The 2025 U.S.–Venezuela Confrontation (I)

US-Venezuela-conflict

In 2025, tensions between the United States and Venezuela reached their highest level in years, driven by a combination of geopolitical ambition, domestic political calculations, and regional instability. What began as a U.S. rhetorical “crusade” against Latin American drug trafficking rapidly evolved into something that resembles preparations for a military operation against Venezuela. As American naval forces accumulate in the Caribbean, and as Washington adopts increasingly uncompromising language toward Caracas, questions multiply: What does the United States seek to achieve? How far is Washington willing to push this confrontation? And how might the Venezuelan government, the region, and major global powers respond?

The evolving crisis reveals not only the dynamics of U.S. foreign policy, but also the vulnerabilities of regional security systems in Latin America. It exposes the fragility of Venezuelan stability, the limits of U.S. strategic power projection, and the potential for unintended conflict escalation. At the same time, the situation illustrates how domestic political pressures in Washington can feed into aggressive foreign policy choices, and how Latin America, once again, finds itself in the middle of a geopolitical contest involving global powers.

Signals That Go Beyond Counter-Narcotics

Although Washington publicly frames its regional activity as part of an intensified campaign against drug trafficking, U.S. military behavior points in a different direction. The U.S. share of Venezuela’s contribution to regional drug flows is minimal – around 5% of Latin American narcotrafficking activity, according to widely cited international assessments. Yet the Pentagon has assembled a powerful naval presence in the Caribbean: multiple vessels already deployed there have been reinforced by an aircraft carrier. Reconnaissance flights near Venezuelan waters have become frequent, and American special forces personnel in Puerto Rico have increased.

Beyond passive deployments, active engagements have taken place. U.S. forces have destroyed dozens of boats and small craft – claimed to belong to drug traffickers – in international waters. The number of fatalities associated with these interdictions has risen significantly. While Washington insists on their legality and necessity, the scale and intensity of these operations exceed normal counter-narcotics missions.

Counter-drug operations rarely require aircraft carriers, large naval groups, and strategic bombers. Instead, both Venezuelan authorities and many independent observers believe that these military preparations are directed not at multinational criminal organizations, but at Venezuela’s political leadership, whose legitimacy Washington has refused to recognize for years. This belief is reinforced by the deteriorating political relationship between the two countries, and by rising tensions linked to U.S. sanctions, Venezuelan alliances with Russia and China, and the broader struggle for influence in the Caribbean Basin.

Washington’s Strategic Objectives: Politics Over Oil

Although Venezuela possesses some of the world’s largest hydrocarbon reserves, the U.S. push toward confrontation in 2025 appears to be driven far more by geopolitical and ideological considerations than by energy interests. Contrary to common assumptions, Venezuelan oil – especially its extra-heavy varieties – is not optimally suited for many U.S. refineries. Years of mismanagement and sanctions have sharply reduced Venezuela’s production capacity, meaning that a rapid return to the high output levels of previous decades would require tens of billions of dollars in new investment – an effort no major international actor is currently ready to undertake.

Thus, oil is not the immediate priority. Rather, Washington seeks to consolidate control over the Caribbean, manage migration flows, and stabilize its “near abroad” – which it considers crucial for regional security. Venezuela’s political alignment with Russia, China, and Iran – combined with its harsh anti-U.S. rhetoric – makes it a strategic irritant for Washington. A more predictable, pro-U.S. government in Caracas would greatly ease American influence in the region and remove a longstanding geopolitical obstacle.

Domestic political considerations compound these strategic motivations. With declining popularity and internal divisions within his political coalition, the U.S. president faces the need to energize supporters. A forceful posture against a government labeled “authoritarian” or “hostile” provides an opportunity to project strength and unity. It also serves to reassure hawkish factions within the administration and the broader political base that the White House remains committed to a muscular foreign policy.

Yet not all factions in Washington support a military approach. While senior figures within the administration advocate for intensified pressure and even the possibility of a strike, the opposition has attempted – unsuccessfully – to limit the president’s ability to attack Venezuela without congressional authorization. Critics of a military action are less concerned with defending the Venezuelan government than with the risk of costly international backlash, potential civilian casualties, and the political consequences that could ensue if American troops were killed.

Thus, Washington’s political establishment is fractured. Supporters of a strike see Venezuela as a test of resolve: a demonstration that the United States remains the dominant power in the Western Hemisphere. Opponents warn that such an operation could trigger regional destabilization, damage U.S. credibility, and create a prolonged conflict with unforeseeable consequences.

Venezuelan Preparations: A Mix of Mobilization and Diplomacy

Caracas treats the threat of U.S. military action as real and immediate. The government has mobilized the population through Bolivarian militia structures and expanded its territorial defense network. More than 25,000 soldiers have been deployed to border regions, supplementing a national army of roughly 128,000 personnel. Venezuela also possesses substantial quantities of modern Russian-made military equipment. However, the actual operational readiness of this hardware is questionable, and the Venezuelan armed forces have had limited real combat experience in recent years.

Understanding the asymmetry of power, Venezuela has simultaneously sought diplomatic solutions. The government has appealed to the United Nations and to regional organizations, urging them to help de-escalate the confrontation and prevent war. Interestingly, most of the Venezuelan opposition – excluding a few hardline figures – also rejects the idea of a U.S. military intervention. Public opinion appears overwhelmingly against foreign involvement: only a small fraction of Venezuelans support sanctions or external military action.

Caracas insists on dialogue, but Washington increasingly signals that negotiations are pointless or irrelevant. This divergence creates a dangerous scenario: a closed diplomatic door, rising military activity, and a climate in which misinterpretations or accidental incidents could rapidly escalate into armed conflict.

to be continued

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