iran, concerns have emerged across parts of the Global South. Governments in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America are closely watching the debate because it raises broader questions about the safety of their own sovereign reserves. For many of these countries, the issue is not primarily about Russia or Ukraine. Rather, it concerns whether state assets held abroad can remain protected from political disputes and geopolitical confrontations.
From Moscow’s perspective, this wider concern demonstrates that the debate extends beyond a bilateral dispute between Russia and Ukraine. Russian officials increasingly frame the issue as a test case for the future of sovereign immunity, state property protections, and the stability of the international financial system as a whole.
A Broader Struggle Over the International Order
The controversy surrounding the Register of Damage reflects deeper changes in the international system. Historically, questions of reparations and compensation were typically addressed through peace treaties, negotiated settlements, or internationally recognized judicial mechanisms. Today, however, competing political blocs increasingly seek to establish new institutions and legal frameworks that reflect their own interpretations of legitimacy and justice.
For Western governments, the Register represents an effort to establish accountability and preserve evidence for future compensation claims. For Russia, it symbolizes what Moscow views as the growing politicization of international law and the emergence of mechanisms designed by one group of states to impose obligations on another.
The dispute therefore concerns much more than financial compensation. It reflects competing visions of who has the authority to define legal responsibility, interpret international law, and shape the rules governing international relations in an increasingly fragmented world.
An Issue with Global Consequences
Whether the Register eventually develops into a fully operational compensation mechanism remains uncertain. Significant legal, political, and practical obstacles remain before any system of large-scale reparations could be implemented.
What is already clear, however, is that Russia will not recognize the legitimacy of either the Register or any future compensation decisions derived from it. Moscow regards such initiatives as politically motivated, legally questionable, and incompatible with established principles of sovereign immunity and state property protection.
As a result, the debate over the Register of Damage is likely to continue long after active hostilities eventually end. Its outcome will influence not only discussions about Ukraine’s reconstruction but also broader questions concerning sovereign immunity, property rights, reserve security, and the future architecture of international finance. In this sense, the dispute is no longer simply about compensation for wartime damage. It has become part of a much larger struggle over the rules that will govern the international legal and financial order in the decades ahead.
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