When Iran’s first vice-president, Mohammad Reza Aref, travelled to Moscow for the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation’s (SCO) prime ministers’ meeting, it came at a moment of renewed pressure on Tehran. The snapback mechanism has been reactivated, Western sanctions discussions are re-intensifying, and the regional environment remains unsettled after the recent twelve-day conflict between Iran and Israel. Yet the trip conveyed something other than diplomatic defensiveness. It offered a window into how Iran is quietly testing the resilience of Asia’s emerging economic frameworks many shaped by China to see whether they can absorb geopolitical shocks without fragmenting.
The SCO meeting illustrated how the organisation has evolved beyond its security origins. In recent years, the bloc has expanded its work on economic coordination, supply-chain security, digital connectivity and transport integration. These shifts reflect a broader transformation across Eurasia, one strongly influenced by China’s long-term commercial planning. For Iran, which joined the SCO last year, this evolution is precisely what makes the organisation useful: it provides economic anchors at a time when Tehran’s traditional channels remain vulnerable to legal and financial volatility.
Aref’s presence in Moscow coincided with the consolidation of China-linked trade corridors across the continent. The Belt and Road Initiative has already transformed flows between China, Central Asia, Russia and South Asia. At the same time, the expansion of BRICS and the gradual strengthening of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) have created overlapping networks of commerce, standards and payment systems that no longer revolve exclusively around the US dollar. Iran’s interest in these groupings is pragmatic, not ideological. Its priority is securing predictable markets, stable transport routes and financial channels insulated from sudden regulatory disruptions.
Against this backdrop, the Moscow visit functioned as a real-time stress test: could these Asian structures continue operating smoothly as Western pressure on Iran intensifies? The initial signals were cautiously encouraging. Discussions on completing the Rasht–Astara railway, accelerating the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC) and improving interoperability between national payment systems suggest that both Russia and Iran are prioritising long-term economic integration. These projects align with China’s broader approach to continental connectivity reducing exposure to maritime choke points and building redundancy into supply chains.
China’s central role in this economic architecture is both obvious and understated. Beijing rarely frames its Eurasian initiatives in geopolitical terms; its focus is on securing trade corridors, protecting industrial ecosystems and ensuring reliable access to markets. From that vantage point, Iran’s deeper integration into regional frameworks reinforces China’s own structural objectives: maintaining diversified land routes, ensuring energy stability and minimising the risks of single-point failures in cross-continental commerce.
The timing of Aref’s trip also intersects with China’s strategic pressures in the Asia-Pacific. As US-led alliances intensify, Beijing has a clear incentive to strengthen continental economic links that can offset vulnerabilities in the maritime domain. Iran’s geography straddling Central Asia, the Middle East and access routes to Europe gives it an outsized role in the resilience of Eurasian transport networks. If supported by sustained investment and stable policy implementation, Iran could become an important complement to China’s westward connectivity strategies.
Notably, Tehran did not frame its Moscow engagement as an anti-Western signal. Iranian officials emphasised the economic character of the visit, an approach that resonates with many SCO and BRICS members that seek to avoid binary alignments. Most Asian economies including in Southeast Asia maintain substantial ties with the United States and Europe even as they deepen cooperation with China. For them, the appeal of these Eurasian initiatives lies in diversification: more transport corridors, more payment options, and reduced exposure to external shocks. Iran’s participation reinforces this trend without forcing political realignments.
The economic implications for Iran, however, are more urgent. If the INSTC becomes fully operational, the country could gain new revenue from logistics, warehousing and energy transit. Integration into Eurasia’s emerging digital payment systems could lower transaction costs and shield parts of the Iranian economy from sanctions-related volatility. Meanwhile, deeper ties direct and indirect to China’s industrial networks may open space for technological collaboration, though Iran’s ability to benefit meaningfully will depend on domestic reform and regulatory clarity.
For China and Russia, Iran’s integration offers complementary benefits. China gains another stable land link along its westward commercial routes, while Russia reshaping its trade orientation amid its own tensions with the West secures additional access points and diversified transit paths. Central Asian states, too, stand to benefit from expanded connectivity, provided that infrastructure upgrades and coordinated border regimes keep pace with rising demand.
Aref’s Moscow visit also holds relevance for Southeast Asia, a region deeply intertwined with global supply chains. The more resilient and interconnected Eurasia’s land routes become, the less exposed Asian manufacturers are to disruptions in maritime chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz or the Red Sea. While Iran is geographically distant from ASEAN, its integration into continental networks contributes to the redundancy and flexibility that large Asian exporters increasingly depend on.
Ultimately, Iran’s participation in the Moscow meeting highlighted a shift in strategy: rather than seeking exclusive alliances, Tehran is embedding itself into a mosaic of Asian institutions SCO, BRICS and the EAEU each offering different channels for engagement. This multi-layered approach spreads risk and increases strategic optionality at a time when global governance is fragmenting. It also mirrors the broader trend in Asia, where states are constructing overlapping economic architectures that do not require political uniformity.
In this sense, Aref’s visit served less as a diplomatic gesture and more as a demonstration of how Asia’s emerging economic architecture can be stress-tested under geopolitical pressure.
As Iran navigates an increasingly turbulent global landscape, its success may hinge on how effectively it embeds itself within these Asian networks. For China and the broader region, the durability of Eurasia’s economic architecture will depend on whether it can accommodate such stress tests without fracturing. Aref’s trip to Moscow was one such test, and the results while preliminary point toward a slow but steady deepening of regional interdependence.
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