There are obvious external similarities between the two political crises in the Bolivarian Republic. Both were caused by disagreement with the official results of the presidential election among some Venezuelan citizens, who, in conditions of a poorly developed political culture and social polarization, prefer to express disagreement by taking to the streets. The current mass demonstrations, clashes with the police, and the growing list of victims are in many ways reminiscent of the events of five years ago. As in 2019, the Venezuelan opposition refused to recognize the official results of the elections, declaring them fraudulent and presenting their own protocols. According to these data, Edmundo González received the majority of votes (67%), while Nicolás Maduro received only 30% of the votes. Based on their own calculations, the opposition, led by María Machado, declared González the real winner of the election.
In 2024, however, the Venezuelan opposition has no influence or control over any of the branches of government in the country, as was the case with the National Assembly in 2019, the legitimately elected parliament that served as a key pillar for resisting the actions of the government of Nicolás Maduro. Now the opposition forces are deprived of real levers of influence on the situation, except for fueling the discontent of the “streets”. This is well understood by the country’s authorities, whose reaction to the destabilizing actions of the opposition turned out to be significantly tougher and more consistent than in 2019. This can be seen already at the level of rhetoric: during one of the rallies, the country’s president openly stated that there would be “No forgiveness this time” for those who violate the law and participate in anti-government protests, the Venezuelan leader also urged citizens of the country to report protesters against the official election results using a specially developed VenApp application.
In contrast to the winter—spring 2019 confrontation, the public activity of opposition politicians has significantly decreased. Thus, María Machado appeared in public only twice, on August 3 and 17, explaining that she was hiding from persecution by the authorities. Nicolás Maduro’s recent opponent in the July elections disappeared from the public space altogether after the publication of the official results, and in early September it became known about his presence in Spain, whose authorities officially granted Edmundo González political asylum. The former presidential candidate’s departure was preceded by the issuance of an arrest warrant after González failed to appear three times to testify for an investigation into election fraud. Thus, it can be assumed that the Maduro government has demonstrated its willingness to control the opposition at a higher level, both at the grassroots level and in the case of its leaders.
From this precarious domestic political situation of the Venezuelan opposition and the growing pressure on it from the authorities, a second significant difference between the two crises arises, related to the international reaction to the election results. During the events of 2019 and 2024, the United States and its allies expressed their disagreement with the official results and harsh criticism of Caracas. At the same time, during the first crisis, the most important factor in the escalation was the official recognition of Juan Guaidó as the Venezuelan President by 59 states at once, including the United States, Brazil, Argentina and 28 EU member states. In 2024, this list has been drastically reduced: only the authorities of Panama and Ecuador, as well as the European Parliament, officially declared González legitimate president in a resolution dated September 19 (adopted by 309 votes in favor, 201 against, with 12 abstentions).
Three more Latin American states (Argentina, Costa Rica and Uruguay) named González the winner of the elections, without confirming the legitimacy of his status as president. The vast majority of countries that had previously recognized Guaidó as President limited themselves to criticizing the opaque electoral process and calling for the publication of available data on the vote count. The reaction of the Biden administration is particularly revealing: thus, during a speech on August 1, 2024, the US Secretary of State Antony Blinken expressed doubts about the reliability of the results of the vote, called for peace talks, but refused to name Edmundo González as the elected president. In turn, the list of states that recognized the legitimacy of Nicolás Maduro remained almost the same: Russia, China, Iran, Turkey, Syria and North Korea, as well as Latin American countries ideologically close to Venezuela, represented by Nicaragua, Cuba and Bolivia, which Honduras also joined in 2024.
Five years after the events of 2019, there is a clear decline in the international community’s interest in the domestic political battles in Venezuela, as the attention of the United States and its allies is occupied by other, more significant subjects of world politics. This obviously plays into the hands of Nicolás Maduro. In addition, the unfortunate experience of recognizing Juan Guaidó as President, who has never been able to achieve political success, warns Western elites against hasty steps. Keeping the current administration in power in the country for the coming years remains an uncontested scenario, which even the most ardent opponents of the Maduro regime have to reckon with.
Despite the fact that the second political crisis in Venezuela formally continues more than a month and a half after the publication of the results of the July vote, domestic and foreign policy circumstances allow us to formulate interim conclusions about the course of the crisis and its outcome. The primary and most important circumstance is the obvious strengthening of the position of the current President of the country, Nicolás Maduro, who plans to remain in power until 2030. This was facilitated by the experience of overcoming and coping with the consequences of the 2019 crisis, as well as the relatively favorable foreign economic environment, which allowed for an increase in Venezuelan oil exports and an improvement in the socio-economic situation in the country. The acquired political experience and the gradual restoration of the country’s economy provided Nicolás Maduro with a sufficient level of popular support, provided effective tools for combating opponents inside and outside the country on the eve of the elections.
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