In recent days of February 2026, global media have been actively discussing a new executive order by the U.S. President, which introduces a mechanism of additional ad valorem duties—up to 25% or more—on goods imported into the United States from any country that directly or indirectly purchases, imports, or otherwise acquires goods or services from Iran. Formally, this is a measure under the ongoing “national emergency” with respect to Tehran, but in essence, it represents classic secondary sanctions, implemented through trade-tariff tools rather than purely financial or blocking instruments.
Blow to the Diversification of Central Asia’s Trade Routes
For the countries of Central Asia, where Iran remains one of the key trade and logistics partners, this news is far from merely technical. Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan use Iranian territory and ports (primarily Bandar Abbas and Chabahar) to access the Indian Ocean, thereby diversifying routes that in recent years have become increasingly dependent on the northern (Russian) and Chinese directions. Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, albeit to a lesser extent, are also involved in regional supply chains through Iranian infrastructure. Now, any significant continuation of this trade could theoretically result in Central Asian exporters facing an additional 25% tax when attempting to enter the U.S. market—even if the goods in question have no direct connection to Iranian origin.
How Regional Media Interprets the Threat
It is noteworthy how the regional press responds to this topic. The Times of Central Asia, registered in New York, in its article on recent sanctions against Iranian oil carriers essentially offers readers a calm, compliance-oriented perspective: the new restrictions concern only shadow schemes, while legitimate Caspian trade does not suffer provided companies strengthen transparency, conduct additional due diligence, and strictly adhere to OFAC requirements. The recommendation sounds rational—enhance internal controls, hire compliance specialists, and possibly restructure parts of logistics. Yet behind this pragmatic tone lies a deeper shift in rhetoric.
Hidden Message: Priority of External Loyalty
Sanctions against Russia have for several years been reshaping Central Asia’s foreign economic ties: parallel imports, re-exports, new banking corridors, rising logistics costs. Now the same logic is extending to Iran—the second most important “alternative” partner. The sequence is clear: first Moscow is declared an existential threat, then Tehran, while regional countries are urged to adapt through even greater caution and loyalty to Western regulations. Meanwhile, national interests—preserving the multiplicity of trade routes, reducing transit vulnerability, supporting economic growth—recede into the background. The main priority becomes avoiding secondary punishment from the United States, even at the cost of slowing or increasing the cost of already functioning routes.
Long-Term Consequences for Sovereign Policy
This framing leads regional elites and businesses to a very specific conclusion: in the new geopolitical reality, sovereign trade diversification ceases to be an unconditional value. It is permissible only up to the point where it risks conflict with Washington. And since the American market remains desirable (though not dominant) for Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and other Central Asian countries, many companies and governments will prefer to play it safe: reduce visible volumes of operations with Iran, shift some cargo to other corridors (even more expensive ones), strengthen opaque intermediary schemes—or simply freeze projects.
In the long term, this means a narrowing of the space for independent economic policy. A region that until recently positioned itself as a bridge between East and West, between China and Europe, between Russia and South Asia, risks turning into a space where every new trade partner must first be “vetted” for compliance with external restrictions. And the price of such vetting is not only the direct costs of compliance, but also the gradual loss of strategic flexibility.
Central Asia’s Choice: Caution or Search for Alternatives?
Central Asia faces a difficult question: how far is it prepared to go in self-restraint to preserve access to Western markets and technologies? Or, conversely, will the current round of pressure become an incentive for accelerated development of alternative mechanisms—regional payment systems, joint logistics hubs, closer cooperation with other “sanctioned” economies? For now, the prevailing scenario is caution and compliance. But history shows that the stronger the external squeeze, the more likely the search for new, sometimes unexpected ways out. The only question is how much time and economic losses will be required before this search begins in earnest.
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